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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate some aspects of essentialist 
beliefs about other people. The empirical part of the thesis is constituted by four 
investigations. Study 1 and 2 built on some earlier work on essentialist beliefs 
about social categories, and supported previous findings about the dimensions of 
Natural Kind and Entitativity that underlie the concept of essentialism in the 
social world (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst 2000, which will be subsequently 
referenced as Haslam et al., 2000). Additionally, Study 1’s results raised the 
hypothesis that cultural contexts may determine different perceptions of social 
groups: in the study the Informativeness measure did not load under Entitativity 
and was negative for Natural-Kind-ness, showing a tendency for subjects from 
multicultural contexts to see natural categories as not informative of individuals.  
Analysis of the literature highlighted the need for further investigation 
exploring the role of social contexts in the way categories are essentialised and 
stimulated hypotheses about the occurrence of cross-cultural differences. Study 
2, based on an Italian sample in Sardinia, tested this hypothesis further 
confirming Haslam et al.’s (2000) findings, and supported the theory that some 
differences in essentialist beliefs may be due to cultural effects. This finding 
showed that in social categorisation processes subjects from different social 
contexts may not rely on the same factors. For instance, while subjects from 
traditional contexts perceive biological aspects as informative of an individual’s 
makeup, people from less traditional contexts regard those aspects as not 
informative. 
Also, the role of a person’s own identification with social categories was 
addressed by the two studies and the hypothesis that one’s own categories are 
- 20 - 
seen as more essential received some support in both studies, particularly in 
relation to Natural Kind-ness. There is a tendency for individuals to “naturalise” 
personal social categories and this same tendency was also observed to be 
employed for the categorisation of minority groups in both Study 1 and 2.  
Interestingly, the analysis of Study 1’s data revealed that the structure of 
individual personal styles in the way individuals essentialise categories also 
corresponded to dimensions of Entitativity and Natural-Kind-ness. Personal 
styles vary along these two dimensions and may result in an individual being 
extreme in both dimensions, extreme in either one or the other dimension, or in 
none of them. This result was tested further in Study 3, whose purpose was to 
design a parsimonious measurement of essentialist beliefs and to explore 
individual styles in different samples of subjects, such as normally developing 
individuals and Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects. There was evidence for 
reliable individual differences in essentialising. There was little evidence of 
group differences in this study although an increase in the rating’s extremeness 
was observed in the Autism Spectrum Disorder sample.  
Finally, Study 4 tackled essentialism from the perspective of social 
categorisation, and considered some variables that previous research defined as 
fundamental in person construal: facial stimuli and verbal information (e.g., 
Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Townsend et al., 2000; Macrae et al., 2005). The 
study provided evidence for the importance of verbal information in relation to 
the behavioural response of a target individual in a social interaction scenario, 
but no significant effect was observed in relation to facial stimuli. This thesis 
contributes new evidence to the discussions of psychological essentialism 
especially for the role of social contexts and category membership, and for 
- 21 - 
findings about cognitive styles of essentialism. Future directions for research on 
the role of social contexts in essentialist beliefs about other people, and on the 
effect of personal category membership in essentialism are suggested. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
Psychological Essentialism set in context 
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1.1. Overall Summary and outline of the thesis 
My primary purpose in writing this thesis is to approach the 
understanding of psychological essentialism from different angles. My first point 
of interest has been the analysis of whether essentialist beliefs can be described 
as a unitary phenomenon that presents cross-cultural commonalities (Bloch, 
Solomon, & Carey, 2001; Diesendruck, 2001; Gil-White, 2001). This question 
was investigated in the first two empirical studies, where participants were 
selected from two profoundly different environments (the multi-cultural London 
society and the mono-cultural Sardinian society).  
Empirical evidence shows that essentialism represents a mechanism that 
despite some dissimilarities in the perception of certain categories (Demoulin, 
Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Haslam et al., 2000; Kalish, 2002), despite the 
occurrence of cross-cultural differences (Lockhart et al., 2009), and despite some 
historical peculiarities (Hirschfeld, 1996) has been observed in different cultures 
(Bloom & Gelman, 2008).  
The first two investigations conducted for this doctoral thesis confirmed 
this position and showed the presence of some differences between the multi-
cultural London society and the mono-cultural Sardinian society. Also, some 
differences in individuals’ cognitive styles between Anglophone and 
Mediterranean cultures had been previously highlighted (Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaars, 1993). Another aim of this work was the investigation of the extent 
to which essentialist beliefs are affected by personal category membership, and 
whether one’s own categories would be more naturalised than other categories. 
Social identity has been defined as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group -
- 26 - 
- or groups -- together with the value or emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1981; p. 255). There is broad agreement in the literature 
about the role that group or category membership (the two terms will be used 
interchangeably in this thesis) plays in an individual’s self-identity, and the belief 
that personal identity is strongly influenced by group membership (Castano et 
al., 2002; p. 336) represents the main principle of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The role that category membership plays in 
essentialist beliefs was investigated in investigation 2 of Study 1 and Study 2 in 
the contexts of London and Sardinia.  
Evidence that psychological essentialism is universally observed across 
different cultures (Bloom & Gelman, 2008) raised the possibility of seeing 
whether a measurement of essentialism could be designed and reliably utilised in 
the investigation of an array of essentialist beliefs, such as beliefs in the 
personality of individuals, in their religious attitudes, or in the social class they 
belong to. This investigation is the focus of study 3, which represents a first step 
into the design of a measurement of essentialist beliefs and brings some 
potentialities for further research.  
Also, given the lack of research other than with normally developing 
subjects, a further investigation was run on a sample of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder subjects. This aspect is very new to the essentialist theory and can 
provide some insights into the understanding of how differences in processing 
the physical and social world in Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects (Happé, 
1999) may lead to differences in the essentialist beliefs that an individual 
endorses.  
Another subject of investigation has been social categorisation, with a 
- 27 - 
focus on beliefs about the understanding of the personality of other individuals. 
Investigation of personality characteristics within an essentialist framework has 
not been very popular so far. Scholarship shows that essentialist beliefs are 
preferentially held for particular personality traits, and that these beliefs are 
organised under a different structure than the two-dimensional structure 
composed of Natural Kind and Entitativity observed for beliefs about social 
categories (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004).  
Study 4, which is presented in Chapter 6, investigated the understanding 
of a target individual’s personality traits through the extremeness of the ratings 
and the perceived confidence of the participants in their judgments in two 
different conditions. In the first condition the participants were presented with a 
neutral or a behavioural story and a photograph of a target person, and in the 
second condition they were presented with a neutral and a behavioural story of a 
target person without a photograph. 
This thesis is composed of 7 chapters. Chapter 1 proposes a journey 
through the definition of the concept of essence in philosophical contexts, of 
psychological essentialism, and of the principle terms encountered along the 
way. In Chapter 1, the implications of psychological essentialism in psychology, 
and particularly in Cognitive and Social Psychology are discussed. The first part 
of the chapter introduces the discussion about theoretical influences in the 
elaboration of an essentialist approach to the physical world in western cultures. 
The second part of the chapter provides the reader with the theoretical 
background of the terms that occur in the field of psychological essentialism, and 
of its contexts and functions in cognitive representations. This part of the chapter 
also focuses on categorisation, which is the study of how individuals make sense 
- 28 - 
of the world, form concepts, and classify entities into classes and domains. There 
are several different theories in the field of categorisation, and the essentialist 
view is one of them. The essentialist view proposes the attribution of essences as 
a way to classify entities, and particularly biological kinds. This section 
introduces the main theories of categorisation through five sub-sections, and 
outlines the core ideas and differences for each of them. Finally, the last section 
of the chapter talks about the transformation paradigm. The role of changes and 
mutation in categorisation and essentialist beliefs is discussed. 
Chapter 2 introduces some of the most relevant work conducted on 
psychological essentialism: essentialism in early life, the structure of essentialist 
beliefs about social categories, the phenomenon of humanisation, and 
essentialism and social categorisation. Also, a last section of the chapter provides 
empirical evidence into the understanding of cultural differences in human 
cognition. This section aims at supporting the conceptual framework within 
which the cross-cultural investigations of this thesis have been carried out as part 
of the work into the understanding of how social contexts affect essentialist 
beliefs. The section is organised in four sub-sections that outline different fields 
of research and introduces the studies presented in Chapter 3 and 4.  
The following four chapters present the empirical work carried out for 
this doctoral thesis, and are organised as individual papers with their own 
introduction and discussion of the results. Chapter 3 describes the first empirical 
investigation. The aim of Study 1 was to investigate essentialist beliefs about 
social categories. The study built on some former work run by Haslam et al. 
(2000) in the USA, which recruited a sample of participants from a conservative 
college. Haslam et al. (2000) highlighted a two-factor structure in the 
- 29 - 
explanation of essentialist beliefs, composed of the two dimensions of Natural 
Kind and Entitativity. My purpose was to replicate this study looking at cross-
cultural differences in the occurrence of the two-factor explanation of essentialist 
beliefs, and at specific changes in essentialist beliefs about some social 
categories. Study 1 tested a sample of students recruited from a number of 
Universities in London. 
Also, it explored individual category membership in order to broaden 
understanding of the role that membership plays on essentialist beliefs about 
one’s own categories and others-categories. This investigation is presented in the 
second part of Chapter 3, and a discussion of the findings for the two 
investigations is presented separately after the results section.  
Chapter 4 outlines the second empirical investigation conducted for this 
thesis. Study 2 used the same design as Study 1 and was run on a sample of 
participants recruited from a different socio-cultural context. For this study, 
participants were sampled from the traditional and mono-cultural society of 
Sardinia, which is an Italian island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea. 
Previous evidence supports the occurrence of some differences in cognitive 
styles between Anglophone and Mediterranean cultures (Hampden-Turner & 
Trompenaars, 1993).  
Furthermore, it is thought that the effect of multiculturalism should lead 
to a greater openness towards certain social categories and to a lower level of 
ingroup identification. This hypothesis is considered controversial and seems to 
apply to some groups more than others, for example multiculturalism may 
represent a threat to big majority groups that dislike the fact that minority groups 
maintain their own customs (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Verkuyten & Thijs, 
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1999).  
However, multiculturalism may also facilitate the positive evaluation of 
outgroups (see Verkuyten, 2005). In light of this evidence, I wanted to explore 
the nature of these differences further. My hypothesis was that the Sardinian 
population would produce stronger essentialist beliefs towards certain social 
categories as an effect of monoculturalism. As for the London sample, Sardinian 
participants were also tested on the self-categorisation scale.  
The hypothesis for this investigation was that people from a less open and 
more traditional context would rate their own categories as more essentialist than 
people from a more open and less traditional environment. Similarly to Chapter 
3, the findings for the two parts of the investigation are presented separately. A 
the end of Chapter 4 the findings of Study 1 (London sample) and Study 2 
(Sardinian sample) for both the investigation on essentialist beliefs about social 
categories and the self-categorisation investigation will be jointly discussed and 
some conclusions will be drawn.  
Chapter 5 explores the implications of measuring essentialist beliefs and 
reports a study that made the first steps towards developing a measurement of 
essentialism based on Natural-Kind-ness and Entitativity measures. This 
measurement was further tested on a sample of Autism Spectrum Disorder 
subjects, who have been observed to present a “different mind” in relation to the 
solution of cognitive tasks and in social contexts (Happé, 1999). 
Chapter 6 reports a study that investigated beliefs of people about other 
individuals' personality traits through the presentation of some behavioural 
information and of visual stimuli. Two versions of the questionnaire were 
designed, and the subjects were tested on either the condition with or without 
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photographs. Each story was rated on two scales of which one concerned the 
personality traits of the target subject, and the other one the perceived confidence 
at rating those personality traits. Previous research had explored the implications 
of facial stimuli in impression making, showing that faces may influence 
people’s behaviour and attitudes (Rule & Ambady, 2011). Therefore, my 
hypothesis was that individuals would show higher confidence ratings for the 
behavioural story than for the neutral story and lower confidence ratings for the 
conditions without photographs.  
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings along with an evaluation of 
the work conducted in the thesis, and suggests further empirical developments 
and directions. 
1.2. The shaping of the concept of essentialism through history 
Essentialism refers to the belief that individuals, animals, and other 
entities have inner essences that are not likely to change over time. According to 
Gelman (2003), “essentialism is a pervasive, persistent reasoning bias that 
affects human categorisation in profound ways [.....], it is the result of several 
converging psychological capacities” (Gelman, 2003; p. 6). Similarly, Medin and 
Ortony (1989) insisted that the concept of psychological essentialism gravitates 
around the belief that core features are responsible for surface features, and this 
represents a fundamental heuristic that characterises our conceptual system. 
One of the first accounts of essences in the western hemisphere was 
made by Plato more than 2000 years ago (Mastin, 2008) who introduced a vision 
of reality as a compound of two entities: ontos -- or ideas, or ideals -- on the one 
hand, and phenomena on the other hand. Whereas ideas are perfect and 
immortal, phenomena are related with contingent factors such as matter, time, 
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and space, and are therefore imperfect, deceptive, and prone to decay and death. 
According to Plato, the two forms are accessible through different channels: 
ideas are experienced through thoughts, and phenomena through senses. In fact, 
if reality can be perceived through senses, the truth is perceived by intuition and 
reason, as he discussed in the Socratic dialog “Meno”.  
The ideals that Plato described reside in God’s design and purpose, and 
even though the material world strives for perfection, this can only be found in 
the original plan, or idea. This account also pervades some of the main 
monotheistic faiths and their teachings about the finiteness of the material world 
as opposed to the spiritual dimension. Plato argued that this dichotomy is 
embedded by human beings, whose body made of mortal substances encases a 
truly perfect divine ideal: the soul. The same concept is found in Christianity, 
Buddhism, and Hinduism. 
It is believed that some of the very finest pieces of art ever produced in 
history would have never come into being if the existentialist crisis between 
perfection and imperfection would have not torn at the heart of some sensitive 
souls. As a young boy, Michelangelo Buonarroti was deeply touched by 
Girolamo Savonarola’s sermons, whose condemnation of the material 
temptations in virtue of more spiritual aims from the pulpit of San Marco 
monastery in Florence in 1490 shook the foundation of the entire Catholic 
Church. The reading of Michelangelo’s artistic production emphasises the 
torment generated by his inner battle between purity and impurity and his 
personal interpretation of the platonic concepts of idea and matter, which are 
summarised by the finished over the unfinished best observed in his late 
sculptures. He himself used to say that his very own purpose was to set free the 
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idea that hides under the matter: 
“The greatest artist does not have any concept 
which a single piece of marble does not itself contain 
within its excess, though only 
a hand that obeys the intellect can discover it”.  
Michelangelo Buonarroti (see Girardi, 1967) 
It wasn’t until Aristotle that what Plato called idea was referred to as 
essence, and matter as its opposite. Whereas matter is purely accidental stuff that 
needs the essence in order to acquire a form and a purpose, essence is indeed 
what allows matter to become real, and they need each other in order to realise 
themselves. This concept was also expressed in Aristotle’s book known as Para 
Psyche, or De Anima, where the mind- or soul- is described as “the cause and 
principle” of the body, and which gives a purpose and a function to it. According 
to Aristotle’s account, essence is thus the opposite of accident and in Greek is 
defined as “the what it has to be”, or “the what it is”. 
Aristotle referred to the Ousía of individual things, which in English can 
be translated as being, or essence (Boeree, 2009). The ideas of Greek idealism 
were later spread within the Roman Empire through Plotinus under the theories 
of Neo-Platonism. Some accounts of essentialism are also found in Classical 
Humanism, which supported a view of human nature as unchangeable and 
eternal. In recent days, essentialism has been challenged by the Darwinian theory 
of the evolution of species: the unchanging nature of species suggested by 
essentialist accounts has been replaced by the modern scientific vision in which 
species change through time and their members might even not share essential 
properties (Atran, 1990). 
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This brief preface to essences in metaphysical terms introduces some of 
the main questions that researchers pose. It is the aim of Chapter 1 and 2 to 
explore psychological essentialism, and particularly what its approach in 
contemporary psychology and its role in people’s lives are. Essentialism has 
been a long term issue in philosophy and the humanistic disciplines throughout 
the centuries, which has attracted the attention of social and cognitive 
psychologists only a few decades ago. This chapter will define psychological 
essentialism and its role in the understanding of human cognition. 
1.3. A definition of the term 
Essentialism is the view that there are properties that are essential to 
objects, whereas some other properties that are not essential are called accidental 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2012). Therefore, an essence is what makes an object 
or individual what it is, and it is understood as the totality of the essential 
properties of an entity. The non-essential characteristics are believed to have no 
impact over membership to a category, whereas essential properties are often 
conceived on the basis of necessity, or what is necessary for them to belong to a 
certain category. According to this view, the action of alteration or removal of the 
essential properties would simply destroy the identity of the object. 
A conceptual difference exists between the positions that metaphysical 
essentialism and psychological essentialism defend, in fact while the former 
proposes the real existence of essences, the latter is concerned with the way 
human cognition works and the phenomena of essentialist tendencies in people’s 
reasoning.  
There are three points defining psychological essentialism in lay-people’s 
beliefs. The first one is concerned with the fact that some categories come from 
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nature and are not made by human beings. This view holds that certain 
categories are natural kinds, real (v. artificial), discovered (v. invented), and 
stable or unchanging (Gelman, 2003). The second point refers to the belief that 
there is a hidden feature which is responsible for things being the way they are 
and sharing similarities with the other members of a category. This feature is, in 
fact, the essence. Under the essentialist account, categorisation is produced 
independently from either outer or inner similarities. In fact, the typical features 
of creatures may depend on essences but do not directly determine categorisation 
(Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007). Finally, according to Gelman (2003), the 
perception of people is that there is a special connection between every-day 
words that refer to both natural kinds and social categories, and the anatomy of 
the real world. According to Gelman (2003), these three components are found in 
adults as well as pre-school children’s categories. 
In psychology, essentialism has remained fairly unexplored for decades 
until it attracted the attention of psychologists from different fields like Social, 
Cognitive, and Developmental Psychology. The term psychological essentialism 
was firstly mentioned by Allport in 1954 in his breakthrough work on prejudice, 
and later reintroduced by Medin and Ortony (1989) in their work on 
categorisation. A further development in the use of the term occurred when 
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) coined the term subjective essentialism to indicate that 
people make assumptions about another individual's disposition on the basis of 
his/her group membership. According to Yzerbyt et al. (1997), individuals are 
strongly influenced by the intrinsic properties of the group and tend to disregard 
the situational factors that collide with their view.  
The notion of psychological essentialism, as suggested by some authors 
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(Haslam, Ernst, & Rothschild, 2000; 2002) can be seen in terms of two related 
concepts: Natural Kind and Entitativity.  
The term Entitativity was introduced in 1958 by Campbell in order to 
indicate the perception of cohesion of social groups, and the extent to which they 
are seen as an entity. As per his definition, Entitativity is “the degree of having 
the nature of an entity, of having real existence” (Campbell, 1958; p. 17). 
Campbell suggested that the perception of groups’ Entitativity is enhanced by 
factors like fate, salience, similarity, and boundaries. Some other factors have 
been identified as being constitutive of Entitativity, in particular similarity, 
proximity, and common goals, although they are not been thought of as essential 
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hamilton et al., 1998).  
This view was later supported by Lickel et al. (2000) who observed that a 
combination of the factors mentioned above, along with some other factors such 
as interaction, similarity amongst the members, and the status of the group as 
perceived by its members, are linked to what they defined groupness. McGarty et 
al. (1995) are thought to be the first ones to have linked Entitativity to 
psychological essentialism, showing beliefs of homogeneity and distinctiveness 
in group Entitativity. 
On the other hand, the term Natural Kind was coined in philosophical 
contexts by Hume and mentioned in his “Treatise of Human Nature” (1739). 
Hume’s writing investigated the psychological basis of human nature and 
proposed a distinction between natural virtues -- which, according to him, 
correspond to qualities such as altruism, generosity, and humbleness -- and 
artificial virtues -- among which he indicated justice, loyalty, and chastity. An 
early account of the term Natural Kind in philosophy is also found in John 
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Venn’s writing “The logic of chance” (1866) and was used to indicate natural 
species, or classes, as found in zoology and botany. A natural kind entity is 
described as a physical object that is associated with a name and that is opposite 
to an artefact kind (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). As argued by some philosophers, 
the belief for natural kind entities is that they have inner properties that 
determine their outer appearance (Machery, 2005).  
The similarities shared by natural kind entities also determine what is 
called inductive potential, which makes people make inferences about Natural 
Kind entities (Kornblith, 1993; Kripke, 1980). 
Essence is hence understood as the cause for category members to share 
certain characteristics. In fact, as Estes (2003) argued, when individuals 
categorise entities under a given category, they understand those entities as 
owning the category essences (p. 200). The position of some authors about 
psychological essentialism (Gelman, 2003; Medin, 1989) is that it constitutes a 
cognitive bias that helps categorizing and that is proved to be used since a young 
age in children. Consequently, essentialism is not an explanation of the 
architecture of the world but is a tool that aids the understanding of the nature of 
entities and of their property of remaining unchanged through growth, 
reproduction, and physical changes. This claim supports the topic discussed in 
the next section: historical continuity.  
1.4. Historical continuity 
When Schopenhauer (2010) said that nothing that is essential ever 
changes he recalled the concept of historical continuity, which refers to both the 
stability of some entities in a changing world, and the stability of some 
fundamental aspects of human history, like human nature itself and of some geo-
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morphological factors in the environment (Gerschenkron, 1962). 
Gelman (2003) suggested that attention to historical continuity, which 
can be observed in adults as well as children, plays a role in the perception of 
identity and constitutes a mechanism rooting back to how the human cognitive 
system works. Historical continuity makes us recognise the identity of 
individuals and artefacts, and it can over-ride both the appearance and 
descriptive properties of an object when tracking identity (Kripke, 1980). Frazier 
and Gelman (2009) researched historical continuity in children and argued that it 
represents a fundamental aspect of human cognition, and that it is also linked to 
essentialism. In their work, pre-school children were observed to appreciate how 
the historical path of objects influences the perception of their meaning and 
identities (Frazier & Gelman, 2009). 
All of us have witnessed this mechanism at some point in our life. For 
example, a recent newspaper report described the auction of the teacup that Lady 
Gaga used during the after-tsunami tour in Japan, which was marked with her 
lipstick. The fact that the teacup’s bids reached the equivalent of £47K in 
Japanese currency suggests that people believed that it was marked with some of 
the true essence of the singer. Hood (2009) described a very similar mechanism 
by investigating the responses that individuals attribute to objects or places that 
have had a distinctive role in history. He observed a number of mechanisms such 
as the difficulty that landlords encounter in selling properties where an 
assassination was committed.  
Another mechanism that Hood (2009) investigated was the tendency of 
people to be attracted by real pieces of lived history, out of which auction houses 
make a fortune, or by objects that belonged to famous people. As in the example 
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with Lady Gaga's teacup, this mechanism seems to be stronger with objects that 
are believed to have been intimate with the celebrity, like clothing or underwear 
items worn by actresses, or music instruments played by musicians. In his book, 
Hood (2009) mentions the example of the clothes charity 
www.clothesoffourback.com, which sells items worn by celebrities at high-
profile events, like the Oscars night. As part of the service, a dry-cleaning of the 
items on sale is also offered by the company, but eventually dismissed by all 
buyers who show no interest in having their icons’ body essences cleaned off the 
precious fabrics. To this extent, the phenomenon of “essence contamination” is 
comparable to contagion by germs: whereas germs are small biological entities 
and essences are non-biological entities, the similarities are found in the quality 
of transferability to others, difficulty to get rid of, and invisibility (Gelman, 
2003). 
Likewise, the developmental psychology literature offers some examples 
of a similar mechanism in children. Usually, two and three-year old children own 
a blanket or soft toy with which they build a deep affection. Psychologists call 
this item the transitional object, which is understood as a transition tool for the 
child in the passage from sleeping with the mother to sleeping alone, when a 
bigger extent of emotional reassurance is needed. The transitional object is 
usually carried everywhere, and the main rule that distinguishes it is that the 
child does not want it to be replaced with any look-alike objects, or washed 
(Hood, 2009). Winnicott (1969), who first theorised the role of the transitional 
object, argued that it represents the mother's essence in the mother's absence. 
1.5. Functional origins and contexts of psychological essentialism 
The previous section defined the principle terms that relate to 
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essentialism in order to provide a solid ground for the theoretical discussion 
about the reasons why essentialism occurs. A considerable amount of debate that 
generates around essentialism concerns two particular aspects. On the one hand 
researchers argue that essentialism represents a conventional and infallible law 
under which all natural terms are associated with essences, when in fact the use 
of Natural Kind terms has been observed to vary and be contingent upon 
contextual factors (Braisby, Frank, & Hampton, 1996). On the other hand, 
although authors acknowledge that essences are purely a theoretical construct 
(Medin, 1989), essentialism seems to constitute a functional way of representing 
categories (Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1994).  
However, the tendency of attributing to psychological essentialism a 
function on the basis of its usefulness, rather than saying that people make use of 
it accidentally, or perhaps intuitively, has also been criticised. Barret (2001) 
argues that there is a conceptual gap between the argument of essentialism as a 
helpful strategy, and the argument that natural selection made it occur on the 
basis of the advantages it brings. He suggests that there should be more clarity 
about the kind of entities that evolution made us hold essentialist beliefs about, 
and the qualities of these entities that induce our essentialist reasoning.  
This clarification should provide some insightful material about the fact 
that essentialist thinking -- first evolved in a science-less world -- still occurs in a 
much changed world. Possibly, the reasons why essentialism has not yet been 
replaced reside in the many potentialities it bears, amongst which are its 
statistical validity and its deep connection to cultural conventions (Medin, 1989).  
Medin and Ortony (1989) consider psychological essentialism as the 
continuation of what metaphysical essentialism had previously argued. As 
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mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Aristotle suggested that a way of 
defining the identity of objects could be to describe their external appearance. 
However, different descriptions of an object could result in the attribution of 
many essences to the same object and would weaken the quality of uniqueness, 
which synthesizes the true nature of objects and which remains constant through 
external or internal changes (Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
In this conceptual gap generated by philosophical conceptualizations and 
by the human perception of objects and living things, psychological 
essentialism’s aim is not to demonstrate that essences exist, but to understand the 
cognitive mechanism that leads people to believe that there are essences. The 
study of essentialism aids understanding of the human’s mind and links the study 
of conceptual representation in cognitive psychology, the study of the way 
cognitive and emotional representation are shaped through social interaction in 
social psychology, and lay-people’s beliefs that things have essences. According 
to Barret (2001), people may see essentialism as an efficacious way of thinking 
about natural categories, and may learn to essentialise Natural Kind categories 
because this is helpful.  
This argument introduces to the question about whether all categories are 
essentialised, or if some categories are essentialised whereas some others are not. 
As Gelman (2003) argued, essentialism comes into play in Natural Kind domains 
such as living kinds (like human beings, plants, and animals), non-living 
biological kinds (like water, or minerals), and social categories (like race, gender, 
and age categories), but not in artefact kinds. On a different position, Bloom 
(1996) argued that historical origins constitute an essence for artefacts, and that 
an artefact’s identity is determined by the intention of its designer.  
- 42 - 
Bloom’s theory is based on Levinson’s (1993) position, which 
propounded that the historical intention behind a piece of art or an artefact 
determines what that object is and which category it belongs to. Hence, a broad 
variety of artefacts are distinguished on the basis of the brand that produces 
them: for example owing a pair of Louboutin shoes has recently become a status 
symbol for some women and despite other brands can be as good, they lack the 
essence attributed to Louboutin.  
Barret (2001) suggested that differences occur in the essentialisation of 
substances and whole organisms: substances lack a causal agent as well as the 
complex properties that are more typical of whole bodies. Also, when they are 
split into particles they do not go through a change of status as whole bodies do. 
On the contrary, whole organisms are characterised by a causal agent that 
determine a number of properties. They also have more complex features, like 
psychological and behavioural ones. Finally, they usually have purposes. For 
instance, we can think of the essence of some products, like Champagne, which 
is only produced in a particular region of France with a particular method. Also, 
in the natural world substances like gold and water (H2O) are attributed special 
essences. In view of this distinction, Barret (2001) defined “shallow” the 
essentialism referred to substances, and “deep” the essentialism of whole-
properties. 
On the other hand, some authors suggested that essentialism is not 
concerned with Natural Kind categories only but with social categories also 
(Gelman et al., 1994; Hirschfeld, 1994), and that categories like ethnicity, for 
example, have been assimilated into the natural categories system (Gil-White, 
2001). Rothbart and Taylor (1992) see the categorisation of ethnic groups under 
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the Natural Kind umbrella as an overextension of categorisation of biological 
kinds. They discussed this phenomenon first and observed that, although social 
categories are thought to share similarities with artefacts, they also share 
elements found in Natural Kind entities, such as inherence, inductive potential, 
and inalterability. For instance, people find in physical traits such as skin 
pigment the evidence that social categories like race have a biological basis 
(Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).  
However, according to Haslam et al. (2000), not all social categories are 
perceived as natural kinds but rather as socially constituted or fuzzy. In support 
of this tendency Hirschfeld (1995; 1996; 1997; 2001) suggested that individuals 
have a cognitive domain that is designed for processing “human kind” 
information, and through which social categories are attributed discreteness, 
naturalness, and inherence. This involves beliefs that the psychological and 
phenotypic traits of a certain race are maintained through generations.  
This concept departed from some empirical studies in which it was found 
that children’s beliefs are not transmitted by parents through explicit teaching 
(Hirschfeld, 2001), and are not formulated on the basis of external appearance 
(Hirschfeld, 1996), but rather seem to depend upon linguistic information. The 
hypothesis that this is an innate and universal tendency in human beings, and that 
it is also domain specific for social groups was advanced by Sperber and 
Hirschfeld (2004). 
This view, supported by Hirschfeld (1995; 1996; 1997; 2001), Gil-White 
(2001), and Atran (1998), suggests that humans master a natural ability to 
process biological categories, which has developed through the evolution of the 
species and which serves adaptability purposes. In particular, Gil-White (2001) 
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argued that people make analogies between biological and social categories, and 
that human groups that resemble races -- like ethnicities -- are the ones that 
happen to be essentialised. In fact, although ethnicities are not races, they require 
that membership is transmitted from parents to the offspring. Gil-White's (2001) 
argument in support of this theory is that there are two factors that influence 
essentialist beliefs in the categorisation of human groups. The first one refers to 
the groups’ qualities of being descent-based and endogamous. The second one is 
that as a consequence non-biological groups tend to be treated as biological. 
Nonetheless, this view implies that individuals have some knowledge about 
endogamy, but whereas adults can have this knowledge the same does not apply 
to children.  
However, Gelman (2003) did not agree with this position and argued that 
Gil-White’s theory does not provide evidence for essentialist abilities in the early 
years (Gelman, 2003). Moreover, the conclusions drawn by Hirschfeld (1995; 
1996; 1997; 2001) and by Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) have been challenged 
by Rhodes and Gelman (2009), who argued that although empirical evidence 
shows that children manifest a biological understanding of physical appearance, 
they do not show a corresponding understanding of social significance of races. 
Rather, race appears to be seen by children as a changeable category based on 
personal views (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
This section aimed at defining the purposes for essentialism to come into 
being. On this argument, Medin’s (1989) position is to compare essentialism to 
an essentialist heuristic (Medin, 1989; p. 1477) that leads people into attributing 
internal similarities to entities that look-alike. Although this mechanism proves 
to be accurate most of the time, some authors (e.g., Gelman, 2003) suggested 
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that when individuals learn about the inner features that lead to category 
membership, the acquired knowledge becomes more important than what is 
observed. Also, in situations where some inconsistent information is provided, 
children tend to produce explanations based on internal and underlying 
properties, thus preferring functional mechanisms over perceptual ones (Legare, 
Gelman, & Wellman, 2010).  
Hood (2009) carried out some studies about the power exerted by the 
theories about the world that an individual learns. According to Hood (2009), 
theories make our mental representation of things more rigid and fixed even 
when they are proven wrong. For instance, children and adults that have learnt 
the theory of gravity in balancing a rod would find difficult to solve a task where 
the rod has been secretly weighted on one side by the investigator.  
Despite balancing the rod in the middle proving unsuccessful, older 
children cannot abandon their theory and so fail in the task, whereas younger 
children are more flexible and solve the problem through subsequent attempts 
(Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1975). Psychological essentialism can also be seen 
as a mental representation of the world: human reasoning is rooted in essentialist 
beliefs regardless of their veracity and is impregnated with them (Medin, 1989).  
Medin observed that “people act as if things (e.g., objects) have essences 
or underlying natures that make them the thing that they are” (Medin, 1989; 
p.1476). However, he specifies, his claim is far from saying that things have 
essences, but that essentialism rather constitutes the way individuals see and 
understand the world. Under this perspective, if psychological essentialism is far 
less accurate than scientific theories, it still represents a successful way of 
understanding categories (Medin, 1989). Some studies (e.g., Blok et al., 2005; 
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Rips et al., 2006) showed that individuals are unlikely to change their view about 
the attribution of essences to objects despite the changes the objects had gone 
through had made them more suitable for fitting into different categories.  
Discussion about the functions and contexts of essentialism has 
highlighted some important aspects that need to be addressed. In particular, the 
views of considering it as deeply connected with human reasoning (e.g., Medin, 
1989) and as intrinsic to categorisation (Gelman, 2003) introduce us to the next 
section, which talks about categorisation -- the study of people’s understanding 
of reality. 
1.6. Categorisation 
The purpose of this section is to introduce the reader to some basic 
principles about categorisation. Within the field of psychology theorists have 
dealt with the way human beings approach the world and understand it. The 
study of categorisation has produced some important theoretical approaches that 
are briefly summarised in this chapter and discussed in some separate sub-
sections. They are the classical view, the prototype view, the exemplar view, and 
the knowledge view. A further theory is represented by the essentialist view, in 
which theorists propose that individuals approach the world in an essentialist 
fashion.  
This field of psychology aims to identify the mechanisms that underlie 
human representation of the world and in particular the process that makes an 
entity be classified under one class rather than another, and that makes a novel 
object be understood. According to Lefebvre and Cohen (2005), cognition is 
categorisation: “all of our categories consist in ways we behave differently 
toward different kinds of things, whether it would be the things we do or don’t 
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eat, mate with, or flee from, or the things that we describe, through our language, 
as prime numbers, affordances, absolute discriminables, or truths. And isn’t that 
all that cognition is for -- and about?” (Lefebvre & Cohen, 2005; p. 42).  
Categorisation processes serve two main purposes: they represent storage 
entities of accessible knowledge on the one side, and connect past knowledge to 
future experiences on the other side. This process is fundamental for decision 
making (Gelman & Meyer, 2011). 
There seems to be no such thing as a single definition for concepts and 
categories, and in the literature there is little agreement in defining the problem. 
For instance, whereas for some researchers categories represent the core 
problem, for some others the process of categorisation is more relevant 
(Lefebvre & Cohen, 2005). Therefore, in this section some of the definitions that 
best contribute to the understanding of the subject will be outlined.  
Categories are classes of entities of various nature that are classified 
together -- e.g., categories of people, of artefacts, and of actions -- because they 
share some sorts of similarity. They are the extension of our concepts or word 
meanings and represent the set of all things to which the concept refers. 
Concepts are the product of human intelligence in making sense of what is 
observed in the reality, they account for the intensional aspects of the link 
between concepts and categories (Hampton & Dubois, 1993; p. 3).  
According to Hampton and Dubois (1993), intension consists in the 
information on which the classification of entities is based and the deductions 
that it generates. It only includes factors that are applicable to all the members of 
a category, although this is not true in the case of prototype concepts. Murphy 
defines concepts as “the glue that holds our mental world together” (Murphy, 
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2002; p. 1), and Medin sees them as “the building blocks for thoughts” (Medin, 
1989; p. 1496). Other authors argued that “concepts are complex data bases and 
they allow us to represent, predict, and interact with the world” (Lefebvre & 
Cohen, 2005; p.9).  
A more extensive definition of concepts was given by Hampton (1999): 
“Concepts are the elements from which propositional thought is constructed, 
thus providing a means of understanding the world, concepts are used to 
interpret our current experience by classifying it as being of a particular kind, 
and hence relating it to prior knowledge” (Hampton, 1999; p. 176). 
Moreover, concepts can be simply called “thoughts”, or “ideas of”, 
individuals or entities. When we think about individuals, for instance, we have in 
mind a unique description for them that can summarise their identity, and yet 
there are countless ways of describing the same individual that are all 
representative of reality (Lefebvre & Cohen, 2005). This opinion is supported by 
Blok et al. (2005) who argued that when people categorise things that are 
relevant to them they do not only represent the categories these entities belong 
to, but also see them as individual things. The importance of individual concepts 
was highlighted by Medin and Shaffer (1978) in their Context Model, where they 
argued that knowledge of categories is yielded by our memories of their 
exemplars.  
A different perspective, called sortalism, asserts that category 
membership determines an individual’s identity by defining the criteria for 
identity (Blok et al., 2005). By definition, a sortal is a basic level noun providing 
principles of both identity and individuation (Xu, 2007).  
Categorisation consists in organising things into categories in order to 
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understand what they are, and to differentiate them from other things. Through 
this process entities can be grouped into classes where a relationship between the 
entity and its class is highlighted, and where relationships between classes have 
taxonomic purposes (Schulz, Stenzhorn, & Boeker, 2008). Some agreement is 
reached in relation to the function of concepts. Smith and Medin (1981) claimed 
that without concepts chaos would reign in our mental representation of things. 
In fact, concepts are believed to produce stability by ordering entities into 
classes, and by allowing inferences about underlying attributes proceeding from 
the visible ones to the invisible ones. Concepts are thought of as “critical for 
perceiving, remembering, talking, and thinking about objects and events in the 
world” (Smith & Medin, 1981; p. 1). 
1.7. Main theories of categorisation 
This section goes through some of the dominant positions in the field of 
categorisation that have developed through the years. An outline of these 
positions will provide some understanding about the differences between the 
classical, prototype, knowledge, and exemplar views, and the essentialist view of 
categorisation.  
1.7.1. The classical view 
The classical view of concepts is the oldest theory in categorisation and 
can be tracked down to Aristotle in the western culture, and to Hull (1920) in 
Experimental Psychology. According to this view, concepts are present at a 
cognitive level as definitions. Definitions of concepts must have two criteria: 
they should have necessary characteristics for the entity to be included in the 
category, and they should provide sufficient characteristics in order for the same 
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entity to be included in the category. As defining criteria the classical view 
excludes the option of borderline cases, therefore certain characteristics are 
clear-cut for either being a member or for being a non-member of a certain 
category. 
Murphy (2002) argued that one of the main failures of the classical view 
was the inability to explain typicality and atypicality of certain category 
members. In this respect, the typical members are thought of as the good 
examples of a given category, whereas the atypical members present as the more 
unusual ones (Murphy, 2002). According to the classical view, all the members 
that have the necessary features that make them suitable for category 
membership are included; however, under this account, deviations from the 
standard are not explained. According to Rosch (1975), the agreement around 
typicality is very high amongst people (she found it to be is as high as .97).  
However, Barsalou (1987) pointed out that the measure obtained by 
Rosch (1975) was not meaningful because it depended on sample size, and 
showed that the average correlation between two random individuals would be a 
better measure, and that it is around 0.8. 
It has been observed that typical members of a category -- e.g., robins 
rather than chickens -- are recognised more easily and faster (Murphy, 2002), 
and also that typical members are the first ones to be recalled in memory tasks 
and to be learnt as category members (Mervis, Catlin, & Rosch, 1976). Some 
further research showed that when people make reference to two category 
members, the most typical one is usually cited first (Kelly, Bock, & Keil, 1986) 
and usually acts as a benchmark (Murphy, 2002). 
Hampton (1988; 1995) investigated typicality in judgements about 
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category membership, and his findings challenged the classical view. For 
example, he found that people perceive entities as part of a joint category (X and 
Y) even if they only fulfil either component x or y (Hampton, 1988). As he 
suggested, this could be a problem with transitivity of category relations, since in 
some cases subjects would recognise entities to be members of sub-categories 
but not of the higher category. Typicality is described by Murphy (2002) as a 
matter of degrees, and its items can be very similar to the prototype (very 
typical), moderately similar (typical), not similar (atypical), or sit in between two 
different categories (borderline). Therefore, typical entities are those that own 
many traits of the category and very few of other categories and that are easily 
recognised as category members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
A relevant study on typicality in natural categories was run by Barsalou 
(1985) in order to explore what determines graded structure in categories. The 
term graded structure refers to the fact that some members of a category are 
more typical than others, and typicality of members can be represented as a 
continuum from more typical to less typical. In Barsalou’s (1985) study, three 
variables were tested on common taxonomic and goal-derived categories: a) 
central tendency (already called family resemblance by Rosch & Mervis, 1975), 
which means that items with the highest similarity to other category members 
scored higher in central tendency; b) frequency of instantiation, which refers to 
the frequency for an entity to be rated as a category member; and c) ideals, 
which is the compliance with the primary goal of the assigned category.  
Barsalou (1985) found that central tendency predicted graded structure in 
taxonomic but not in goal-derived categories, and that central tendency and 
ideals may determine graded structure in both. He also argued that the ability of 
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people to construct concepts is dynamic and varies in different contexts. 
It has been argued that one of the main problems with the classical view 
was the failure to explain typicality, and therefore this issue has been given 
priority by subsequent theories (Murphy, 2002). Typicality is what leads 
judgements about category membership (Rosch, 1978), and prototype similarity 
taps into both the goodness of an individual/animal/object as an example of that 
category, and the fact that the target individual/animal/object belongs to that 
category and not to another one (Hampton, 1995). Accordingly, the relationship 
between the typicality of an entity and the clarity of category membership is 
quite straightforward (Hampton, 1998) (for a detailed explanation of the 
relationship between typicality and category membership see Hampton, 2007). 
Under this view, when an entity’s resemblance with the features for the 
category decreases, the chances for it to be regarded as a category member also 
decrease. However, since category boundaries can be unclear, this judgement 
could differ greatly amongst perceivers (Hampton, 1995). Hampton’s (1995; 
1998) claim of a strong relation between typicality and category membership 
was also confirmed by Diesendruck and Gelman (1999), with the distinction of a 
stronger attribution of category membership to animals (relatively absolute 
category membership) than to artefacts (relatively graded category membership). 
1.7.2. The prototype view 
One of the most important criticisms of the classical view was 
formulated by Rosch (1975) under her theory called the prototype view -- or the 
probabilistic view. One of the key concepts of the prototype view is the concept 
of summary representation which states that an entity, for example a dog, should 
present with sufficient canine characteristics in order for it to be called a dog, but 
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none of these characteristics would be defining. The typicality problem that 
undermined the classical view was attempted to be solved by the prototype 
theory through the idea that the most typical items will present with the more 
highly weighted traits of the assigned category, whereas the most atypical items 
will present with fewer highly weighted traits.  
However, the prototype view has been criticised for a lack of precision in 
the definition of prototype, which is often mistaken by researchers as a single 
best exemplar rather than as a list of properties. 
1.7.3. The exemplar view 
The exemplar view was elaborated by Medin and Shaffer (1978) and 
greatly differentiates from previous accounts. In fact, rather than mentioning a 
single concept in which the understanding of an entity is included, or rather than 
providing a list of features for the entity, this view refers to the fact that an 
individual’s memory of previous experience of that entity works as a filter in the 
understanding of the new entity. For instance, when we see a dog we match it 
with our previous experiences of dogs and differentiate it from animals that look 
alike it (e.g., foxes) thanks to the ability we have to recall more similarities with 
the dogs that we have previously come across with, rather than with foxes 
(Murphy, 2002). Under this account, typicality occurs when an entity presents as 
very similar to known previous examples of the same category, whereas 
atypicality occurs when an entity presents as very dissimilar to known previous 
examples. By definition, an exemplar is a good example of a certain entity. 
According to Diesendruck and Gelman (1999), prototype models seem to 
represent the most adequate models for the categorisation of artefacts. Empirical 
results show how as the typicality of the items decrease, also the absolute 
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categorisation of artefacts drops down. On the contrary, low typical items are 
attributed negative categorisation (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999). 
1.7.4. The knowledge view 
The knowledge approach, also called the theory view or the theory theory 
view, was elaborated in response to the loose ends left by the previous two 
approaches: the prototype view and the exemplar view. Its main theorists have 
been Murphy and Medin (1985) in the context of the psychology of 
categorisation, and Carey (1985) in the developmental psychology context. The 
knowledge approach suggests that concept making is a process that is deeply 
related to the knowledge of the world that individuals have, and that the 
relationship between concepts and knowledge is always bidirectional (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985). Under this approach, it is thought that the knowledge that 
concepts possess allows them to provide explanations of the world.  
The structure of concepts is organised by domains, and within the same 
domain the nature of the knowledge is similar. For instance, the principle that 
lions roar contain some “nomological, causal, functional, and/or generic 
knowledge” about lions (Machery, 2009; p. 101). On a similar account, Machery 
(2005) talks about the role played by concepts -- which he calls default bodies of 
knowledge (Machery, 2005; p. 449) -- in supplying the information required by a 
certain situation. Barsalou (1993) suggests that concepts are the product of the 
working memory and that they are sensitively provided under the requirements 
of contextual factors, whereas Prinz (2004) argue that they are stored in the long-
term memory.  
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1.7.5. The essentialist view 
The essentialist view brings a different approach in the theorisation of 
categorisation. Psychological essentialism was propounded by Medin (1989) as 
the bridge between observed properties and the theory-based view of 
categorisation, which asserts that concepts are represented as theories rather than 
feature lists. He suggested an alternative to similarity-based models, including 
the prototype model, by accentuating the role played by individuals’ theories in 
the mental representation of concepts (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Medin’s (1989) 
view, which can be defined as an essentialist account of categorisation, refers to 
lay-people’s beliefs that categories have underlying properties -- or essences -- 
that determine their nature and general make-up. As Medin (1989) discussed, 
despite the fact that these properties -- or essences -- may remain unknown by 
people, they are thought to be there and to determine category membership. 
Under this account, the differences in typicality amongst category 
members are contemplated. In fact, certain members may present different non-
essential traits and be a worse example of a category than other members, or a 
less typical example (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999). The essentialist view 
promotes an “absolute” categorisation, where entities are either members or not 
members of a category (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; p.339) in accordance to 
their essential properties. For instance, if an exemplar is attributed the essential 
properties of that category it would be fully rated as a category member.  
On the contrary, if an exemplar is thought to lack the essential properties 
for category membership it would be rated as a non-member (Diesendruck & 
Gelman, 1999). Also, as Diesendruck and Gelman (1999) suggest, some 
categories may be more essentialised than others, as in the case of animals, to 
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which preschool children attributed more inductive inferences than to artefacts 
(Gelman & Markman, 1986), and to which also adults attributed more defining 
features than artefacts (Malt & Johnson, 1992). 
This position was elaborated in a study from 1999 where Diesendruck 
and Gelman investigated the connection between the degree of typicality and 
category membership. They had forty-two subjects rating the typicality of 
category membership of a set of 293 animals and artefacts presenting a different 
degree of typicality. The aim of the experiment was to see if and how the 
attribution of animals and artefacts to categories differ, and whether animals 
would be judged as members of a category in an absolute fashion and 
independently of typicality. Their hypothesis wanted to challenge the prototype 
account, which suggested that in the presence of a similar grade of typicality the 
two domains (artefacts and animals) would be granted the same ratings.  
The conceptual framework in which the study was conducted reflected an 
essentialist account of categorisation, according to which a decrease in typicality 
would also decrease the chances for absolute category membership. Thus, it was 
predicted that by decreasing typicality, absolute negative categorisation would 
increase as an effect. According to Diesendruck and Gelman (1999), the results 
showed that atypicality affects categorisation of animals more than 
categorisation of artefacts since non-typical animals were considered either 
members or not members of a given category. Previous studies had supported 
this position (see Barr & Caplan, 1987; Hampton, 1998). Particularly, Hampton 
(1998) observed that in the categorisation of animals the core properties are a 
better predictor of category membership, which is not different from what the 
essentialist position suggests. 
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Likewise, according to the essentialist account, category membership is 
granted when individuals, animals, or artefacts have some essential traits that 
make them suitable for that category. If these essential properties are missing the 
exemplar cannot be a member of that category, but if the properties are owned 
the exemplar is considered a full member of that category. Under this view there 
is no room for fuzziness as the conditions for category membership are either 
met or not. Empirical work has shown that when perceivers are uncertain about 
the core features of the target they tend to attribute negative membership in an 
absolute fashion (Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999). 
In his work from 1995, Kalish pointed out the lack of empirical evidence 
in favour of the essentialist view. In fact, although previous work (see Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Keil, 1989) showed that non-essential properties (e.g., external 
traits) are less relevant than internal properties in the perception of the essence of 
an entity, they are still taken into account by perceivers. Kalish (1995) tested 
category membership and typicality in three studies. Study 1 (N = 31) explored 
graded categorisation by asking participants to make judgements about typicality 
and category membership of low-typical entities (e.g., penguins for the category 
birds).  
The results showed that changes in both superficial and deep traits 
influence the perception of typicality as well as category membership, and that 
differently from graded items, defined items were attributed a clear-cut 
membership. Study 2 (N = 20) tested typicality, membership, and relationship to 
a category of seven different items among which were animal and artefact kinds 
(e.g., how representative of the category horse is a donkey; how much a donkey 
is a member of the category horse).  
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The judgements of category membership appeared graded particularly for 
artefacts, but also for animals. Moreover, the results showed that category 
membership and typicality are affected by changes in both the outside and the 
inside. Since it was hypothesised that a certain extent of ambiguity of the items 
tested in study 1 and 2 may have led to graded responses, Kalish (1995) carried 
out a third study (N = 41) in which only animal kinds were tested. Animal 
categories are indicated in the literature as particularly prone to be attributed 
essences (see Keil, 1989). The participants were instructed to think about 
biological aspects in their judgements of the target items (e.g., biologically 
speaking a donkey is not at all typical of a horse). This study provided evidence 
for category membership to be graded even in the presence of biological 
categories, as participants did not perceive animal kinds as “all-or-none” 
categories (Kalish, 1995; p. 346). 
Overall, the results from Kalish’s (1995) work suggest that some artefact 
and animal kinds are thought not to have an essentialist structure. Although the 
results were obtained with a number of low-typical items, Kalish (1995) argued 
that they would also be replicated with more typical items. The investigation 
showed that the two concepts of category membership and typicality are 
profoundly linked, and that changes in external traits affect both. Therefore, 
Kalish’s (1995) argument is that although essences remain the most important 
aspect for the evaluation of category membership they are not the only one, and 
that other features of an item may determine its category membership.  
This section has provided some background knowledge about the 
position of the essentialist account of categorisation. The next section will 
discuss the role of the transformation paradigm as a test of psychological 
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essentialism.  
1.8. The role of changes and mutation in essentialist beliefs 
Psychological essentialism highlights a basic distinction between the 
inside and the outside, or between surface and inner features of animated and 
unanimated things (Medin & Ortony, 1989). Medin and Ortony (1989) advocate 
that between surface and inner features there is a close relationship and that 
sometimes surfaces depend on deep properties. This tenet represents the core 
concept of psychological essentialism. Starting from this concept, this section 
would like to discuss research investigating how changes in either external or 
internal features in both living and non-living entities may affect the perception 
of category membership. In the next paragraphs, a review of studies in relation to 
these changes and transformation will be discussed. 
In psychological essentialism research, there are three commonly used 
paradigms that explore essentialist beliefs about social categories: the 
transformation paradigm -- used among others by Keil (1989) and Mahalingam 
(1998); the adoption paradigm -- used by Gelman & Wellman (1991), and 
Hirschfeld (1996); and the brain-transplant paradigm -- used by Johnson (1990), 
and Mahalingam (2001). In particular, the transformation paradigm investigates 
whether changes in the external or internal appearance of a living being affect 
the attribution of category membership of the same (Mahalingam, 2003).  
As Keil (1989) argued, when older children are asked to categorise an 
animal, they rely on its origin rather than on its appearance. In one of his 
experiments, Keil (1989) used a scenario with a horse with painted stripes to 
make it look like a zebra. He observed that whereas four-year-old children think 
that external changes may determine categorization, older children do not accept 
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that painting stripes on a horse would turn it into a zebra. Thus, Keil (1989) 
argued that older children understand that a change in appearance cannot change 
a creature’s kind. On the other hand, beliefs about artefacts were observed to be 
opposite to those about natural kinds so a coffee pot can be turned into a bird 
feeder by external actions changing its appearance. Another interesting point is 
the one about “discoveries” which shows that older children believe that 
scientists can discover something about a creature’s insides which lead to it 
being categorized differently.  
Rips (1989) argues that similarity between an entity and other entities in 
the same category is seen by some theorists (e.g., Rosch, 1975) as a necessary 
condition for such entity to be included in the category (1989). According to 
Rips (1989), this way of categorising is simple and involves representing a 
category and an object in somebody’s perception, and calculating similarity 
between the two. This process can be applied to all categories and objects, and it 
will produce different similarity rates.  
However, as Rips (1989) claims, some criticism in relation to the role of 
similarity in categorisation has risen in both philosophical and psychological 
debates (see Goodman, 1970, in relation to philosophical accounts; and Murphy 
and Medin, 1985, in relation to psychological accounts). Rips (1989) showed 
that sometimes category membership and similarity are separate from each other 
and that they may respond differently to similar factors. Particularly, according 
to Murphy and Medin (1985), an object’s classification responds to the 
procedures applied to scientific classification with the difference that -- when it 
comes to classifying an object -- lay people are less accurate than scientists. 
Accordingly, Rips (1989) claims that similarity and categorisation 
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represent two separate processes. In his work, Rips (1989) investigated whether 
similarity and categorisation are different by using the transformation paradigm 
to investigate different categories that are commonly known to people (e.g., 
quarters, temperatures, or eggs). In the first study, he used a number of problems 
presenting pairs of categories tapping different dimensions. In each pair, one 
category was fixed and the other one was more variable. In a further study, Rips 
(1989) queried participants about a number of problems in which they had to rate 
likelihood, similarity, and typicality (e.g., temperature). In both studies, Rips 
(1989) observed that similarity can be dissociated from categorisation, and that 
categorisation is around the midpoint on the scale. Rips (1989) argued that 
similarity seems to depend on how close entities are to the core features of the 
category, and that typicality is perceived on the basis of both categorisation and 
similarity.  
In order to explore so, Rips (1989) designed two studies focusing in 
natural kinds on one study, and on artefacts on the other one. In the first scenario, 
an imaginary animal that could be categorised either as a fish, reptile, insect, 
mammal, or bird went through a particular event that made it look more similar 
to that of a different category. Another scenario described mutation as a result of 
natural processes (e.g., a caterpillar turning into a butterfly). The results showed 
that the mutated creature was judged more similar to the new appearance 
category but more likely to be categorized in the pre-mutation category. On the 
other hand, when the change was a natural mutation, people judged the early 
form to be more similar to the category it resembled, but then categorized it as 
belonging to the category of the adult form. The same results were observed in 
the artefact scenario but with a slightly smaller effect. Thus, findings suggest that 
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similarity can be dissociated from categorization. 
Hampton et al (2007) noticed that the categorization responses in Rips 
(1989) data were not clearly in favour of one category, but were close to the 
midpoint of the scale. Thus, they decided to explore this further in a series of 
studies that would test the robustness of Rips’ (1989) claims. The first study was 
a replication of Rips (1989) with some changes: 1) since Rips (1989) showed 
very similar results for similarity and typicality, the former one was omitted in 
order to focus on typicality and categorisation ratings; 2) labels of the different 
stages of a creature were not given; 3) the full story was read by all participants, 
but the first half of the story was rated by half participants, and the second half 
story by the other half of participants. 
Hampton et al. (2007) focused on two core aspects of essentialism: an 
entity’s offspring and the belief that inner make up cannot change through 
external action. The study tested 32 participants on 16 different scenarios 
describing an animal that presents behavioural and external characteristics of 
another animal. All 16 scenarios gave a description of the animal’s appearance 
and behaviour, occurrence of change through either mutation or maturation, 
details about the change and its effect on both behaviour and appearance, and the 
fact that the offspring reflected the animal in its former stage.  
The results showed that typicality changed consistently, and that also 
categorisation shifted in each change. The data contained systematic individual 
differences, with one group of participants responding as Rips (1989) had 
suggested, and another group doing the opposite and judging the category on the 
basis of the creature’s changed appearance rather than on its original essence. 
One group, labelled as “phenomenalists”, thought that both mutation and 
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maturation determine changes in category membership. The other group, labelled 
“essentialists” thought that accidental mutation did not change categorisation of 
the creature.  
The group of essentialists did not see mutation as a cause for an entity to 
change category, and their judgements reflected three different types of beliefs: 
both the early and late stage in an entity’s life are part of the same category (Rips 
essentialists); an entity’s offspring is what determines category membership 
(origin essentialists), if external features change (e.g., maturation), category 
membership may also change (nominal essentialists). To conclude, Hampton et 
al. (2007) showed that there are distinct individual differences in people’s 
beliefs. Also, people are more likely to think that contamination changes the 
category of the creature than to present the pattern claimed by Rips (1989). 
Hampton et al. (2007) argued that their work showed how people adopted the 
causal homeostasis theory and inferred that if the appearance had changed 
through internal processes, then also deeper internal properties that determine 
categorization would have changed. 
What was interesting in these studies is how the transformation paradigm 
can represent a test of psychological essentialism and generate different 
perspectives on essentialism itself. For instance  ¸Hampton et al. (2007) observed 
that what they called “origin essentialists” seemed to refer to the former reality 
of a creature, and particularly to the juvenile stage of that same creature. On the 
other hand, what were called “Rips essentialists” referred to the cause of change 
and considered change as a superficial matter concerned with an entity’s 
appearance rather than with an entity’s internal make up.  
This section discussed research on the transformation paradigm and its 
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role as a test of psychological essentialism. The next chapter will explain how 
psychological essentialism develops in individuals from infanthood throughout 
adulthood, and the different contexts where essentialism occurs. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Psychological essentialism has become a broadly studied subject in the 
past fifteen years, and has been attributed great relevance in the understanding of 
the basic mechanisms of human cognition through the lifespan. For this reason, 
its investigation has seen a great involvement of the most different psychological 
fields, going from the work carried out in essentialist representation in infants 
and children within the domain of Developmental Psychology (e.g., Bloom, 
2000; Gelman, 2003; Newman & Keil, 2008), to theories of social representation 
and beliefs towards the ingroup and the outgroup in Social Psychology (e.g., 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Haslam et al., 2002; Keller, 2005; Leyens et al., 
2000; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004), and to the study of the phenomenon of 
humanisation and dehumanisation (e.g., Demoulin et al., 2009; Leyens et al., 
2003; Haslam, 2006), just to mention some. The aim of this chapter is to provide 
a brief introduction to these areas of investigation, along with an overview of 
some of the most relevant studies for each of these areas. 
The second section will delineate the main current positions in the 
literature about the onset of essentialism in children, and the occurrence of 
developmental shifts in essentialist beliefs. Also, given the role that they play in 
children’s essentialism, the concepts of induction and innate potential will be 
explained. Studies about developmental shifts in children’s essentialist thinking 
are discussed in the second part of that section. Numerous are the positions about 
the onset of essentialism in children, ranging from those that support cultural 
inheritance (e.g., Fodor, 1998), genetic dispositions (e.g., Carey, 1996), or 
parental teaching through the use of language (e.g., Gelman, 2003). These 
positions will be summarised in two separate sub-sections. Work on essentialism 
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in children has been very influential in the field. Thus, the inclusion of this 
material in the thesis should provide some insightful information for the 
understanding of essentialism in adults.  
The third section deals with the understanding of how essentialist beliefs 
are organised and whether they can be defined through some particular measure 
and organised in a specific pattern or structure. This section presents some 
relevant evidence that constitutes the theoretical background for the first 
hypothesis of Study 1 and 2 of this thesis, which explored the structure of 
essentialist beliefs. 
The fourth section discusses the phenomenon of humanisation and 
introduces some studies that contributed to its understanding. Through the 
material presented in this paragraph the reader will be able to appreciate the 
mechanism that underlies individuals’ beliefs about one’s own essences and 
somebody else’s essences. This mechanism has been addressed by Study 1 and 2 
in relation to beliefs about one’s own versus others-categories with the 
hypothesis that one’s own categories would be judged as more essentialist than 
others-categories.  
The fifth section talks about social categorisation, which is the 
phenomenon concerned with how people see others. In particular, the section 
focuses on explaining social categorisation and its relevance in psychological 
essentialism. Research in social categorisation has highlighted some links with 
the attribution of an essentialist nature to both individuals and categories, and the 
onset of prejudice. 
Finally, section 2.6 debates the occurrence of cultural differences in 
cognitive styles. In the section, some studies providing support about the 
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occurrence of such differences are discussed and organised in four sub-sections. 
This material will aid the understanding of the conceptual framework 
underpinning the cross-cultural investigations run for Study 1 and 2. 
2.2. Essentialist beliefs in early life 
One of the main sources of interest for psychological essentialism is the 
study of the early essentialist mechanisms in individuals, and particularly 
essentialist thinking and representation in infants and children. This area has 
been explored over two decades with some remarkable discoveries that have 
overturned some of the classic theories of Developmental Psychology. Amongst 
the main investigators in the field are Gelman (2003), Newman and Keil (2008), 
Bloom (2000), and Hirschfeld (1996). These authors have queried the origins 
and functions of essentialism in human thought by posing some preliminary 
questions: Does essentialism originate in culture? Is it influenced by language? 
Is it present at birth? Is it to be found in the reality of the world?  
According to the literature, essentialism is both a childhood disposition 
that has to do with the make-up of human minds (Gelman, 2003), and a basic 
human bias (Gelman, 2009a). In her work Gelman (2003) argues that when it 
comes to explaining an entity’s specificity, young children appeal to underlying 
properties and consider these responsible for identity and category membership. 
This ability does not seem to be taught by parents, whose explanation of the 
world was proven to give little explicit essentialist information (Gelman et al., 
1998; Gelman et al., 2004). In the debate around the onset of essentialism, 
Gelman (2004) supports the view that essentialism is the base from which 
understanding of the world develops, and that it does not require scientific 
knowledge to come into being.  
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For example, children know that there are some profound differences 
between girls and boys that go beyond the colour of their clothes, even though 
they do not know what those differences are or what they are caused by. 
Particularly, for gender differences it has been observed that young children can 
be especially “nativist” and that children aged four refer to innate biological 
differences (Gelman, 2004).  
The nature of children’s beliefs was first investigated through the use of 
inductive inferences by Carey (1985) who provided children as young as four 
with some new piece of information about certain categories. Induction is 
defined as the capacity to extend knowledge to new situations, and is thought to 
be one of the main functions of categorisation (Medin et al., 2003). The purpose 
of Carey’s (1985) investigation was to see whether the new knowledge would 
generalise to different categories within the domain of biological understanding, 
and was carried out as part of a broader investigation on conceptual changes 
about biological entities in children. The findings showed that children had the 
tendency to make more inferences about properties related to people than 
properties related to animals, and that they attributed properties related to people 
to categories of animals.  
Also, Carey (1985) found that children are more likely to project 
attributes typical of human beings to animals than to attribute traits typical of 
animals to humans. Moreover, in her experiment about the patterns of attribution 
of biological properties in children and adults, Carey (1985) observed that the 
basic functions of an organism (e.g., growth, respiration, and death) are central to 
the understanding of biological entities in adult subjects. However, in four-year-
old children their poor knowledge of biological mechanisms is reflected in the 
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way they understand biological kinds. For example, to the question “does an x 
breathe?” (Carey, 1985; p. 10) a four-year-old child would answer that 
individuals breathe, and would generalise this to the target entity on the basis of 
the commonalities it bears with people. Although this question may trigger a 
different model of information-processing in adults, they are also likely to make 
wrong inferences sometimes, which are caused by a lack of scientific 
knowledge. However, the results showed that the inductive projections 
individuals make are generally driven by deep biological properties rather than 
by perceptual similarities (Carey, 1985). 
Gelman (2004) ran some further investigation to explore the mechanism 
of induction. She observed that induction is present in adults as well as young 
children and that it comes into play when attempting to deduce the external 
features of category members from non-visible internal traits. Accordingly, its 
role is to favour category membership over perceptual similarities and a 
perception of category membership as stable despite observable external 
transformations (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). The concept of induction is linked 
to the concept of “innate potential”, which claims that traits are determined at 
birth (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). Although it is not clear when this belief 
appears in life, whether at six years of age (Solomon, 2002) or at four years 
(Gelman, 2003), it seems that children can be more “nativist” than adults and 
would believe, for example, that a child adopted at birth would speak the 
language of his biological parents rather than the language of his adoptive 
parents (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1997).  
As highlighted by some authors (e.g., Gelman & Opfer, 2002), an 
important aspect to consider in the fact that children tend to attribute essences 
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almost exclusively to animal kinds, is the concept of “animacy” (Gelman & 
Opfer, 2002). According to Keil (1989), animacy represents understanding of the 
main features and functioning mechanisms of an entity. Also, it represents 
understanding of the distinction between different kinds (e.g., between animate 
and inanimate ones) (Gelman, 1990). In tasks about the changes in identity of 
animals and artefacts across transformations of the outsides, for example, 
preschool and older children considered that an animal can turn into another 
animal, and that an artefact can change into one other, but changes from artefact 
to animal and vice versa were not considered (Keil, 1989).  
According to further research (see Keil, 1994), by the age of four 
children acknowledge that there are processes that are typical of living kinds but 
not of non-living kinds. Amongst these processes are physical growth, 
reproduction, and metamorphosis. In the judgment of animacy it seems that both 
outer appearances and the ability to produce movement (e.g., faces) are relevant 
(Gelman & Opfer, 2002). Barret (2001) agrees with this position and suggests 
that the human ability to categorise seems to be particularly receptive to some 
perceptual cues that come from the environment, such as motion and surface 
features. 
In a study about children’s essentialist beliefs about animal species and 
gender categories, Taylor, Rhodes, and Gelman (2009) used the switch-at-birth 
task, which consists in telling children a story about a baby who is born by 
parents of a given species and then raised by adoptive parents from a different 
species. The questions involve asking whether the baby will show the traits 
typical of his biological parents or the traits typical of his adoptive parents. The 
study tested two groups of children (group 1, age M = 4.11; group 2, age M = 
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9.11; N = 160). Four stories were presented in the experiment (e.g., one of them 
was about a baby cow raised by a pig family), and for each story pictures of the 
target animal and of the adoptive family were shown. In the picture of the baby 
animal, only a few features of the adult animal were shown, and the questions 
asked about some adult features that were not shown in the task (e.g., when the 
baby cow has grown up, what does it say? Does it say moo -- category-based 
beliefs -- or oink -- environment-based beliefs --?).  
The task investigating gender categories, on the other hand, presented a 
story where a baby girl moved to an island inhabited by males only. Photos of 
the baby, of the island’s inhabitants, and of the island, were shown. The photo of 
the baby did not present any gender-typical features, and the questions asked 
participants about what the baby girl would like to do when she grows up (e.g., 
when the baby girl is a big kid, what does she like to do? Does she like to sew -- 
category-based beliefs -- or does she like to build things -- environment-based 
beliefs--?).  
The results showed that participants from all group ages attribute 
physical development to biological causes (category-specific). In fact, all 
participants agreed that a baby cow will grow into an adult cow. On the other 
hand, beliefs about the influence of environmental factors were higher in the task 
investigating gender differences. Also, some differences were observed in the 
category-based predictions about behavioural properties, which decreased with 
age. Generally, it was shown that traits observed at birth are considered to be 
likely to characterise the makeup of both animal and human categories (Taylor, 
Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009).  
The main trend for authors in the development of essentialist thought is 
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to suggest that a basic grasp of the difference between reality and appearance is 
required (Carey, 1996; Fodor, 1998; Bloom, 2000; Gelman, 2003). The meta-
cognitive understanding of this distinction seems to be achieved at the age of 
four (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983), although a rudimentary discernment is 
observed from the age of two (Gelman, 2003). On the other hand, Carey (1996) 
suggests that this ability may be innate and that when children look at creatures 
in order to make sense of them, they are most likely to be strengthening their 
essentialist abilities which then become more effective over time. Under this 
perspective, it seems that some developmental shifts occur in children’s beliefs 
about internal features, and that adults and children may have different views 
(Newman & Keil, 2008). By the term developmental shifts I intend the changes 
that occur across development. In this specific case, however, the focus is on the 
conceptual changes that occur when some new piece of information replaces and 
integrates the previous material.  
In a study from 2008, Newman and Keil wanted to investigate where 
people think the essences of an entity are located, and whether some changes in 
beliefs occur through development. The study involved reading a brief story 
about substances, big animals, and small animals and choosing between a 
distributed statement (It doesn’t matter where they take the pieces from, any 
piece will be able to tell them what kind of animal it is), and a localised 
statement (There is only one special piece that will tell them what kind of animal 
it is). A sample of adults and children were tested, and the stories and questions 
were slightly changed and simplified for the group of children. The sample of 
adults included college undergraduates, whereas the sample of children was 
composed of children from three age groups (group 1, age M = 6.0; group 2, age 
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M = 8.1; group 3, age M = 10.2).  
One of the differences between the group of children and adults was that 
children do not normally learn about biological microstructures like DNA at 
elementary school, and even if they have been exposed to this concept before, 
their knowledge should be rather superficial. What was observed was that adults 
showed a greater extent of generalised beliefs, but also that they were more 
likely to think that internal essences are more localised in animals than they are 
in objects. On the contrary, the findings from the groups of children showed that 
the two groups of older children tended to have a more distributed view, but that 
this -- similarly to the group of adults -- occurred especially for substances rather 
than for animals. On the other hand, the group of younger children showed 
preferences in choosing the localised view for small animals but did not show 
differences in the case of big animals and substances.  
Newman and Keil (2008) observed that, although the explanations given 
by the participants were not scientifically accurate, they clearly reflected beliefs 
in the accountability of biological mechanisms for the make-up of biological 
entities. These findings contrast with Piaget's theories about a lack of 
understanding of causality in preschoolers, whose explanations of causality 
reflected some confusion between psychological, biological, and sometimes even 
magical agents. A previous study by Springer and Keil (1989) highlighted the 
ability of preschoolers to understand that biological functions are likely to be 
passed on to the offspring, whereas other functions were seen as irrelevant. Also, 
a cognitive shift in these beliefs was found in the age group of 4-7-year-old, and 
in older children. 
In a set of studies from 1991, Springer and Keil investigated early 
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understanding of causal mechanisms in biological and non-biological kinds in 
preschoolers. Considering that previous studies had already highlighted an early 
ability in children to differentiate between natural kind and artefact features 
(Gelman, 1988; Keil 1989), Springer and Keil (1991) wanted to focus on the 
ability to understand causal mechanisms that produce changes in both biological 
and non-biological entities. Since they wanted to focus on easily observable 
features, their study investigated beliefs about the transmission of pigment in 
flowers (non-animated biological entities), dogs (animated biological entities), 
and cans (artefacts). The study revealed that adult participants believed in a 
genetic explanation, and that the main trend for children was the belief that baby 
flowers get their pigment through little pieces given by their mothers, whereas a 
mechanical agent was widely considered responsible for the pigmentation of 
artefacts. 
2.2.1. Role of parental teaching and cultural exposure in children’s essentialist 
beliefs 
One of the most obvious hypotheses concerning the origin of 
essentialism is that it comes from cultural exposure through teachings, tales, and 
normal daily conversations with social partners. However, empirical research 
does not support this over-simplification, and illustrates how individuals from 
different cultures essentialise in surprisingly similar ways across very different 
cultural contexts. On the other hand there is also evidence that the degree to 
which cultures essentialise might vary greatly.  
For example, research by Bloch, Solomon, and Carey (2001) conducted 
on a sample of 7 adults and 25 unschooled children between the age of seven and 
fifteen years in a rural mountain village in Madagascar, showed discrepancies 
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with previous studies run in western countries. The research was conducted in 
the local Malagasy dialect by one of the investigators who used a variation of the 
Solomon et al. (1996) adoption task, in which participants were told a story 
about a child raised by a couple of adoptive parents. The results showed that both 
age groups believed that an adopted boy would look like his adoptive parents 
rather than his birth parents on the majority of the traits including physical 
appearances. On the other hand, other studies have found interesting similarities 
between western cultures, and the Brazilian (Diesendruck, 2001) and Mongolian 
culture (Gil-White, 2001). 
Within the context of these sometimes controversial findings, one of the 
main aspects that authors like Gelman aimed to investigate was the extent to 
which social interaction and cultural exposure influence essentialist thinking. 
Gelman et al. (1998) argued that very little essentialist input is given by parents 
in their explanation of the world to children, and that essentialist theories seem to 
make a spontaneous appearance early in childhood (Gelman, 2003). Her view is 
clearly opposite to the more old-fashioned view that described children as 
empiricist and therefore more interested in superficial and perceptual aspects 
than inner ones, and lacking the ability to form categories (Inhelder & Piaget, 
1964). These views clearly contrast with Fodor’s (1998) position, which 
proposed essentialism as a consequence of the circulation of scientific 
knowledge about biological microstructures.  
However, the studies carried out in infants and children (Gelman, 2003; 
Gelman, 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 1991) seem to confirm the position that if 
essentialism had required some scientific knowledge in order to come into play, 
it would not be observable in preschool children. The same position is taken by 
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Medin and Ortony (1989) who propounded essentialism as a place-holder 
concept: people think that there is something defining the general make up of 
entities without knowing what it is, and base their inferences on that. This view 
implies that categories have sharp boundaries, underlying realities, and that their 
members share deep similarities (Gelman, 2004).  
Gelman (2003) argued that children up to the age of four go through 
some major changes in the way their essentialist thought is organised. She 
introduced the idea that a step-by-step process occurs in the pre-verbal stage in 
children, making them notice the complex make-up of certain categories, later 
attributing some intrinsic hidden qualities to them, and finally linking the same 
categories with names through the use of language. Eventually, the process 
becomes automated thanks to the exposure to an increasing number of 
categories.  
At the same time, social exposure provides a shared knowledge for the 
attribution of essences. This view fits well with the findings that children -- as 
well as adults -- think that language is related to the architecture of the world 
(Gelman, 2003), and is also shared by Hampton (2010), who highlighted the 
fundamental role that concepts play for human beings at conveying 
communication between social partners. In fact, a large extent of the concepts we 
use derive from our culture, although sometimes in the daily use of words lay-
people’s classification is preferred to scientific classification (for example, the 
scientific and the culinary use of the word “fruit” do not correspond very 
closely) (Hampton, 2010). 
2.2.2. The influence of language on essentialism 
This section discusses an aspect of cultural exposure that is considered to 
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be especially relevant in the onset of essentialism: language. In particular, the 
role of names (or labels) and generics is evaluated on the basis of some relevant 
theories about essentialist beliefs in children. The term “generics” is explained, 
and the role they play in essentialism clarified. Also, a general discussion of why 
authors argue about a close connection between the use of language and 
essentialist assumptions is provided. According to Gelman (2003), language is a 
powerful instrument for communicating cultural explanations of the world, and 
for providing a structure to people’s categories. Likewise, some authors argued 
about the importance of generics in essentialism in relation to their ability to 
express the essential qualities of category members (Gelman & Meyer, 2011).  
Some studies have highlighted the fact that the relationship between 
linguistic and conceptual representation starts even before language becomes 
available. Particularly, work conducted on infants as young as nine months of 
age showed that infants can learn categories before they learn to talk (Balaban & 
Waxman, 1997). Recently, the linguistic relativist hypothesis acquired new 
supporters in arguing that people's thought is shaped by their language (Gentner 
& Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  
Empirical studies show how young children essentialise categories before 
being taught scientific rules (Gelman & Coley, 1990), and despite the very little 
verbal input on essentialism provided by parents in their interaction with 
children (Gelman, 2003). Also, more recent positions argue that pre-lingual 
children group objects together on the basis of their labels (Fulkerson & 
Waxman, 2007), and that this occurs in two steps: on the one hand children learn 
to treat different entities under the same label as similar to each other, and on the 
other hand they produce inferences on hidden commonalities for the named-alike 
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entities (Gelman, 2009b). 
Language provides an efficacious way of expressing two important 
pieces of information: while words express membership in a category, generics 
express the range of the category. For clarity, generics are sentences that make 
reference to either the whole category or to individuals that best represent the 
category, and that express essential qualities (Carlson & Pelletier, 1995). They 
are also what mothers use to help their children to make sense of the world, and 
it has been observed that in their conversations with their children mothers 
produce about 30 generics per hour on average (Gelman, 2003). In fact, they 
provide the information that a certain quality is typical of a kind even though it 
could be not universally found in all the category members (Gelman & Meyer, 
2011).  
Gelman (2003) argues that in order for generics to impact essentialism in 
children they must be provided in the verbal interaction between adults and 
children and be easy to understand, and must reflect the conceptual distinction 
between categories. It was observed that generics are also used in other 
languages like Mandarin, and that there are similar patterns in the way they are 
used as they are generated more to refer to animals and to animate domains than 
to objects or other domains (Gelman & Tardif, 1998). A study investigating 
whether generics are also used by children was carried out by Gelman (2003), 
showing that children make a similar use of generics as adults do, that they 
generate generics from the age of two with their use increasing with age, and that 
they are more common than non-generics terms. 
The common view among theorist is that names play a powerful role in 
conveying meaning and underlying essentialist tendencies (Clark, Gelman, & 
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Lane, 1985; Gelman, 2003). Mayr (1991) suggested that despite the great 
diversity observed within the same category of objects, names are essential 
accounts for defining classes of objects. Names might ease the perception, even 
in young children, that the real meaning and essence of things is being grasped 
(Piaget, 1929). Labels and names seem to represent a guide through the 
perceptual differences of objects that reaches for category similarities (Gelman 
& Meyer, 2011). A similar position is held by Carey (1995), who argued that the 
root of beliefs in essences is to be found in category labels. As an example, the 
impact of the medical terms indicating mental and physical illnesses could be 
mentioned.  
These terms can have an even more powerful impact when combined 
with certain verbs (e.g., “is”) rather than others (e.g., “has”). In fact, the 
statement “this child is autistic” seems to refer to a deep and permanent state 
which implies that the whole personality is affected. On the other hand, the 
statement “this child has autism” seems to indicate that autism is not the main 
feature for that child, but rather that it is one of the features that determine 
her/his personality, suggesting a more temporary state as in “this child has a 
cold” (Gelman, 2003). 
Language represents one of the primary vehicles for communicating 
category membership but whereas in the old days it was thought that names 
captured the essences of things (see Aarsleff, 1983), in contemporary psychology 
a different perspective is taken. Mayr (1991) talked about the misleading belief 
that lay-people have about single words containing and describing the diversity 
of a whole category (e.g., the word mountain refers to mountains that are 
profoundly different one from another), thus reflecting an underlying sameness. 
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The same concept was also described by Piaget (1929), who suggested that when 
children learn what things are called may believe that they are finally grasping 
their core properties. 
A study by Clark, Gelman, and Lane (1985) captured how -- as early as 
pre-school age -- children use nouns to refer to stable and congenital traits and 
adjectives to express temporary conditions. However, it was later demonstrated 
that also some adjectives -- e.g., “shy” and “smart” -- convey category 
membership (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). A similar study with an adult sample 
showed that individuals attribute names a greater ability to express the identity of 
a kind than adjectives (Markman, 1989). In support of this view, Hall (1999) 
argued how proper names are a fundamental aspect of an individual’s identity, 
and that having a name constitutes one of the most fundamental human rights. 
Also, in some contexts, a change in name represents the boundary between an 
individual’s old identity and her/his new roles and destiny (see for example the 
change of the name of the chosen pope during the ecclesiastical investiture, or 
how the giving of a name to a pet animal raises its status to a quasi-human in the 
eyes of the owner). 
Although Gelman (2003) highlights the role that labels play in 
essentialism, she also suggests that the link between essentialist beliefs and 
nouns may be indirect. Rather than constituting a place-holder for identities, 
names set the boundaries that define what kind an entity belongs to. The domain-
specific theories that an individual has about a target category are supported by 
the attribution of names at making assumptions about the stability and coherence 
of that category, and this would underlie essentialist tendencies (Gelman, 2003). 
In this context, the role played by language could be to provide useful cues and 
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to reinforce some mechanisms that are already intrinsic to the infant’s abilities, 
amongst which are their inferential capacities (Gelman, 2003). In Gelman’s 
words, “Essentialism is initially a non-linguistic assumption that is intensified by 
language and that over time comes to be cued by words” (Gelman, 2003; p. 193). 
2.3. The structure of essentialist beliefs 
This section presents some studies that have investigated the structure of 
essentialist beliefs about social categories. In particular, a strand of research 
suggests the interplay of two dimensions in the structure of essentialist beliefs: 
Entitativity and Natural Kind. This conclusion was reached in the light of some 
work investigating a little known phenomenon: what are the elements that occur 
in essentialist beliefs about social categories (Haslam et al., 2000). The 
conceptual framework on which the work conducted for this thesis is based is 
discussed in this section.  
Study 1 and 2 hypothesised that some cultural differences would be 
observed in the structure of essentialist beliefs about social categories, and this 
hypothesis was formulated on the basis of Haslam et al. (2000) investigation. In 
their study, two elements were described as crucial in the explanation of 
essentialist beliefs: Natural Kind and Entitativity. A definition for these two 
dimensions will be provided in the first part of this section. The dimensions will 
be also extensively discussed in the first empirical chapter, Chapter 3. The final 
part of this section discusses the relevance of these two factors in the 
understanding of essentialist beliefs.  
Over the years several authors (e.g., Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et 
al., 1997) have looked at the structure of essentialist beliefs. In particular, 
research conducted by Haslam et al. (2000; 2002; 2004) constituted a 
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breakthrough in the field, and suggested that essentialist beliefs seem to be 
defined by the occurrence of two dimensions: the perceived Natural-Kind-ness 
and the perceived Entitativity of social groups. The term Natural Kind (or 
Natural-Kind-ness) refers to lay-people’s beliefs that some categories have a 
biological make-up, are distinct from other categories, and do not change easily 
in the course of history (Haslam et al., 2000). The term Entitativity comes from 
entity, and from the perception of groups as entities, and states that belonging to 
a certain category provides much information about its members. Also, some 
categories are thought of as inherent and highly cohesive entities.  
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) defined social categorisation through five 
characteristics: a) social categories have an ontological status which makes their 
members share some essential features; b) category membership is perceived as 
immutable; c) essentialist categories have an inductive potential that allows 
inferences about the members of that category; d) a unifying theme is believed to 
link category members one to another; e) essentialism is linked to exclusivity, 
and members of one category cannot easily be seen as members of another.  
In the field of psychological essentialism, some authors have tried to link 
social categorisation and essentialist beliefs. In particular, Haslam et al. (2000) 
carried out an investigation in order to define the structure of essentialist beliefs 
about social categories. In their study, a list of nine components of essentialism 
was drawn by borrowing some elements of psychological essentialism 
mentioned in the social scientific and philosophical literature. The nine items 
included Discreteness, Uniformity, Informativeness, Naturalness, Immutability, 
Stability, Inherence, Necessity, and Exclusivity. These nine components were 
employed in the design of a rating scale to be tested on a list of some common 
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social categories (e.g., gender groups, age groups, and profession groups).  
In total, the study counted forty social categories to be rated on the nine 
scales of essentialism by a group of 40 undergraduate students from a 
conservative mid-West American college.  
The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) showed that the scales 
grouped around two separate components, which were labelled as the Natural 
Kind dimension and the Entitativity dimension. According to Haslam et al. 
(2000), the Natural Kind dimension is composed of the five measures of 
Discreteness (some categories have more defined and clear-cut boundaries than 
others); Naturalness (some categories are more natural whereas others are more 
artificial); Immutability (for some categories becoming a member is easy and 
mutable, whereas for other categories it is more difficult and immutable); 
Stability (some categories have always existed and they are relatively stable 
whereas some categories change much over time), and Necessity (individuals 
need to have certain characteristics in order to become members of certain 
categories, whereas for other categories there is not such requirement), see Table 
3.2 for complete wording, and Table 3.4 for measures ratings.  
On the other hand, the Entitativity dimension is composed of the four 
measures of Uniformity (members of certain categories share many traits and 
they are relatively uniform, whereas members of other categories have not many 
things in common); Informativeness (for certain categories being a member 
provides much information about who they are, whereas other categories are less 
informative of their members); Inherence (members of some categories have 
some deep characteristics in common even though their outer traits are not the 
same, whereas other categories do not have such underlying reality), and 
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Exclusivity (belonging to some categories may be exclusive of other category 
memberships, while other categories are less exclusive about which other 
categories their members can belong to), see Table 3.3 for complete wording and 
Table 3.4 for measures ratings.  
As argued by Haslam et al. (2000), social categories are essentialised in 
two independent ways. One involves the perception that a category is a Natural 
Kind -- with stable, immutable, and natural traits -- while the other one involves 
seeing a social category as an entity -- with inherent and exclusive properties that 
make it informative about the person. For example, categories such as gender 
and race rated higher on Natural-Kind-ness, whereas categories like religious 
beliefs and political attitudes scored higher on Entitativity. The methodology and 
findings of Haslam et al. (2000) are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
However, the design utilised by Haslam et al. (2000) was criticised by 
Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt (2006), who argued that those nine measures fail 
to employ a direct measurement of essentialism as separate from the two 
dimensions of Natural-Kind-ness and Entitativity. They suggested that the most 
suitable and direct measurement of essentialism would be the Inherence 
measure, which summarises the meaning of essentialism, of having inherent 
properties.  
Also, Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt’s (2006) point of view was that 
essentialist beliefs represent either the consequence or the antecedent of certain 
beliefs, but not the core of essentialism. This view had previously been shared by 
Yzerbyt et al. (2004) who called inherence “a proxy for essence” (p. 106). Under 
this view, inherence refers to an underlying nature which is the most basic 
defining feature of essentialism, thus it should be considered as an independent 
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measure (Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006).  
Haslam, Bastian, and Bissett (2004) provided some further evidence for 
this claim. In their experiment they noted that Inherence was, amongst some 
other essentialist beliefs, the more strongly associated with judgments about 
traits defining personal identity. Moreover, in an experiment from 2005, Haslam 
et al. found that only Inherence, amongst other measures of essentialism, played 
a role in self-humanisation processes, and they suggested that Inherence could 
synthesise very well some deep and fundamental traits of human nature.  
In a study from 2006, Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt aimed at providing 
some evidence for why categories are perceived through these two separate 
lenses of Natural-Kind-ness and Entitativity. They also stressed the practicality 
of the findings, since the two dimensions may have different implications for the 
onset of prejudice. Their study focused on the extent to which group membership 
influences essentialist beliefs about other groups. In particular, one of the factors 
that they considered was chosen versus forced membership in a social category, 
where the former factor (CSC) refers to one's own personal choice at being a 
group's member, and the latter factor (FSC) refers to groups for which 
membership does not depend on one's own will and decision.  
Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt (2006) hypothesised that FSC could lead 
to the perception of a greater Natural-Kind-ness as opposed to CSC where the 
perception of Entitativity should prevail. They ran a set of studies in order to test 
four hypotheses: first, they wanted to see whether the structure of essentialist 
beliefs would come out again with the two-factor pattern found by Haslam et al. 
(2000). Then, they looked at whether there would be any differences between 
essentialist beliefs towards FSC and CSC. Also, they hypothesised that the level 
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of Natural-Kind-ness would be higher for FSC and lower for CSC, in contrast to 
the Entitativity level that would be higher for CSC and lower for FSC. Finally, 
they predicted that Inherence would be equivalent for both CSC and FSC groups. 
Their findings confirmed the occurrence of the two-factor structure found 
by Haslam et al. (2000), and showed that higher levels of Natural-Kind-ness 
were perceived for FSC, and higher levels of Entitativity were associated with 
CSC. Moreover, they found that participants had the tendency to divide groups 
on the basis of memberships, with a 2X2 Analysis of Variance showing two 
clusters corresponding to FSC and CSC. Finally, the level of attributed Inherence 
did not differ from FSC to CSC but was equally present for both groups, as they 
had predicted. 
2.4. Psychological essentialism and humanisation 
In this section I will illustrate the concept of humanisation by presenting 
some work that has been conducted in this field of research. The term 
humanisation refers to the attribution of human essences to the self and to other 
individuals. Several terms have been coined in order to provide a definition of 
the different forms of attribution or deprivation of human essences to 
individuals. The purpose of the present section is to clarify the meaning of the 
main terms as well as the research context in which they are relevant. Thus, the 
first part of this section is dedicated to the understanding of the terminology.  
This should provide a good theoretical background from which to move 
on to the description of some of the most relevant studies, with which the second 
part of this section deals. Findings in the field of humanisation bring some very 
insightful knowledge to the understanding of psychological essentialism in all its 
complexity. In particular, understanding the mechanisms of the attribution of 
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essences to the self and to others will help to appreciate in more depth the 
mechanism that underlies essentialist beliefs in intergroup processes and beliefs 
towards categories an individual is not a member of. This aspect is addressed by 
Investigation 2 of Study 1 and Study 2 of this thesis, and is discussed in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4. 
There is a line of research showing how adults and children think of 
races as biological domains, which are attributed phenotypic, personality, and 
behavioural traits that are thought to be representative of the race in question 
(Hirschfeld, 1996; Hirschfeld, 2001). This concept leads to the belief that races 
are characterised by inner essences that are inherited by children from parents. 
Under this view, essences are regarded as more powerful than environmental 
factors or than the bringing up of the offspring (Machery & Faucher, 2005). 
 However, this belief may have a negative connotation. Keller (2005) and 
Lerner (1992) agree upon the fact that biological essentialism increases the level 
of acceptance and justification of discriminatory policies addressed towards 
outgroups, compared to situations where such essentialist rationalization is not 
available. In fact, the concept of humanisation is common in the literature about 
racism and genocides and in all those contexts where a bitter hatred occurs 
between social groups. Lerner (1992) wrote: “the enactment of biological 
determinism into social policies gives us means to make some of our fellow 
humans less than us. Such prejudice leads inevitably to injustice. This all too 
often has enabled murder” (Lerner, 1992; p. 196).  
Some essentialist rhetoric seems to have favoured genocides and ethnic 
cleansing, and beliefs in group essences are possibly related to prejudice, 
discrimination, and social conflict (Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2006). 
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Haslam (2006) remarked that despite the re-occurrence of dehumanisation 
processes throughout history and the cruelty that still now accompanies 
devaluation of other social groups and individuals, until a few years ago the 
phenomenon raised little attention within the social sciences. 
By definition, humanisation is a theoretical concept that consists in 
“making more human”, or in attributing an individual a certain extent of positive 
human qualities, such as individuality, benevolence, and personal warmth. The 
term dehumanisation is its opposite, and consists in the mental act of depriving 
individuals of their human qualities. On the other hand, the term infra-
humanisation is used in ingroup and outgroup contexts and refers to the tendency 
of individuals to regard outgroup members as less human than ingroup members 
(Rodríguez-Pérez et al., 2011). Leyens et al. (2001) claimed that essentialising 
social groups might involve rebutting their human essence and might therefore 
lead to infra-humanisation processes. 
Haslam et al. (2005) highlighted the importance of the distinction 
between “human nature characteristics” and “uniquely human characteristics”. 
The occurrence of two different senses of humanness was observed in an 
investigation upon the two different concepts of human nature (HN) and 
uniquely human (UH) traits run by Haslam et al. (2005). The term human nature 
refers to biological, immutable, and deep properties that are typical of the human 
species and universal across all human beings. They are thought to appear early 
in life, to be constituted of emotions, and to be universal and prevalent (Haslam 
et al., 2005). For instance, they can be summarised as emotional responsiveness, 
interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, individuality, and depth 
(Haslam, 2006).  
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On the other side, there is some agreement in the view that UH traits are 
linked to culture and socialisation, morality and civility, rationality and logic, 
maturity, and refinement (see Schwartz & Struch, 1989; Demoulin et al., 2004; 
Haslam, 2006). These traits may vary across different cultures and also within 
the same society (Haslam et al., 2005).  
As Haslam (2006) argues, these two different senses of humanness find 
their counterpart in two different senses of dehumanisation. Dehumanisation 
takes place when the typical traits of one or the other senses of humanisation are 
denied. When individuals are denied what distinguishes them as human beings 
from non-human beings (e.g., animals) like cognitive and moral traits, they may 
be perceived as animal-like and therefore an animalistic form of dehumanisation 
is applied (Haslam et al., 2008). In this scenario, individuals are thought of as 
“unintelligent, amoral, and uncivilised” (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; p. 116).  
Far from being exclusively an intergroup event, dehumanisation can also 
occur in interpersonal processes, and individuals have been observed to assign 
more human nature traits to themselves than to the rest of the in-group (Haslam 
et al., 2005). Therefore, animalistic dehumanisation is based on the denial of 
uniquely human traits and applies to intergroup and interpersonal processes. 
There is a vast literature in history testifying how human beings have been 
likened to animals and denied their humanness. This form of dehumanisation has 
also been observed to be employed as a political strategy in genocidal conflicts 
(e.g., see the propaganda promulgated against the Jews during the holocaust). 
On the other hand, mechanistic dehumanisation develops from the refusal 
of “human nature” traits and emotions in both interpersonal and intergroup 
processes. Mechanistic dehumanisation consist in comparing individuals to 
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“automata”, denying them traits that are regarded as universal and basic amongst 
the human species. In particular, individuals are deprived of emotional traits, and 
are seen as “cold, rigid, and inert” (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; p. 116). When 
the typical HN traits of emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, and 
individuality are denied, individuals lose what distinguishes them from 
machines. Usually, these individuals are seen as foreigners, distant, or even 
aliens (Haslam, 2006). 
Findings from Leyens et al. (2001; 2003) showed that ingroups are 
attributed a greater deal of human essence (humanness) than outgroups. 
However, this seems to involve exclusively human secondary emotions -- 
perceived to be lacking in individuals from outgroups -- but not primary 
emotions, which are universally attributed to all human kinds. Further studies by 
Gaunt, Leyens, and Sindic (2004) confirm the tendency to deny secondary 
emotions to outgroup individuals, and to attribute a greater amount of positive 
and negative emotions to ingroup members. People seem to understand 
secondary emotions as socially learned rather than inherited through genetic 
transmission, and to make a late appearance in development. 
Haslam et al. (2005) hypothesised that when interpersonal comparison 
occurs, people attribute greater human essences to themselves than to other 
individuals. Also, they differentiated intergroup processes, which involve the 
attribution of uniquely human characteristics, from interpersonal processes, 
which involve the attribution of human nature characteristics. In individual 
contexts, it seems that the perception of individuals is that they personally 
incarnate human essences to a greater extent than others. The reasons for this 
could be many and various, ranging from the perception of a greater depth in 
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one’s own nature, to the fact that it may be more difficult to observe certain 
characteristics in other individuals. 
An interesting study on humanisation was ran by Haslam et al. (2005), 
looking at whether the two different assumptions of humanness -- humanness 
and human uniqueness -- are found in lay-people’s beliefs and, if so, whether 
either one or the other one, or both, are perceived in an essentialist way. The 
concept of human uniqueness is the exact correspondent of humanness, but in 
the context of the infra-humanisation theory (group contexts). The hypothesis 
formulated by Haslam et al. (2005) was that individuals do not attribute uniquely 
human characteristics to outgroup members. 
The study included a pilot study, and had a total of 80 personality 
characteristics assessed on a seven-point Likert scale. Four versions of the 
questionnaire were constructed, counting 20 personality characteristics each, 
which were to be rated on fourteen items of human nature and uniquely human 
traits (e.g., uniquely human: “This characteristic is experienced solely by human 
beings and is not experienced by animals”; human nature: “This characteristic is 
an aspect of human nature”), essentialist beliefs (consistency, immutability, 
informativeness, and inherence), predictors of trait essentialism (emotion, 
desirability, prevalence, and universality), and some predictors of uniquely 
human judgments (age of emergence, cognition, morality, and social learning). 
The study showed that the two concepts of human nature traits and uniquely 
human traits failed to correlate, confirming the occurrence of two distinct 
understandings of human essences. 
For the group of human nature, some qualities like pro-sociality, 
openness, warmth, cognitive flexibility, and also negative emotionality rated 
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high. On the other hand, for the group of uniquely human qualities morality, self-
control, intelligence, and sociality were the most listed features. Three groups of 
judgements were presented in the study. The first group was hypothesised to tap 
into judgements on human nature and essentialism. There was no expectation for 
essentialist beliefs to be associated with uniquely human judgements. The second 
group was also related to human nature judgements but not to essentialist beliefs. 
The third group was related to uniquely human judgements, with the expectation 
that traits are perceived as uniquely human as long as they are considered the 
fruit of social transmission, observed at a relatively late age rather than at birth, 
relevant to morality, and subordinated to cognition. 
The first study confirmed the coexistence of the two distinct concepts of 
human nature and uniquely human characteristics, of which only the former is 
essentialised and located in the Natural Kind domain. Also, individuals rated 
desirable personality characteristics high in the human nature domain, thus it is 
important to keep the self-humanisation concept distinct from the self-
enhancement concept. The former term, self-humanisation, is concerned with the 
attribution of more human nature traits to one’s self than to others. The latter 
term, self-enhancement, consists in the mechanism involving an individual’s 
belief of being above average for positive characteristics and for the likelihood to 
be successful, and below average for negative traits and for the likelihood to face 
adverse events.  
Self-humanisation and self-enhancement were the subjects of the second 
study, which tested the hypothesis that the two concepts are not statistically 
dependent, and that only self-enhancement attributes would positively correlate 
with self-esteem. The results confirmed the distinctness of the two concepts and 
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the association of self-esteem to self-enhancement concepts. Moreover, human 
nature traits were extensively attributed to themselves more than to others, and 
the self-humanisation inclination was observed to be stronger than self-
enhancement, adding new knowledge to how individuals perceive themselves, 
which usually correspond to perceiving themselves above average on some 
positive traits like desirability and humanness. 
A further study (study 3) was run in order to test the robustness of the 
self-humanisation effect, and to investigate the mechanism behind a different 
attribution of human traits to others. Haslam et al. (2005) hypothesised and 
tested some aspects that might function as mediators of the self-humanisation 
process. These ranged from affective and emotional traits, which might be not be 
readily observable from the outside, to personality traits. Also, in light of the 
finding that human nature is essentialised, some elements of essentialism were 
included as mediators of self-humanisation.  
A mediator is an intermediate variable between the predictor and the 
criterion: if held constant with partial correlation the relation between two other 
variables changes. This effect occurs because the first variable has an effect on 
the mediator, which then has an effect on the second variable. Mediators function 
as an explanation of the effect of external factors on individuals’ psychology 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). In order to qualify as mediators, variables must present 
the following conditions: a) variations in the values of the independent variable 
produce variations in the values of the mediator; b) variations in the mediators 
produce variations in the independent variable; c) in cases where mediator and 
dependent variables are controlled there is no significant relationship between 
dependent and independent variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
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The results showed that six out of seven of the mediators used in the 
study were not supported in the analysis, and that the only one supported was 
inherence (Haslam et al., 2005). This might suggest that some traits could be 
rated above average for one’s own traits but not for others because of the 
perception of an underlying and deeply rooted nature. This aspect had also been 
previously discussed by Yzerbyt et al. (2004), who observed that inherence 
represents the most fundamental aspect of essentialism, with the strongest link to 
personal identity than any other element of essentialism.  
Also, a further study was included in the investigation, aiming at 
replicating the effect for self-humanisation observed in study 2 and 3, by using a 
different methodology, which was seen as more suitable for the needs of self-
humanising. Therefore, a set of personality characteristics classified along the 
three dimensions of desirability, human uniqueness, and human nature were 
used. Also, participants had to rate themselves as well as ingroup members, 
rather than outgroup members. The findings revealed that people seem to 
attribute human nature traits to themselves and to the ingroup, but no evidence 
for higher ratings on negative traits for self-humanisation was found.  
The set of studies run by Haslam et al. (2005) discussed above broadens 
our knowledge of the little-explored world of human essentialist beliefs. In broad 
terms, this work shows that individuals attribute human nature traits to 
themselves to a greater extent than to others. Also, it introduced the 
distinctiveness of the two concepts of human nature traits and uniquely human 
traits: if human nature traits are rated above average for one’s self, uniquely 
human traits are perceived as by-products of cultural exposure and are 
assimilated later in life. Human nature traits seem to be bound-up with inborn 
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emotional responsiveness such as “interpersonal warmth”, “openness”, 
“imagination”, and “negative emotionality”, which constitute universal features. 
A possible explanation for this disposition could be that it might 
sometimes be difficult to grasp someone else’s traits, and all the different 
nuances we appreciate in ourselves are not grasped in others. Therefore, Haslam 
and Bain (2007) considered three items to be tested as self-humanising 
moderators, which were “focalism”, “empathy”, and “abstract construal”. This 
study was run because of a lack of research testing moderators in self-
humanisation processes. A moderator -- according to the definition given by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) -- “is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative 
(e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the 
relation between an independent, or predictor, variable, and a dependent, or 
criterion, variable.  
Within a correlational analysis framework, a moderator is “a third 
variable that affects the zero-order correlation between two other variables” 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). Also, given a possible explanation of the self-
humanising process as a way to humanise one’s defects, trait valence was 
introduced as a fourth moderator. The findings from study 1 showed that an 
important part in the self-humanisation process is played by “egocentrism”, 
meaning by this a greater availability of inner trait information, which 
determines a perception of a better match with human nature traits. Also, it is 
thought that a motivation factor comes into play and makes one’s negative traits 
appear more acceptable.  
Study 2 tested abstractness and the hypothesis that a greater portion of 
humanness might be attributed to one’s self due to the difficulty in perceiving 
- 98 - 
other people as real and tangible. In fact, by introducing some minimal 
information about a hypothetical subject to the participants, the results showed 
that self-humanising was drastically reduced by one half and self-enhancement 
by one third. Finally, study 3 examined the empathy mediator. When applying 
empathy in human interactions, a greater understanding of other’s feelings 
should be applied and an inter-subjective proximity should be perceived. 
However, the findings for study 3 did not support the hypothesis about empathy 
(Haslam & Bain, 2007). 
In 2008 Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and Suitner carried out a 
study about animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanisation. The 
investigation was run on an Australian, a Chinese, and an Italian sample of 
participants and aimed to shed light on the likelihood of the two types of 
dehumanisation described above, and to grasp the two extremities of the 
phenomenon.  
The results highlighted a tendency to differentiate humans from non-
humans across the three cultures. Despite some cross-cultural differences, 
animals were generally attributed the same extent of primary emotions as 
humans, but lesser secondary emotions and cognitive skills, and greater 
perceptual skills. On the other hand, robots were attributed a little emotional and 
perceptual ability. Finally, super-human beings (God) were perceived as superior 
in both perceptual and cognitive skills, and similar to humans for emotional 
skills.  
In brief, Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and Suitner (2008) found that 
there was a good match between these findings and the results from Haslam’s 
(2006) model of de-humanisation, where emotions and aspirations are found to 
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be the essence of human nature and also constitute the dividing lines between 
human beings and robots. On the other side, human uniqueness traits -- like 
cognition and secondary emotions -- differentiate human beings from animals. 
2.5. Psychological essentialism and the perception of individuals and groups 
Section 1.6 discussed categorisation in general terms by providing a 
definition for it and describing the main theories of categorisation. The purpose 
of this section is to outline the process of social categorisation in individual 
contexts, and to provide a conceptual framework for Study 4. Study 4 looked at 
how a target individual’s personality traits are perceived by individuals who see 
either a photograph of a facial stimulus or read a story about a target individual.  
In this section, the link between social categorisation and psychological 
essentialism will be discussed, and the great amount of empirical evidence 
provided by studies on lay-people’s essentialist beliefs about social groups will 
be considered. To begin with, the need for coherence in the perception and 
categorisation of social partners, which is explained by the concepts of stability 
of traits, unity, and historical continuity, will be mentioned. Then, an outline of 
the basic principles of social perception will be given. Finally, some relevant 
studies that explored two of the tendencies that are connected to social 
categorisation will be described. They are the attribution of underlying realities 
to social categories, and the mechanism of devaluation and prejudice.  
In the past few decades, one of the main areas of interest for social 
psychologists has been the study of social perception -- how people view others. 
Since the dawn of social psychology the two main points of investigation have 
been the perception of individuals and the perception of social groups. Subjects 
use information to evaluate individuals and groups, and to build their mental 
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representation upon it. In the literature, the perception of individuals and groups 
has been addressed as two distinct phenomena (for accounts on impression 
formation see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1980; Wyer et al, 1984; and 
for accounts on intergroup perception see Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Rothbart et 
al., 1978).  
However, some authors have highlighted the similarities that underpin 
the mechanism of social perception towards individuals and groups and proposed 
that the two phenomena are processed by the same rules (Hamilton & Sherman, 
1996). Hamilton and Sherman (1996) observed that people make some 
spontaneous assumptions about individuals when information is processed. This 
mechanism appears to be different when making judgements about groups, 
which instead seems to be based on the information stored in memory. 
On the other hand, the main point in perceiving individuals is to 
understand their personality traits and therefore the main focus becomes 
processing the prominent information instantly. Also, when individuals 
experience a lack of coherence, they seem less prone to acknowledge identity to 
groups but more prone to attribute it to individuals, and generally they expect 
less entitative qualities like coherence, internal organisation, and uniformity from 
groups than from individuals (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The results of 
Hamilton and Sherman’s (1996) investigation showed that whereas people tend 
to yield different expectations for individuals and for groups, the process by 
which these expectations are determined is similar. 
One of the fundamental postulates about social perception states that 
individuals are perceived as single and coherent entities, and this principle leads 
to a unified and coherent vision of other individuals: they are entities with their 
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inherent traits and essences and with the same internal characteristics which 
remain stable through time. This concept links to the view of historical 
continuity as discussed in section 1.3. Historical continuity is observed since 
early infancy and refers to the fact that perception of identity is maintained 
through time. This is testified by people’s tendency to use the same name for 
individuals through time in spite of the developmental changes that make their 
physical appearance or character change consistently (Frazier & Gelman, 2009; 
Sorrentino, 2001). 
Back in 1946 Asch argued that “each person confronts us with a large 
number of diverse characteristics...yet our impression is from the start unified; it 
is the impression of a person” (Asch, 1946; p. 258). This assumption of unity in 
others seems to be the main driver in social perception, and what is inferred is 
“unity, consistency, and essence” (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; p. 337). 
According to Hamilton & Sherman (1996), this is the first and main postulate 
from which all the other laws of social perception derive. 
The second principle is expressed by stability. Some studies highlighted 
the expectation of stability over time in individuals’ personality. Lutsky et al. 
(1994) carried out a study where they questioned participants about trait stability 
over a period of 20 years in two target people they knew well. The results 
showed that very high stability was expected in most traits. The third principle of 
social perception states that the perception of a target person is organised 
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). In fact, it was observed that when two or more 
traits are observed in a target person, they are organised as part of a dynamic 
structure (Asch, 1946). The fourth principle states that perceivers try to 
understand and solve discrepancies in a target person’s behaviour (Hamilton & 
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Sherman, 1996). Accordingly, when inconsistencies are observed in a target 
person’s behaviour, people look into different reasons that could provide an 
explanation (Asch, 1946), and may also draw on the so-called attribution process 
(Hamilton, 1988). 
In order to draw a clear picture of the theories about social perception, I 
will discuss these laws and summarise the main views on the topic in the 
literature. As previously mentioned, these views were named basic principles in 
social perception by Hamilton and Sherman (1996), who suggested that they are 
all connected with the first postulate of unity. In social interaction contexts, some 
inferences about an individual’s core personality traits are made by the perceiver, 
and the perceived traits are seen as the expression of inner qualities (Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996). This process was observed within the domain of the theory of 
inference, which suggests that perceivers try to infer internal dispositions from a 
target person’s acts. 
Asch (1946) observed that individuals tend to go from a general idea of a 
social target to a more detailed and coherent one. Some authors talked about a 
primacy effect (Anderson, 1974; Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979), which 
postulates that in memory recall tasks, the first few items presented are recalled 
more frequently than the middle ones (Murdock, 1962). Likewise, Asch (1946) 
talked about the primacy effect by observing that when individuals are described 
by a list of traits, the first traits in the list influence the evaluation of the last 
ones. The second principle of social perception posits that consistency is 
expected in the personality of a target person (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). This 
assumption means that perceivers expect to observe information that is 
consistent with the first impression they had of a target person (Asch, 1946; 
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Lutsky et al., 1994). 
Individuals seem to have a perception of the differences between their 
own and other groups, and between their own and other cultures. A 
psychological distance from “us” and “them” -- between the ingroup and the out-
group -- has been observed in the perception that individuals have of others. This 
mechanism has been broadly discussed in Social Psychology, and also linked to 
subjective essentialism. Through the mechanism of psychological essentialism 
similar essences can be attributed to “us” -- like sharing a language, or having 
the same cultural background, or aspiring to common goals -- thus people feel 
more similar to individuals who share the same essences and different from those 
who do not have them (Leyens et al., 2000).  
The mechanism of attribution of an underlying nature to social categories 
has been identified with the term “biological components of psychological 
essentialism” and was investigated in a series of studies by Keller (2005). These 
studies aimed at analysing the role of the biological component of psychological 
essentialism in social processes like stereotyping, prejudice, and political 
attitudes. Particularly, Keller (2005) looked at some conservative political 
attitudes such as the protestant work ethic, patriotism, and nationalism, which 
seem to be related to essentialist beliefs (see Allen, 1994; Lewontin, Rose, & 
Kamin, 1984). His investigation departed from previous studies showing that 
people believe that social categories have a natural and entitative nature 
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Haslam et al., 2000; 2002; 2004; Rothbart & 
Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). 
According to Keller (2005), essentialist beliefs about social groups may 
be associated with a mechanism of devaluation. Previous research showed that 
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essentialist beliefs about social categories seem to provide a fertile soil for 
prejudice (Haslam et al., 2002; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Martin & Parker, 1995; 
Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2001), to favour infra-humanisation 
tendencies (Demoulin et al., 2009), and to legitimise social disparities 
(Verkuyten, 2003). 
Likewise, research by Haslam et al. (2002) showed that essentialist 
beliefs might be linked to sexism and racism, although in the study a lack of 
consistency between essentialist beliefs and measures of prejudice was 
highlighted. Despite the extensive literature in the subject, Keller (2005) 
criticised a lack of strong evidence supporting the relationship between 
essentialist beliefs and prejudice. What he found was a significant relationship 
between essentialist beliefs as measured by his BGD Scale (Belief in Genetic 
Determinism) and distinct socio-political attitudes, and some evidence which 
showed a functional role played by essentialist beliefs in justifying and 
rationalizing a given social order. His findings confirmed what was previously 
hypothesised by Yzerbyt et al. (1997), and also the fact that the biological 
component of psychological essentialism is a determinant in motivated social 
cognition. 
This argument was further explored by Rangel and Keller (2011), who 
argued that the Belief in Genetic Determinism (BGD) does not constitute the 
only scale in determining essentialist beliefs, but that the approach should be 
complemented by the concept of Belief in Social Determinism (BSD), which 
acknowledges the role of social factors in shaping an individual's essential traits. 
Rangel and Keller (2011) claim that both BGD and BSD concur in the making of 
essentialist beliefs and this was eventually supported by the results of their 
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investigation, where it was observed that both concepts predict the negative 
consequences of prejudice and discrimination. Particularly, it was observed that 
BSD serves as a justification of the negative attitudes towards other individuals, 
and represents a pervasive lay-theory. Therefore, essentialism seems to involve 
various forms of determinism such as biological, historical, and social (Yzerbyt 
& Demoulin, 2010). 
Some recent investigations put the accent on the connection between 
social categorisation and essentialist beliefs. A study conducted by Bastian, 
Loughnan, and Koval (2011) tested the implications that beliefs about 
differences among individuals have for automatic responses. They administered 
a measure of essentialist beliefs borrowed from former work (see Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; 2008) on a sample of 102 participants. The measure utilised, 
called ES+, is based on evidence showing that essentialist thinking is related to 
beliefs about human traits such as Immutability, Biological Basis, Discreteness, 
and Informativeness (see Haslam et al., 2000). Participants also completed four 
sets of trials of the Go No-go Association Task (GNAT) designed by Nosek and 
Banaji (2001) about the four concepts of Asian-good, Asian-bad, Caucasian-
good, and Caucasian-bad (Bastian, Loughnan, & Koval, 2011).  
The automatic responses were measured through the model designed by 
Paladino and Castelli (2008). The study showed that individuals who have 
essentialist beliefs about human traits (e.g., attribution of distinctiveness, 
stability, and informativeness) are likely to perform some body responses upon 
the group membership of target individuals. The automatic motor activation 
responses that were observed in Bastian, Loughnan, and Koval’s (2011) 
experiment as a reaction to group membership seem to testify a strong link 
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between essentialist beliefs and categorisation processes, which would go 
beyond negative or positive connotations attributed to the target category.  
In fact, even in the absence of prejudicial thoughts about the outgroup, 
subjects showed a prompter activation of their motor responses in presence of an 
exemplar representing the ingroup (Bastian, Loughnan, & Koval, 2011). Bastian, 
Loughnan, and Koval (2011) argued that preference for the ingroup may be 
automatic and that this effect could represent the ground for developing 
prejudicial sentiments towards the outgroup. Therefore, motor-responses to one's 
own group are more immediate and automatic than responses for the outgroup 
even if beliefs towards the outgroup are neither positively nor negatively 
connoted (Bastian, Loughnan, & Koval, 2011).  
2.6. The effect of culture in cross-cultural differences in cognitive style 
This section will discuss the occurrence of cultural differences in 
cognitive styles, and the effect of different cultural contexts in human cognition. 
At the beginning of the section some introduction will guide the reader through 
the most significant positions in the field, whereas in the second part some 
empirical work providing evidence about differences between the eastern and 
western hemispheres, and between Mediterranean and Anglophone cultures, is 
presented. Discussion of studies about the perception of the world by easterners 
and westerners will offer the reader first insight into these differences. Thus, the 
discourse will narrow down to evidence about more specific dissimilarities 
between northern and southern Europeans, which is directly relevant to the 
present work. The final part of the section will then illustrate laypeople’s beliefs 
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This section aims to provide some theoretical background supporting the 
hypothesis of cultural changes in essentialist beliefs, which is one of the aspects 
investigated in the first and second studies presented in this thesis. In particular, I 
looked at the impact of multiculturalism in essentialist beliefs and of cultural 
differences in cognitive styles, and expected that a sample of subjects from 
multicultural contexts would produce less strong essentialist beliefs about others’ 
categories than a sample of subjects from mono-cultural contexts (Verkuyten, 
2005). Empirical evidence supports theories about the occurrence of some 
differences in the cognitive style of individuals from eastern and western 
cultures (Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Nisbett, 2003), and from Anglophone and 
Mediterranean cultures (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1993).  
According to Cole et al. (1971), “Every culture has its myths. One of the 
most persistent is that non-literate people in less developed countries possess 
something we like to call a “primitive mentality” that is both different from and 
inferior to our own. This myth has it that the “primitive mind” is highly concrete, 
whereas the “western mind” is highly abstract; the “primitive mind” connects its 
concrete ideas by rote associations, whereas the “western mind” connects its 
abstract ideas by general relations; the “primitive mind” is illogical and 
insensitive to contradictions, whereas the “western mind” is mature and rational, 
and so on and on. In its most frightening form this myth includes the claim that 
these differences are genetically based [.....]. The same stereotype is likely to be 
applied to ethnic minorities living in the West.” (Cole et al., 1971; p. vii). 
In order to test the myth mentioned above, many researchers in the Social 
Sciences have focused their work on what the differences and the similarities 
amongst different cultures are. In his preface of the book “The Cultural Context 
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of Learning and Thinking” (Cole et al., 1971), Miller argued that if different 
minds occur in some aspects of cognition, they are to be seen as the result of 
cultural influences rather than of evolution.  
By the term cognition we want to make reference to the many cognitive 
processes that come into play in the understanding of the world (Frith, 2008). 
Cognitive styles consist in an individual’s pattern in perception, thinking, 
learning, relationship making, and problem solving (Witkin et al., 1977). Also, 
they can be thought of as the individual differences in perceiving the stimuli of 
the environment and the use and organisation of the information provided by the 
environment (Van Den Broeck et al., 2002). 
One of the biggest questions about cultural influence is how human 
cognition is shaped by culture and by the context where an individual’s live 
happens. A belief that has accompanied anthropologists for a long time, until 
about half of the 19th century, was that cultural differences cause cognitive 
differences. This position has been supported by Boas (1911), who claimed that 
“the existence of a mind absolutely independent of conditions of life is 
unthinkable” (p. 133), and that “the functions of the human mind are common to 
the whole of humanity” (p. 135). This position is shared by Mesquita, Feldman-
Barrett, and Smith (2010), who argued that: “The unity of selection is not the 
gene but the individual, who, for the purpose of molecular genetics, can be 
thought of as a bundle of genes that are turned on and off by our DNA, which is 
regulated by the epigenetic context” (p. 2).  
These views strongly support the importance of the environment in the 
making of individuals. Some authors also point out that westerner psychologists 
too often carry out their investigations in a way that reinforces psychological 
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essentialism and shifts the attention away from some very important matters, like 
for instance, the importance of contexts (Mesquita, Feldman-Barrett, & Smith, 
2010). This approach has led to a fragmentation of cognitive and emotional 
processes and to a treatment of them as separated issues. For this reason, I would 
like to explain, in this section of the present chapter, how contextual factors and 
mental processes cohabit and influence each others in a constant and dynamic 
manner.  
A strand of research shows how different contexts cause different 
emotional and physical responses in biological kinds. For example, studies on 
rats show how, in the presence of a threat, rats behave differently: if left free to 
run away they would do so and their blood pressure decreases, but if restrained 
their blood pressure would rise (Iwata & LeDoux, 1988). This evidence recalls 
the context principle, which refers to the fact that all human processes -- from 
behaviour, to emotions, and thoughts -- are caused by the continuous and 
constant interaction with the environment. The contextual entities may range 
from the physical environment, to cognitive processes, to the socio-cultural 
environment (Mesquita, Feldman-Barrett, & Smith, 2010).  
This theory in psychology is not new. In fact, it dates back to Wundt’s 
(1916) theories about the influence of the social surroundings in an individual’s 
make-up, but also to other theories from the first few decades of the 20th century 
(e.g., Lewin, 1935). In more recent years, Mischel and Shoda (2008) argued how 
individuals’ behaviours are not the result of essential features, but the product of 
the interaction between contextual factors and personal character, and that social 
influence is the key to grasp an individual’s personality in a holistic way. In 
Bruner’s (1990) words: “contexts shape the human mind by imposing the 
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patterns inherent in the culture’s symbolic systems -- its language and discourse 
mode, the forms of logical and narrative explication, and the patterns of mutually 
dependent communal life” (p. 4). 
The position upheld by the cross-cultural approach to differences in 
cognitive styles is that the basic cognitive processes are universally shared 
amongst human kinds, but different abilities are produced by the employment of 
different cognitive abilities based on the requirements of the environment (Berry 
et al., 2002). This belief had been previously disseminated by Ferguson (1956) 
and is shared by the ecological perspective of Berry (1980).  
The ecological analysis’ point of view is that the ecological demands of 
the environment set the actions for survival, and that cultural support facilitates 
the development of the most suitable cognitive skills. This approach includes the 
idea of the presence of a number of universal abilities (abilities baseline) shared 
by human kinds, which are affected by ecological requirements that determine 
the development of some patterns of abilities. In a similar opinion, Cole et al. 
(1971) said that “people will be good at doing things that are important to them, 
and that they have occasion to do often” (p. xi).  
2.6.1. Cultural differences between East and West 
Contemporary cultures may be considered as the by-product of the 
ancient cultures from which they have been generated. The two main lanes of 
thought that are still regarded as conceptually different in many respects are the 
western and the eastern philosophies. They represent two approaches to life, the 
matrix from which the destiny of the two hemispheres of the globe developed, 
and can be traced back to ancient times. That would be the time where ancient 
Greek philosophers debated over the matters of the world in a place near 
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Syntagma Square in Athens, and the time where Confucius elaborated the 
concepts of morality, justice, and sincerity as rules to be employed for the 
collective benefit (Nisbett, 2003).  
The two cultures have developed in profoundly different ways. On the 
one hand the Greeks, the promoters of individuality and democracy, were the 
supporters of what they defined as the most peculiar traits in human beings -- 
curiosity -- as a path towards the understanding of one’s own interiority, talents, 
and of the external world. On the other hand the Chinese, who regarded harmony 
as the highest ambition in societies, a value to be accomplished through the 
individual and collective effort of respecting others by controlling the self. For 
them, the perfect society would be the one where the contribution of every single 
individual is not lost but harmonically coexists with the individuality of all the 
other members (Nisbett, 2003).  
Although analysis of the differences between East and West goes beyond 
the purpose of this section, they are mentioned because represent an interesting 
testimony of how cultural backgrounds influence individuals. For instance, in 
these two models of society mental processes differentiate profoundly. In fact, 
on the contrary of the values of harmonic coexistence promoted by 
Confucianism in the East, in western cultures individuals are free to face conflict 
when interacting with people with different points of view, and so can practise 
their dialectic tools and lead debate.  
Oyserman and Lee (2008) carried out an investigation on the literature 
about the role of collectivism and individualism in what and how individuals 
think. These two terms refer to some important differences in the structure of 
societies and in the relationships amongst individuals, and have been the focus of 
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scholarship about the understanding of psychological processes (Oyserman, 
Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). Collectivist cultures perceive groups as the core 
of societies, where individuals exist in function of their group memberships and 
social relationships. Instead, individualistic cultures see individuals as the unit of 
measure for societies, whose purpose is to promote the prosperity of their 
members. Societies that are identified as collectivist are for example the Asian 
and Chinese culture, whereas societies that are thought of as individualistic are 
those identified with the western hemisphere.  
It is believed that life experiences of individuals would vary considerably 
in the two contexts, and that this would also lead to the use of some cognitive 
processes (e.g., inclusion) rather than others (e.g., exclusion) (see Oyserman & 
Lee, 2008). In this respect, the literature provides some empirical evidence about 
the characteristics of individuals from individualistic cultures as opposite to 
those from collectivistic cultures. This evidence can be summarised in five 
points: 1) in individualistic settings collective values will decrease in favour of 
individualistic values; 2) one’s own self-concept will make a bigger use of 
personal traits than collective traits; 3) the obligations towards others will 
decrease; 4) well-being will be linked to personal success rather than social 
obligations; 5) cognitive strategies will favour contrast and distinction rather 
than assimilation and integration (Oyserman & Lee, 2008).  
For what concerns cognitive styles, in particular, results showed that 
individuals that belong to collectivist cultures are more likely to include and 
relate information rather than exclude and separate it. On the contrary, 
individuals that belong to individualist societies are more likely to contrast and 
separate information rather than integrating it. Likewise, further studies 
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highlighted some differences in the speed of tasks completion between subjects 
from the two cultural settings (Oyserman et al., 2008).  
A further theoretical position about different ways of seeing the world 
was proposed by Witkin et al. (1962) through the psychological differentiation 
theory, which was elaborated within the empirical work on field-dependence. 
The concept of psychological differentiation states that different biological and 
psychological conditions may produce different cognitive styles (Witkin et al., 
1962). According to this conceptualisation, the two main cognitive styles 
individuated in human kinds are the field-dependent and the field-independent 
style. Field dependence consists in the extent to which the surrounding 
background influences the perception of an object, and was investigated by 
Witkin and colleagues (1962; 1977) in a series of studies in which it was 
observed that a set of abilities -- and in particular cognitive and social skills -- 
seemed to be related to each other as if they were a pattern.  
In a paper from 1977, Witkin and Goodenough argued that in ambiguous 
situations social referents are used by field-dependent people to resolve 
confusion. Field-dependent people rely more on social cues and are socially 
orientated: they show closer physical proximity with social partners, are more 
interactive with other individuals, and show emotional openness. Generally, 
field-dependent people are defined by a positive attitude in social interactions 
and by a set of positive social skills. On the other hand, field-independent people 
tend to maintain physical distance with their social partners, and to prefer non-
social situations. They are more autonomous in ambiguous situations, have poor 
social skills and little interest in social interactions. Instead, they show very good 
skills in cognitive analysis.  
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In view of the results of the work on field-dependence, Witkin and Berry 
(1975) argued that people who live in tight social settings, and people whose job 
involves a certain level of cooperation and coordination with other individuals 
(e.g., subjects from agricultural settings) are more field-dependent than those 
who live in loose social structures and whose occupation is relatively free from 
social links and roles (e.g., subjects from hunting settings). Likewise, it is 
thought that educated individuals and particularly people from a western 
educational background would be more field-independent (Witkin & Berry, 
1975). 
The work presented above supports evidence for the fact that cultural 
differences shape different minds in the two hemispheres of the globe. However, 
evidence about cross-national differences is also available and will be introduced 
in the next sub-section.  
2.6.2. Cross-cultural studies about differences in cognitive styles 
A series of experiments show that cultural differences are to be found not 
only between easterners and westerners, but also between subgroups of the 
western culture. For example, in a study carried out by Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (1993) some striking differences were observed between the group 
composed of the Anglophones (including the British, the Canadians, the North-
Americans, the Australians, and also the Swedish) and the group of the 
Mediterraneans (including the Italians, the Spanish, the French, the Belgians, and 
also the Germans). 
The study was run with the impressive sample of 15.000 participants, 
recruited through seminars for company managers. The investigators aimed at 
exploring the value that the participants attributed to individual distinction versus 
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harmony with the group through the preference given to jobs in which 
individuality is encouraged and valued, and jobs in which everyone works 
together for the benefit of the whole group. The sample was composed of 
Americans, Canadians, Australians, British, Dutch, Swedish, Belgians, Germans, 
French, Italians, Spaniards, Singaporeans, Koreans, and Japanese.  
The results saw the majority (90%) of Americans, Canadians, British, 
Australians, Dutch, and Swedish preferring jobs were individuality is more 
valued, whereas this was true for only the 50% of the Asians. The percentage for 
participants from the rest of Europe was in between the two trends. This result 
was also replicated in two subsequent experiments run by Hampden-Turner and 
Trompenaars (1993), showing a tendency for people from Anglo-Saxon cultures 
to hold opposite views from people from Asian cultures, and for the rest of the 
Europeans to fall in between these two trends.  
A further investigation run by Maass, Karasawa, Politi, and Suga (2006) 
provided evidence of cross-national differences in the use of language and 
demonstrated that in the Japanese culture concrete language that make use of 
context-limiting verbs as descriptors is preferred, whereas in the Italian culture a 
use of a more abstract language that favour non contextual adjectives is more 
likely to be employed.  
2.6.3. Differences between traditional and modern cultures 
In 1966 Levy-Strauss borrowed the term “primitive mind” (termed 
“mentalité primitive” in the French version of his book “La Pensee Sauvage”) 
from Boas (1911) in order to refer to primitive cultures. He specified that the use 
of this term did not want to downgrade primitive cultures and to say that they 
have a lower cognitive potential. Instead, he argued that both western and non-
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western cultures develop strategies with the similar intent to understand the real 
world through rationality. However, some differences are found in the strategies 
employed, which would be closer to tangible properties in non-western cultures, 
and be more inferential in western cultures. 
Modern societies can be defined through the two opposite trends of 
individualisation and globalisation. The former term refers to the fact that one’s 
own individuality becomes the referent for values, attitudes, aspirations, and 
goals. Thus, individuals follow their own values for personal fulfilment in an 
autonomous fashion (Van Den Broeck et al., 2002). The latter term refers to 
modern life as an event occurring in a “global village” (Robertson, 1992; p. 8), 
where constant confrontation amongst different cultures is experienced and 
foreign values become known and assimilated.  
2.6.4. Cultural differences in essentialist beliefs 
In view of the fact that there are some features that are universally shared 
by all human beings, some beliefs about other individuals happen to be similar 
from one culture to another. For example, some interesting similarities have been 
observed in the perception of the stability of psychological traits amongst young 
American children and young Hindu children (Miller, 1987). However, cultural 
differences in beliefs also occur. For instance, some authors argued that 
ideologies about one’s own and others’ culture are passed from parents to 
children, and that this process starts from birth and continues through life 
(Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003).  
Whereas some general beliefs -- or folk-psychologies -- are more likely 
to be transmitted from an early age, variations in beliefs through development 
suggest that some of them become more familiar at a later stage of life (Lockhart 
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et al., 2009). In a cross-cultural study about the stability of psychological traits in 
individuals, it was observed that young children (aged between 5 and 6 years) 
from Japan and from America were very optimistic about the possibility for 
negative traits to change over time. On the contrary, older children (between 8 
and 10 years old) were more likely to attribute changes to personal effort. The 
results from the adult sample showed a different trend, as adults generally 
viewed personality traits as inborn and thus more essentialists. The findings of 
the study also highlighted some differences between the two cultures. In 
particular, Japanese participants overall showed a greater level of optimism 
towards the stability of positive traits and the possibility for negative traits to 
change (Lockhart et al., 2009).  
To conclude, social practices are not just a way to structure societies or to 
approach life matters. Instead, they consist in the extent to which different 
visions of the world are implemented (Nisbett, 2003). However, psychological 
and cognitive characteristics are not immutable, and a person would greatly 
modify his behaviour, his social interactions, and his self-concept, after 
experiencing life in different cultural contexts (Nisbett, 2003). 
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3.1. Introduction 
In everyday life people are immersed in a context of social relationships 
and from an early age they become familiar with social labels. According to 
Goldman (1999), human life is a process leading towards knowledge, discovery, 
and understanding of new information; the two main driving forces being 
practical needs and curiosity. By naming categories, and by reflecting on their 
peculiarities, individuals draw a picture of the social environment. From an early 
age individuals are attracted by objects, animals, and other people: they are 
labelled and their inherent meaning explored. In Chapter 1 and 2, I discussed 
how some authors (e.g., Medin, 1989; Gelman, 2003; Bloom & Gelman, 2008; 
Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010) identified psychological essentialism with a 
powerful tool that humans use to go beyond the superficial appearance of things 
and to grasp their deeper structure. 
In Chapter 2, I talked about the substantial growth in interest around 
psychological essentialism that occurred in the past ten years in Psychology. In 
particular, Social and Cognitive Psychology studies have focused attention on 
psychological essentialism as the mechanism that underlies social categorisation 
and stereotype endorsement (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2002), and 
on essentialist beliefs about social categories (Demoulin et al., 2006; Haslam et 
al., 2006; Gelman, 2003; Mahalingam, 2003; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Haslam et 
al. , 2002; Gil-White, 2001; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). 
Research by Haslam et al. (2000) suggests that social categories are 
perceived by people through the lens of essentialist beliefs, and that essentialist 
beliefs are organized along two dimensions: Natural Kind and Entitativity. The 
term Natural Kind refers to the belief people have about certain categories 
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having biological origins, and being characterised by sharp boundaries and 
historical invariance (Haslam et al., 2000). On the other hand, the term 
Entitativity makes reference to lay beliefs about certain social categories being 
inherent, informative, and highly cohesive. 
From about a decade ago, interest in essentialism from a Social and 
Cognitive Psychology perspective has grown considerably, and a series of 
studies have provided some important empirical contributions. In particular, 
Haslam et al. ran a ground breaking investigation in 2000, with which they 
intended to explore lay-people’s essentialist beliefs. This investigation 
constitutes the study upon which the design of Study 1 built, and will be 
illustrated in detail in the next section. Study 1 does not represent a direct 
replication of Haslam et al. (2000) since different social categories were used. In 
fact, a direct replication would involve presenting London participants with 
categories which may not be most meaningful to them. Therefore, Study 1 used a 
procedural replication in which the same methods were used throughout but 
social categories were generated by a sample from the chosen population, rather 
than taken from the US study. This provides a better test of cultural differences, 
which is not biased by selection of materials. 
The following sections -- section 3.3 and 3.4 -- will focus on the 
methodology and results of Study 1, whereas investigation 2 of Study 1 is 
outlined in section 3.5. At the end of the chapter, a general discussion of the 
findings will be provided along with a comparison with Haslam et al. (2000), 
and some conclusions will be drawn.  
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3.2. Overview of a former study on essentialist beliefs 
The experiment carried out by Haslam et al. (2000) aimed at 
investigating three main aspects of essentialist beliefs. The first one was the 
extent to which people essentialise social categories. The second one concerned 
the structure of essentialist beliefs and which beliefs apply to which social 
categories. Finally, they wanted to investigate the link between essentialist 
beliefs and social evaluation.  
The experiment they carried out involved a sample of forty students from 
a conservative mid-West American college (mean age 19.3 years, 31 women and 
9 men), who were asked to rate 40 social categories (such as Male, Homosexual, 
Old, and Liberal) on nine dimensions of essentialism. There were two versions 
of the questionnaire featuring each 20 categories (one category for each domain), 
and each participant rated either one or the other version, with half of the sample 
rating twenty categories only.  
The measures of essentialism had been taken from relevant writings in 
Social Sciences and Philosophy, and included dimensions such as Naturalness 
and Informativeness (see Table 3.1 for a complete list of categories, Table 3.2 
for a list of the Natural Kind measures, and Table 3.3 for a list of the Entitativity 
measures). In the pre-test stage, participants were requested to draw a list of 
categories representative of the American culture upon 20 social domains 
provided by the investigators. A wide range of categories was obtained, of which 
40 were kept for the study. Four versions of the questionnaire were constructed, 
with each version including only one category of the pair of two listed per 
domain. Each questionnaire obtained ratings for twenty categories and was 
randomly distributed to participants. 
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One of the main purposes of Haslam et al.’s (2000) work was to 
understand the structure of essentialist beliefs and to verify the suitability of the 
nine measures of essentialism for the understanding of essentialism. To 
accomplish that, and to see how the nine measures were related to each other, 
correlations between them were calculated across the mean ratings of the 40 
categories on each measure. The results showed both strong and weak 
correlations among the measures of essentialism, with the nine measures 
gathering in two separate clusters.  
The pattern was confirmed by the principle components analysis, 
confirming that a two-component solution would be the most adequate for 
explaining the structure of essentialist beliefs, with its two components be 
represented by the two unrelated ideas of Natural Kind and Entitativity. This 
interpretation was given in light of the fact that high correlations were found 
within the two clusters, with a median inter-correlation of .64, while the median 
correlation between the two clusters was .08. Also, the Principal Component 
Analysis showed that Factor 1 and Factor 2 explained on their own 75.2% of the 
total variance, whereas each additional factor accounted for less than 6.4% of the 
total variance. 
Haslam et al. (2000) observed that Discreteness, Naturalness, 
Immutability, Stability, and Necessity gathered together under the Natural Kind 
dimension (see Table 3.2), whereas Uniformity, Informativeness, Inherence, and 
Exclusivity grouped under the Entitativity dimension (see Table 3.3). Categories 
in domains like Gender, Race, and Ethnicity were assigned high values along the 
Natural Kind attributes, whereas Sexual Orientation, Religious Beliefs, and 
Political Groups were mostly assigned entitative characteristics.  
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However, some within-domain discrepancies were also identified, with 
categories that tend to be stigmatised coming out with higher Entitativity and 
lower Natural Kind values. The more striking incongruities were observed for 
Language, Height, Disease, Sexual Orientation, Appearance, and Race. In 
particular, although the Race domain clustered under Natural Kind, Blacks were 
attributed higher Entitativity than Whites. The same effect was observed for the 
AIDS category, which scored higher in Entitativity than the Cancer group that 
was instead considered more natural. Similarly, Homosexuals had the highest 
rating for Entitativity whereas Heterosexuals were rated as more natural.  
Haslam et al. (2000) suggested that the interaction between Natural Kind 
and Entitativity could be related to the perception of category status. Precisely, 
more naturalized categories seem to have a higher status and to be less prone to 
stigma than those judged as more entitative. They also suggested that when 
making judgements of low status natural categories, people assume that their 
members are very similar to each other and have intrinsic properties. They also 
collected judgments of status for each category and were able to confirm these 
suggestions. 
This aspect was accentuated with categories that are highly essentialised 
on both the entitative and the Natural Kind dimension since they appear more 
likely to be branded with low status. In consideration of their results, the 
argument that Haslam et al. (2000) advanced is that essentialist beliefs might be 
connected to stigma and stereotype, and that both Natural-Kind-ness and 
Entitativity determine which social categories are essentialised. They argued that 
the two factors constitute two different approaches to the phenomenon. On the 
one hand, Natural Kind beliefs seem to be more widely embraced amongst 
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individuals and indicate categories that are less easy to change. On the other 
hand, the within-domain substantial fluctuations in Entitativity beliefs seem to 
suggest that such categories could be modified more easily.  
The attribution of Natural-Kind-ness to stigmatised groups also showed 
less variance amongst participants than for Entitativity. These aspects support 
the claim that a helpful way to reduce stigmatisation of certain groups would be 
to modify beliefs in their entitative attributes rather than in their Natural-Kind-
ness. However, the interaction between the two dimensions does not necessarily 
mean that if one of the two dimensions is highly essentialised for a category this 
constitutes a sufficient condition for devaluing such a category. 
3.3. Study 1 
Study 1 was carried out in order to run a systematic investigation about 
some aspects of essentialist beliefs. First, my intention was to verify Haslam et 
al.’s (2000) findings on essentialism, particularly concerning the structure of 
essentialist beliefs and the occurrence of the two dimensions of Natural Kind and 
Entitativity.  
Also, I wanted to explore whether the social environment influences 
essentialist beliefs, and whether the two-component structure identified for the 
US student sample would generalise to other western cultures outside the US. In 
fact, despite some acceptance of the fact that cultural differences produce 
differences in the way people think (e.g., Nisbett, 2003), current research has 
failed to investigate the role of culture in shaping essentialist beliefs about social 
categories.  
Finally, a further purpose of the experiment was to examine the 
perception of the essentialism of those social categories that an individual feels 
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that he/she belongs to, compared to others. Thus, an additional question was 
included in the questionnaire asking respondents to identify the five categories 
with which they most identified themselves, with the aim of seeing whether 
people would hold stronger essentialist beliefs about categories with which they 
identify themselves. 
Study 1 was built on Haslam et al.’s (2000) work and conducted with a 
sample of subjects from London. London is one of the most multicultural cities 
of the world, with large ethnic minority groups from all over the globe. 
Experience of being raised in a multicultural environment can be expected to 
have an effect on social categorisation and on beliefs about other groups. 
Particularly, some authors suggest that experiencing diversity can improve 
people’s attitude towards minority groups (Crisp, 2010a; 2010b), and that 
multiculturalism plays a positive effect on intergroup relations (Richeson & 
Nussbaum, 2004). 
Study 1’s procedure was to replicate Haslam et al.’s (2000) study in 
order to a) verify the generality of the two-component structure, b) measure 
cultural changes in social categorisation, and c) investigate the extent to which 
self-identification influences essentialist beliefs on social categorisation. No 
significant changes were brought to the experiment overall, and the nine items of 
essentialism used in the original study were also employed in Study 1. However, 
to ensure relevance, a new list of social categories was created, with some slight 
difference from the original study, and an additional scale of self-evaluation was 
introduced in order to investigate the weight of category membership in social 
categorisation. The question about status was however not included.  
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The study, similarly to Study 2, was carried out through a web-based 
approach, reflecting an increasing trend in psychological research. Over the past 
years, there have been a number of studies aimed at validating reliability of this 
approach, among which was a study by Buchanan and Smith (1999). In the study 
the responses of 963 individuals who took part in a revised version of Gangestad 
& Snyder's (1985) self-monitoring questionnaire online, were compared to the 
responses of 224 individuals who did a paper and pen version of the same. The 
occurrence of similar psychometric properties in the web-based approach and in 
the paper-and-pen version was highlighted. Generally, most studies have 
confirmed the validity of web-based data collection, which is now an accepted 
method for psychological research. 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participant 
A sample of 123 participants (females = 88), mostly composed of 
students from various universities in London, took part in this study. The age 
ranged from 18 years to over 40, with 80 participants between 18 and 25 years. 
The questionnaire was put online and advertised as a study on social categories 
through leaflets distributed at City University and in other universities in 
London. No participants were excluded from the analysis.  
3.3.1.2. Materials 
Pre-test 
A pre-test was carried out. Fifty first-year undergraduate students from 
City University were administered a brief questionnaire in which they were 
asked to list 20 social categories. In order to help them produce diverse 
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categories, they were invited to think about some social categories into which 
three people they know would fall. A pool of about 70 different categories was 
obtained. The categories obtained were grouped in domains that mirrored those 
used by Haslam et al. (2000), and retained on the basis of the highest frequency. 
The pre-test allowed collecting a range of social categories suitable for the 
English context, and which could also be representative of those investigated by 
Haslam et al. (2000). 
Main Study 
A total of 36 categories were selected, reflecting Haslam et al.’s (2000) 
list for most domains except for 5, which were not represented in the pool 
obtained in the pre-test and were as follows: Disease, Interest, Language, 
Psychiatric Disorder, and Region. Instead, Study 1 had a broader Personality 
Trait domain, which counted two sets of categories. For each domain, the two 
opposite categories with the highest rating were kept. See Table 3.1 for a 
comparison between the sets of categories used in the former study and in Study 
1. 
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Domains Study 1 Haslam, et al. (2000) 
Age groups Old Young Old people Young people 
Dietary 
groups 
Meat-eaters Vegetarians Meat-eaters Vegetarians 
Ethnic 
groups 
British Asians Asians Hispanics 
Gender Male Female Males Females 
Intelligence Talented Intelligent Average  Smart  
Interest 
groups 
  Movie buffs Sports fan 
Language 
groups 
  English 
speakers 
Spanish 
speakers 
Disabilities Blind Sighted Blind people Paraplegic 
Diseases   AIDS 
patients 
Cancer 
patients 
Occupations Students Pensioners Blue-collars Doctors 
Personality Caring Selfish Extroverts Introverts 
 
Shy Friendly   
Physique Attractive Ugly Attractive  Ugly  
Physiques Short Tall Large people Small people 
Political 
groups 
Liberals Conservatives Liberals Republicans 
Psychological 
Disorders 
  Depressives Schizophrenics 
Races Black White Black people White people 
Regions   Easterners Mid-
westerners 
Religions Atheists Believers Catholics Jews 
Sexual 
orientation 
Heterosexuals Homosexuals Heterosexuals Homosexuals 
Education Educated  Non-educated Educated Non-educated 
Social Status Married Single Married Single 
Social classes Upper-class Middle-class Lower-class  Middle-class  
 
Table 3.1. Sets of social categories used in Study 1 and in Haslam, Rothschild 
and Ernst (2000) 
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A ten-question survey was designed, with the nine measures of 
essentialism borrowed from Haslam et al. (2000) used as the first nine questions 
of the questionnaire; no changes from the former study were made on the 
measures. A definition for each measure was given at the top of each screen but 
the names of the measures were omitted. The task involved rating the 36 social 
categories along the nine measures of essentialism on a seven-point Likert scale.  
The nine measures of essentialism were as follows: Discreteness, 
Necessity, Immutability, Stability, and Naturalness (which had previously been 
recorded as Natural Kind measures; see Table 3.2 for complete wording 
according to Haslam et al., 2000); Uniformity, Informativeness, Inherence, and 
Exclusivity (which had previously been recorded as Entitativity measures; see 
Table 3.3 for complete wording according to Haslam et al., 2000). 
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 NATURAL KIND DIMENSION 
MEASURE DEFINITION  
Discreteness Some categories have sharper boundaries than others. For 
some, membership is clear-cut, definite, and of an 
“either/ or” variety; people either belong to the category 
or they do not. For others, membership is more “fuzzy”; 
people belong to the category in varying degrees. 
Necessity Some categories have necessary features or 
characteristics; without these characteristics someone 
cannot be a category member. Other categories have 
many similarities, but no features are necessary for 
membership. 
Immutability Membership in some categories is easy to change; it is 
easy for members to become non-members. Membership 
in other categories is relatively immutable; it is difficult 
for category members to become non-members.  
Stability Some categories are more stable over time than others; 
they have always existed and their characteristics have 
not changed much throughout history. Other categories 
are less stable; their characteristics have changed 
substantially over time and they may not have always 
existed.  
Naturalness Some categories are more natural than others, whereas 
others are more artificial. 
 
Table 3.2. Natural Kind measures according to Haslam et al. (2000) 
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 ENTITATIVITY DIMENSION 
MEASURE DEFINITION  
Uniformity Some categories contain members who are very similar 
to one another; they have many things in common. 
Members of these categories are relatively uniform. 
Other categories contain members who differ greatly 
from one another, and don’t share many characteristics.  
Informative-
ness 
Some categories allow people to make many judgments 
about their members; knowing that someone belongs to 
the category tells us a lot about that person. Other 
categories only allow a few judgments about their 
members; knowledge of membership is not very 
informative.  
Inherence Some categories have an underlying reality; although 
their members have similarities and differences on the 
surface, underneath they are basically the same. Other 
categories also have similarities and differences on the 
surface, but do not correspond to an underlying reality.  
Exclusivity Some categories do not allow their members to belong to 
other categories; belonging to such a category excludes a 
person from these other categories. On the other hand, 
some categories do not limit which other categories their 
members can belong to; they do not exclude a person 
from these categories.  
 
Table 3.3. Entitativity measures according to Haslam et al. (2000) 
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A tenth item, called “Self-Categorisation Scale”, was introduced in order 
to investigate how membership in a social category affects beliefs in the 
essentialism of that category. This scale required the participants to indicate 
which five categories out of the list of 36 they felt would best describe them.  
Through this scale, it would be possible to consider how people judged 
their own categories on the essentialism measures, and to make a comparison 
with the ratings of others-categories. The scale would help to clarify the extent to 
which membership in a category influences the perception of that category. My 
hypothesis was that the categories with which the participants identified 
themselves would receive more essentialist judgements on Natural-Kind-ness 
and less essentialist judgements on Entitativity (based on the link between higher 
status, higher naturalness, and lower Entitativity established by Haslam et al., 
2000).  
According to previous research (Cortes et al., 2005), people’s perception 
of their ingroup reflects the belief that the ingroup has more distinctive qualities 
than outgroups. Furthermore, Demoulin et al. (2006) carried out some studies on 
social categories where the membership was either forced or chosen. According 
to their definition, forced social categories (FSC) are the ones that can be 
explained as biologically based, like gender, ethnicity, and age. On the other 
hand, chosen social categories (CSC) correspond to non-biological social 
categories, such as profession, education, and political beliefs. Their study 
revealed that categories that belong to forced social categories may be 
considered higher in naturalness than categories that belong to chosen social 
categories (Demoulin et al., 2006). 
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Moreover, according to Rothbart and Taylor’s (1992) definition, Natural 
Kind categories are independent from people’s will. These categories are 
distinguished by a low internal coherence since their members are very different 
from each others. On the other hand, what Demoulin et al. (2006) call CSC 
correspond to entitative groups whose group members shared distinctive features 
even before joining the group. As an example, I could mention the fact that an 
individual may have certain political beliefs before joining a political party. The 
event of having certain characteristics in common (e.g., attitudes, beliefs) make 
members of entitative groups be attributed high levels of internal coherence and 
of inductive potential (Demoulin et al., 2006).  
3.3.1.3. Procedure & Design 
The questionnaire was completed online. Participants did not receive a 
monetary compensation but had the opportunity to enter a prize draw for 
Amazon vouchers. Students from City University could additionally gain one 
course credit. 
On the first screen of the questionnaire, a brief explanation of the nature 
of the study was given. Also, the meaning of the term “social categories” was 
clarified and the structure of the study outlined, as follows: 
“Welcome to this study on Social categories. Social categories are the 
way in which people can be divided into groups with labels. They are ways of 
categorizing or pigeon-holing people. I would like to investigate how people 
perceive common Social Categories and you will be asked to rate a number of 
categories on different scales. 
Completing this questionnaire is entirely voluntary, and your data will be 
kept confidential and anonymous. Your name will not appear in the data. 
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There are no right or wrong answers to these questions but your answers 
are vital to the success of this study, so please think carefully before responding. 
There are 9 scales to judge all together, and there will be 2 pages of categories 
to judge for each scale. There is an additional page in which you are requested 
to indicate which categories you belong to. Thank you in advance for your 
help”. 
Prior to participation, participants’ consent was collected along with 
some demographics (gender, age, ethnic group, nationality, and English 
proficiency). 
The set of 36 categories was divided into 2 lists of 18 by picking up one 
category per domain in order to present only one category for each domain at the 
time. The order of presentation of the categories for the two lists of categories 
remained the same. From the third screen onwards, each screen showed the 
definition of one of the nine measures of essentialism, and the first set of 18 
categories. The next screen would then show the same measure of essentialism 
with the second set of 18 categories. No time limit was set although an average 
of 30 minutes was given as an indication for completing the task, and a bar on 
top of the screen showed progress through the study. 
The study was put online and remained available for a period of two 
months. Different versions of the questionnaire were constructed, and the two 
versions A (scales presented in ascending order from 1 to 9) and B (scales 
presented in descending order from 9 to 1) were given in an alternating 
succession by the system in order to have an average of 50% for each version at 
the end of the administration. In both version 1 and version 2, and as in Haslam 
et al.’s (2000) experiment, five items -- Scale 2 Uniformity, Scale 3 
- 137 - 
Informativeness, Scale 4 Naturalness, Scale 5 Immutability, and Scale 6 Stability 
-- were reverse-keyed. The system was set in order to allow participants to 
proceed to the next page only after rating all the items on the existing page. 
The ratings for each scale are listed in Table 3.4. 
 
Numeration MEASURE   
1 Discreteness 1= clear-cut 
 
7= fuzzy/indefinite 
2 Uniformity 1= diverse/differing 
 
7= uniform/similar 
 
3 Informative-
ness 
1= few 
judgments/uninform
ative 
7= many 
judgments/informative 
4 Naturalness 1= artificial 
 
7= natural 
 
5 Immutability 1= easily 
changed/mutable 
7= not easily 
changed/immutable 
6 Stability 1= unstable over 
time/ change much 
7= stable over 
time/change little 
7 Inherence 1= underlying reality 
or sameness 
7= non underlying 
reality or sameness 
8 Necessity 1= necessary 
features or 
characteristics 
7= non necessary 
features or 
characteristics 
9 Exclusivity 1= exclude other 
categories  
7= non exclude other 
categories 
 
Table 3.4. Ratings for the nine measures of essentialism according to Haslam et 
al. (2000). The reverse keying is shown in the Table. Scales 1, and 7-9 had a 
rating of 1 as high for essentialism, and scales 2-6 had a rating of 7 as high.  
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On the final screen, participants were shown the 36 categories and were 
asked to check the five categories which they considered best described them, 
according to the instructions below: 
“The following are the social categories that you have been asked to 
categorize in the previous nine scales. Please indicate which five of these 
categories you belong to by clicking in the box provided”. 
3.4. Results  
The results will be presented and discussed in two sections. The first 
section presents the replication of the analysis conducted by Haslam et al. (2000) 
looking at the structure of essentialist beliefs by running a PCA on the nine 
measures of essentialism. In the second section the results of the data concerning 
self-identification with particular categories are discussed.  
3.4.1. Structure of essentialist beliefs 
One of the purposes of this study was to see whether the results from 
Haslam et al. (2000) would be replicated in a different social context. Thus, 
whereas the former study tested a sample of mid-western American students 
from a conservative college, Study 1’s participants were sampled in London, 
which is the symbol of multiculturalism and where diversity is culturally valued 
and promoted.  
As a first step into the analysis, the five reverse-scored scales were re-
coded so that all scales had a score of 1 indicating high values, and 7 indicating 
low values for essentialism. The reliability for each of the 9 measures was then 
calculated, looking at the inter-correlation of raters’ judgements across 
categories. For each measure separately, the ratings given to the 36 categories 
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were compared across the group of participants to calculate the reliability of the 
mean ratings for each category. Good reliability (Cronbach’s α > .8) was found 
for all measures, as shown in Table 3.5.  
 
 Reliability Mean  Std. Dev. Communalities 
Discreteness .971 3.21  0.78 .697 
Uniformity .830 4.77  0.33 .747 
Informativeness .940 4.21  0.56 .768 
Naturalness .979 3.39  0.95 .864 
Immutability .986 3.72  1.15 .638 
Stability .953 3.67  0.66 .769 
Inherence .858 4.13  0.35 .844 
Necessity .960 3.16  0.67 .880 
Exclusivity .843 4.62  0.32 .664 
 
Table 3.5. Descriptive statistics for the nine measures of essentialism 
 
Given the high levels of reliability, the participant data were averaged to 
provide mean ratings for each of the 36 categories on each of the 9 measures. 
Analysis of these means showed some strong correlations amongst some of the 
measures of essentialism, and some weak ones (see Table 3.6).  
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Scales Dis Uni Inf Nat Imm Sta Inh Nec 
Dis         
Uni .076        
Inf -.486**  .459**       
Nat .498**  .333* -.691**      
Imm .425** -.079 -.381* .775**     
Sta .683** -.115 -.666** .771** .617**    
Inh .532** .557** .124 .316 .473** .353*   
Nec .802** 0.82 -.488** .715** .714** .638** .631**  
Exc .454** .451** .075 .016 .214 .112 .613** .486** 
 
Table 3.6. Correlations between the measures of essentialism. ** Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed) 
 
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was run. The PCA confirmed a 
two-factor structure (see a scree plot in Figure 3.1). 76% of the total variance 
was explained by two factors. Additional factors each accounted for ≤ 8.2% of 
the total variance.  
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Figure 3.1. Factor Extraction of Factor 1 and Factor 2 
 
The first factor, identified as Natural-Kind-ness, included Naturalness, 
Stability, Immutability, Necessity, and Discreteness. The second factor, 
identified as Entitativity, grouped together Uniformity, Exclusivity, and 
Inherence (see Figure 3.2 for the factor loadings, and Table 3.7 for the relative 
importance of Factor 1 and Factor 2, based on the Rotated Component Matrix). 
Unexpectedly the last measure, Informativeness, was observed primarily to load 
negatively on the Natural Kind dimension rather than positively on Entitativity 
as Haslam et al. (2000) had found.  
According to the results, categories that are perceived as natural are seen 
as biologically based, stable over time and unrelated to human creations as they 
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are believed to have always existed and to have shown little changes through 
history. Also, they are attributed strong boundaries that differentiate category 
members from non-members, and necessitate some defining features without 
which their members would not be considered as such.  
On the other hand, categories that are regarded as entitative are seen as 
more exclusive, to the extent that membership to a certain category is believed to 
exclude individuals from belonging to other categories. Moreover, members of 
entitative categories are thought to share several characteristics amongst them, 
making them appear uniform and similar in their external appearance as well as 
in their inner traits. This account seems to confirm the findings of Haslam et al. 
(2000) as well as some previous results (see Kripke, 1980; Atran, 1990). 
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 Component 1 Component 2 
Naturalness .925  
Stability .875  
Necessity .826 .455 
Informativeness -.791 .377 
Immutability .774  
Discreteness .728 .409 
Inherence .348 .850 
Uniformity -.298 .811 
Exclusivity  .800 
Eigen Values 4.516 2.355 
% of Variance 47.690 28.647 
Sum of Variance 76.337  
 
Table 3.7. Relative importance of Factor 1 and Factor 2, based on the Rotated 
Component Matrix. Loadings below .2 have been suppressed 
 
However, some dissimilarities with the former study were also 
highlighted by the results, with the main difference be represented by the 
behaviour shown by Informativeness. Although results by Haslam et al. (2000) 
individuated Informativeness as a component of Entitativity, Study 1 showed 
that the measure did not load on Entitativity but was instead negatively 
correlated with the Natural Kind factor. This can be observed in Figure 3.2. 
- 144 - 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Factor Loadings for Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 1 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the factor loadings for the data as a loading plot with 
Component 1 as the x axis, and Component 2 as the y axis. The figure illustrates 
the differences with the findings of the former study. According to my results, 
the dimension of Natural Kind is now composed of five measures of 
essentialism, whereas the dimension of Entitativity is composed of three 
measures. Respectively, the four measures of Natural Kind are observed 
clustering together on the x axis to form Factor 1, whereas the three measures of 
Entitativity cluster on the y axis to form Factor 2. The dimension of 
Informativeness loads apart on the x axis and is negatively correlated with 
Natural-Kind-ness (for comparison, see the cluster of factors obtained by Haslam 
et al., 2000, shown in Figure 3.3). The pattern is remarkably similar for most of 
the measures except for Informativeness. 
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Figure 3.3. Factor Loadings for Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Haslam et al., 2000) 
 
In order to explore the results in more depth and to see which categories 
are treated as more natural and which as more entitative, a factor score for each 
category was calculated. These factor scores are illustrated in Table 3.8, and the 
location of the categories on the Entitativity and Natural Kind axes are shown in 
Figure 3.4, where it can be seen that the domains high on Natural-Kind-ness are 
Gender (Female, and Male), Race (Black, and White), Height (Short, and Tall), 
and Age (Young, and Old).  
On the other hand, some categories scored particularly high on 
Entitativity, like Political Groups (Conservative, and Liberal). The highest score 
on Entitativity was given to Upper-Class, whereas the same-domain category 
(Middle-Class) received a lower score. Some further within-domain 
discrepancies were also observed. 
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In particular, the Sexual Orientation domain had different scores for 
Homosexuals, which loaded under Entitativity, and for Heterosexuals, which 
loaded under Natural-Kind-ness. Similarly, Dietary Groups had Vegetarian 
scoring as more entitative than Meat-Eater. All the Personality Trait categories 
appeared negatively correlated with both Entitativity and Natural-Kind-ness, 
whereas all Physical Attributes scored positive for Natural-Kind-ness.  
The within-domain differences observed by Haslam et al. (2000) for the 
Race domain --with Blacks scoring high on Entitativity -- were not replicated by 
Study 1. Instead, the results showed similar ratings for Whites and Blacks, which 
were both high for Natural-Kind-ness. Another interesting difference from the 
former study was observed for Homosexuals, indicated as highly entitative in the 
former study and which, despite scoring positive in Entitativity in the present 
study, received less extreme ratings. Finally, some categories showed similar 
scores with the former study, with the most similar ones being Middle-Class, 
Profession, Age, and Physical Appearances.  
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Domain  Category Natural Kind Entitativity 
Age Old .81 .62 
 
Young .51 .52 
Diet Vegetarian -.10 .85 
 
Meat-eater .44 -.20 
Ethnic groups British -.14 .11 
 
Asian 1.04 .46 
Gender Female 1.27 1.56 
 
Male 1.72 .83 
Intelligence Talented -.58 -1.73 
 
Intelligent -.62 -.60 
Disabilities Sighted 1.48 -.90 
 
Blind 1.40 .85 
Occupation Pensioner .09 .72 
 
Student -.79 -.60 
Personality Selfish -.96 -.06 
 
Caring -.46 -1.19 
 
Shy -.45 -1.04 
 
Friendly -.71 -1.03 
Physical appearance Attractive -.99 -.79 
 
Ugly -.31 -1.95 
Physiques Short 1.33 -.95 
 
Tall 1.79 -1.27 
Political groups Liberal -1.60 .35 
 
Conservative -1.33 1.26 
Races Black 1.47 .38 
 
White 1.35 .13 
Religion Believer -.89 .69 
 
Atheist -.53 .87 
Sexual orientation Homosexual -.09 .99 
 
Heterosexual .75 -.68 
Education Educated -.87 -.07 
 
Uneducated -1.36 -.24 
Marital Status Married -.22 .09 
 
Single -.36 -1.37 
Social Class Middle-Class -1.00 .73 
 
Upper-class -1.07 2.64 
 
Table 3.8. Factor scores and mean ratings of the social categories, by domain 
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Figure 3.4. Location of all categories along Natural Kind and Entitativity 
Components 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the behaviour of Informativeness was different 
than in the former investigation. In fact, while Informativeness had formerly 
been individuated as a component of Entitativity, in Study 1 it correlated 
negatively with Natural-Kind-ness. In order to fully appreciate this result, the 
mean score for each category for Informativeness was plotted against the factor 
score for Natural-Kind-ness. Figure 3.5 shows which categories are considered 
more or less informative. The categories low in Informativeness are the 
biological ones, like Gender (Female and Male); Height (Tall and Short); Race 
(Black and White); Disabilities (Blind and Sighted); Age (Old and Young); 
Ethnic Groups (Asian); Sexual Orientation (Homosexual); and Dietary Groups 
(Meat-Eaters).  
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On the other hand, Upper-Class scored particularly high on the scale, 
suggesting that our participants regard it as very informative of what its members 
are.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Location of categories for Informativeness along Factor 1 and Factor 
2 
 
 
The result obtained for Informativeness represents an interesting ground 
for discussion. As observed in the data, categories such as Upper-Class, Liberal, 
Believer, Conservative, and Selfish scored particularly high on Informativeness, 
whereas categories like Short, Tall, Sighted, Meat-Eater, and Heterosexual had a 
much lower score. This seems to suggest that for our sample of participants, 
Natural Kind categories in general tend not to be informative of individuals, and 
this is particularly true for categories related to Physical Appearance, Sexual 
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Orientation, and Diet. This result is consistent with the multi-cultural social 
context of students in London. On the other hand, non-biological categories 
tended to be perceived as informative, and especially those related to Class 
(Upper-Class), Political Orientation (Liberal, and Conservative), Religious 
Beliefs (Believer), and Personality Traits (Selfish). 
To summarise, it can be argued that individuals from a multicultural 
environment do not perceive biological traits as providing enough information to 
make judgments about individuals. Instead, they considered non-biological 
categories as more informative about somebody’s makeup. This result contrasts 
with Haslam et al.’s (2000) study where biological categories such as Race and 
Sexual Orientation were seen as informative. In the context of a largely young 
white population, it may be enough to be an outsider on any of these biological 
categories for the categorization to carry information. 
3.4.2. Discussion 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the results, the reader is reminded 
that social categories were not identical in the two studies (social domains 
overlapped to 85%, and individual social categories overlapped to 40%). Thus, 
comparisons with Haslam et al. (2000) should be understood with this in mind.  
The results of the first part of the investigation led to some interesting 
discoveries. First of all, the occurrence of a two-factor structure -- as suggested 
by Haslam et al. (2000) -- was confirmed with a sample of participants selected 
from a multicultural context. Despite some differences observed in the 
composition of the two factors, this finding suggests the opportunity of some 
generalisation across western cultures and could eventually provide the basis for 
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It is interesting to note that items high on Natural-Kind-ness generally 
correspond to forced categories, whereas those low on Natural-Kind-ness 
generally correspond to chosen categories. One possible explanation of the 
association of low Natural-Kind-ness with informativeness is the idea that 
individuals willingly chose to belong in those categories. This hypothesis is 
considered a possibility, although it may prove wrong in the light of the scores 
observed for some categories (e.g. race categories) that were associated with 
high informativeness in Haslam et al. (2000), but not in study 1.  
Another interesting result was highlighted by the comparison of the 
scores for the individual social categories between the former study and the 
present study. This comparison revealed in detail the effect of cultural contexts 
in the perception of biological and non-biological categories. For example, Study 
1 participants’ ratings testified the positive effect of a multicultural environment 
in the perception of races since no differences in the perceived Entitativity 
between Black and Whites were observed, with both categories scoring high on 
Natural-Kind-ness. The same effect was observed for the Homosexual category, 
which had been identified as prone to stigmatisation in the former study, and 
which in our study showed a much lower score on Entitativity. A fuller 
discussion will follow the results of the second part of the investigation. 
3.5. Investigation 2: Essentialism and self-identification 
This section presents the design, procedure, and results of the second part 
of the investigation, which was concerned with the self-identification scale. 
Participants were asked at the end of the survey to choose the five categories that 
best described themselves. The frequencies and percentages for the chosen 
categories are illustrated in Table 3.9. As shown in the table, 18 categories were 
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chosen by at least 12 participants (12 participants represents roughly the 10% of 
the total).  
 
 
Category Freq. % Category Freq. % 
Old              0 0% Young            56 46% 
Attractive       10 8% Ugly             0 0% 
Upper-class      1 1% Middle-class     22 18% 
Meat-eater       22 18% Vegetarian      18 15% 
Blind            0 0% Sighted          26 21% 
British          25 20% Asian            27 22% 
Female           69 56% Male             16 13% 
Talented         7 6% Intelligent      26 21% 
Student          59 48% Pensioner        0 0% 
Caring           9 7% Selfish          6 5% 
Shy              4 3% Friendly         34 28% 
Short            5 4% Tall             9 7% 
Liberal          9 7% Conservative    3 2% 
White            33 27% Black            3 2% 
Atheist          12 10% Believer         17 14% 
Homosexual      4 3% Heterosexual    25 20% 
Married         10 8% Single           15 12% 
Educated        33 27% Uneducated      0 0% 
 
Table 3.9. Frequencies of self-categories as chosen by participants. The 
categories in bold show the categories that were chosen by at least 12 
participants (10% of the total) 
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The data were analysed in two different ways. The Analysis by items 
considered the mean ratings for categories that were chosen by at least 12 people 
(18 categories in total). The Analysis by participants considered all categories. 
Analysis by Items 
For the 18 categories chosen by at least 12 people, mean ratings of each 
category on each scale were calculated for the subset of participants who 
identified themselves with the category (Identifiers) and for the remaining subset 
of participants who did not (Non-Identifiers).  
Table 3.10 shows the mean ratings for Identifiers and Non-identifiers for 
each of the nine measures, averaged over the 18 categories, and the significance 
of the difference between the means for identifiers and for non-identifiers (paired 
t-test across the 18 categories). In the table low values indicate higher ratings of 
essentialism. Using a Bonferroni correction for nine tests, alpha was set at .0055.  
As we can observe from the table, three scales showed a significant 
difference, all of them in the direction of people judging their identified 
categories as more essential: these were Discreteness, Naturalness, and Stability. 
Necessity was marginally significant. These scales all belong to the Natural Kind 
domain. It is remarkable that although only three scales were significant, 
people’s own categories were rated consistently higher on essentialism.  
To confirm this pattern, the measures were collapsed according to 
Haslam et al.’ s (2000) two-factor solution by averaging the five Natural Kind 
measures, and the four Entitativity measures into two summary scales. Table 
3.10 shows that there was a small but highly significant tendency for people to 
judge their own categories as higher on Natural-Kind-ness, but no difference in 
ratings of Entitativity.  
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Measure Identifier Non-Id Paired t Significance 
Discreteness 2.69 3.09 4.52* <.001 
 
    
Uniformity 4.83 4.81 0.19 N.S. 
 
    
Informativeness 4.06 4.25 1.29 N.S. 
 
    
Naturalness 3.02 3.37 3.72* <.005 
 
    
Immutability 4.29 4.24 0.60 N.S. 
 
    
Stability 3.25 3.59 5.05* <.001 
 
    
Inherence 3.97 4.06 1.31 N.S. 
 
    
Necessity 2.87 3.11 2.63 (<.05) 
 
    
Exclusivity 4.55 4.57 0.22 N.S. 
 
    
Natural Kind 3.22 3.48 5.63* <.001 
     
Entitativity 4.35 4.42 1.09 N.S. 
 
Table 3.10. Item analysis. For each measure, the mean rating for Self-Identifiers 
(ID) and Non-identifiers (Non-id) for the 18 categories with at least 12 people 
identifying with them. Lower values indicate more essentialist responses 
 
Analysis by participants: 
A second way of analysing the data looked at the mean of each 
participant’s ratings of their own 5 identified categories on each scale, and 
compared this with the mean of the rest of the group’s ratings of the same 5 
categories on that scale (results for each scale are shown in Table 3.11). 
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Measure Identifier Non-Id Paired t Significance 
Discreteness 2.80 3.00 2.49 (< .05) 
 
    
Uniformity 4.82 4.84 0.13 N.S. 
 
    
Informativeness 4.10 4.20 1.31 N.S. 
 
    
Naturalness 3.00 3.44 4.44* <.001 
 
    
Immutability 4.35 4.27 1.04 N.S. 
 
    
Stability 3.38 3.59 2.12 (< .05) 
 
    
Inherence 3.97 4.07 0.81 N.S. 
 
    
Necessity 2.91 3.07 1.62 N.S. 
 
    
Exclusivity 4.61 4.63 0.10 N.S. 
 
    
 
Table 3.11. Participant analysis. For each measure, the mean rating given by an 
individual to the five categories with which they identified (Own) is compared to 
the mean rating given by the rest of the group to those five categories (Group). 
Lower values indicate more essentialist responses 
 
Although all scales showed a positive effect with Identifiers rating their 
own categories as more essential, only Naturalness was significant using the 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha of .0055. As before, the scales related to Natural Kind 
status showed a larger effect. Naturalness was significant with the Bonferroni 
correction, while Discreteness and Stability were marginally significant (p < 
.05). Consistently with the previous statistical analysis, it was observed that the 
measures of essentialism that define the Natural Kind dimension were slightly 
but significantly more essentialised for the categories with which people 
identify, while the measures of the Entitativity dimension showed no effect. Both 
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analyses lead to the same conclusion, showing that Natural Kind is enhanced for 
one’s own categories. 
3.6. General Discussion 
The general objective of the present study was to investigate two 
questions. First, I looked at the occurrence of the two-factor structure for 
essentialist beliefs discussed by Haslam et al. (2000) in a different socio-cultural 
environment. Second, I looked at the effect of individual identification with a set 
of categories on the perception of how essential the categories are.  
The findings of the first part of the study partly confirmed the earlier 
study, especially in the occurrence of a two-dimension structure of essentialist 
beliefs. However, some differences were also highlighted. In particular, amongst 
the nine measures of psychological essentialism one of them (Informativeness) 
behaved very differently, suggesting that cultural contexts may play a role in the 
structure of essentialist beliefs. Some differences were highlighted in the 
perception of single categories, especially for groups that had been observed in 
earlier studies to be prone to stigmatisation, such as blacks and homosexuals 
(Haslam et al., 2000).  
Generally, it seems that belonging to a multicultural environment may 
lead to the “naturalisation” of some social groups -- which consists in the 
attribution of natural characteristics to non-biological categories -- a process 
which earlier research has linked to the attribution of a higher status. In fact, 
Haslam et al. (2000) observed that some of the categories that were attributed 
higher Entitativity seem to be particularly prone to devaluation, as opposed to 
the categories that were attributed higher naturalness. In light of their results, 
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Haslam et al. (2000) argued that naturalness could be linked to the attribution of 
a higher status than Entitativity.  
The results allow the drawing of some conclusions and suggest that 
whereas for a middle-class white American student some biological categories 
are associated with characteristics that are more typical of the Entitativity 
domain this does not appear to be true for the London sample, which did not 
associate biological categories with entitative factors.  
Certainly, this study represents a step further into the understanding of 
psychological essentialism. The findings of the second part of the study provide 
some useful material about the role of category membership in the way 
individuals perceive their own and other categories. An important aspect of the 
results is constituted by the fact that perceived naturalness increases for one’s 
own categories. Across the two analyses, the categories that people identified 
with were considered by those individuals to be more natural, more discrete and 
more stable.  
For example the 68 participants who identified with the category Female 
rated being female at an average of 2.02 on the Natural Kind scales, compared to 
an average rating 2.43 given by other participants. At the same time, the 15 who 
self-identified as Males, rated being male as more natural (1.65) than did other 
participants (2.13). The categories that we see ourselves as belonging to tend to 
be those that we think of as discrete, natural, and stable. Those same categories 
are seen to be less natural by people who do not identify with them. By linking 
the findings from the two parts of the study, we can appreciate how they support 
each other. In fact, this appears especially true in light of the fact that an 
enhanced naturalness would correspond to the attribution of a higher status to 
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one’s own categories. The literature illustrates the power of the ingroup bias, 
according to which individuals attribute more positive traits to ingroup members.  
According to Tajfel (1981), knowledge of membership to a certain group 
is profoundly connected to the emotional significance of the membership itself, 
and self identity is built upon this significance. Thus, since individuals’ self-
esteem is drawn from their group memberships to a great extent, they tend to 
attribute a higher status to their own categories and to show a high ingroup bias 
(Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998). Study 1’s results showed that a higher level of 
naturalness is attributed to one’s own categories. If we see this result in the light 
of the concept above, it could be argued that naturalising a category could 
represent a mechanism of reinforcement of the status of that category.  
If we consider how the social categories in Study 1 have scored, it would 
be possible to sketch out a picture about how Study 1’s participants attributed the 
two forms of essentialism to the categories. For example, the domain of racial 
categories scored very low in Entitativity and high in Natural-Kind-ness, as did 
the domains of Age and Physical Traits. Likewise, in the present study, 
categories such as Blacks and Homosexuals were attributed higher levels of 
naturalness than in the former study by Haslam et al. (2000). This result could be 
due to the impact of the constant exposure to other ethnicities and cultures that 
occurs in multicultural contexts, which appear to reduce the perception of 
Entitativity of categories in favour of their naturalness, possibly improving their 
status in the eyes of the perceiver.  
However, the fact that a number of our participants are likely to have 
been from such minority groups themselves should also be considered. In fact, 
- 159 - 
despite the fact that only four people self-identified as Homosexual and 3 as 
Black, there were 27 who self-identified as Asian.  
The replication of Haslam et al. (2000) constitutes a first step into the 
understanding of the extent to which essentialist beliefs are affected by the 
cultural context. In psychology, there is a broad array of literature on cultural 
differences, most of which has been produced by research in cultural 
psychology. Cultural psychology’s main principle is that individuals are strongly 
affected by their culture. As Heine and Ruby claim (2010), every detail of an 
individual’s life depends upon what they have learnt from the culture they 
belong to, including life choices, behaviours, relationships, and values. Cross-
cultural studies aim at highlighting differences in behaviours and beliefs among 
individuals who belong to different cultural backgrounds (Brislin, 1976).  
Study 1 is a correlational design study whose aim was to highlight the 
occurrence of cultural differences between London participants and the 
population used in Haslam et al. (2000). In particular, one of its purposes was to 
see whether cultural differences may lead to differences in an individual’s 
essentialist beliefs.  
In this section, it has been discussed how some differences have been 
observed in the way Study 1 participants perceived some social categories 
compared to how those same categories had been perceived in Haslam et al. 
(2000). Some of these differences have been linked to multi-cultural factors 
emerging from the great cultural diversity that defines Study 1’s participants.  
In comparison to Haslam et al. (2000), whose sample was composed of a 
majority of female individuals from a conservative mid-western American 
college, in Study 1 56 out of 123 participants identified themselves as belonging 
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to non-British cultural backgrounds. This represents nearly half of the total of 
participants and allows some speculations about the role that cultural differences 
may play in essentialist beliefs.  
However, other factors have also been considered. For instance, 
individuals tested in Study 1 represent a broader demographic than Haslam et 
al.’s (2000) sample, and more general US-UK cross-cultural differences, 
including the influence of different social policies that are adopted in the two 
countries, should also be considered. Also, individuals’ political views have been 
recognised as a powerful lens in somebody’s beliefs and perceptions towards 
some social classes (Cohen, 2003). Moreover, other strong social and cultural 
factors such as school and university curricula, media and television exposure 
(McQuail, 1979), are to be acknowledged in the way they may influence an 
individual’s essentialist beliefs.  
On the basis of the differences and similarities between the former study 
and Study 1, I decided to run a further study in a different social context. This 
would bring the opportunity to explore in more depth some of the instances 
previously observed with a sample of participants from a traditional and mono-
cultural environment. The new investigation -- Study 2 -- set out to see whether 
subjects from a traditional context would generate a structure similar to Haslam 
et al. (2000), and also whether stronger essentialist responses for own-categories 
would be produced. The findings of Study 2 are presented in Chapter 4. Also, an 
in-depth discussion and comparison of the results from the two studies is 
provided in the general discussion section at the end of Chapter 4. 
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4.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the second empirical investigation that was 
conducted for this thesis. Study 2, which was a replication of Study 1, was run 
on a sample of subjects from a traditional socio-cultural background.  
Results of Study 1 confirmed the occurrence of the two dimensions of 
Natural Kind and Entitativity described by Haslam et al. (2000) with a sample of 
subjects from a multicultural context. Also, the overall structure of essentialist 
beliefs was similar to the original study for most of the essentialism measures 
with the only exception of Informativeness, and some differences were observed 
in the way single categories were essentialised. According to the Principal 
Component Analysis, Entitativity included Uniformity, Exclusivity, and 
Inherence, and Natural Kind included Naturalness, Stability, Immutability, 
Necessity, and Discreteness.  
According to table 3.7, Informativeness was weakly positive for Factor 2 
rather than strongly positive as expected. The strong negative loading on 
Natural-Kind-ness was surprising, as it was near zero in Haslam et al. (2000). 
This result indicated that for my sample of subjects belonging to Natural Kind 
categories involves being uninformative. The differences in the ratings of the 
single items concerned mostly categories such as Homosexuals and Blacks, 
which received more “natural” ratings than in the original study. This showed 
that categories that are biological or considered as such are perceived as neither 
entitative nor informative by a multi-cultural sample of subjects.  
In consideration of this result, my hypothesis is that the differences 
between the two studies in relation to the dimension of Informativeness and to 
the scores of the single social categories (e.g., Sexual Orientation, and Race) 
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may be due to an effect of the social environment, and that a greater level of 
interaction and exposure to different social groups may change the perception of 
them. The aim of the experiment was also to see whether the two-dimension 
pattern in the structure of essentialist beliefs can be generalised to a number of 
western cultures. Finally, since Haslam et al.’s (2000) study tested a small 
number of subjects (N = 40), the present study aimed at providing further 
strength to the results. Study 2 was run in Sardinia, which is an Italian region 
with a special statute and an island, thus benefits from natural physical 
boundaries that decrease contacts between the locals and the non-locals. Section 
4.2 describes the anatomy and character of the Sardinian population and outlines 
some key historical events that have occurred through the centuries in Sardinia. 
These events have been crucial in generating certain attitudes and beliefs towards 
the non-locals among Sardinians.  
Empirical evidence about the effect of multiculturalism is summarised in 
section 4.3, and a definition of multiculturalism is given at the beginning of the 
section. The findings of Study 1 suggested that differences in people’s 
essentialist beliefs may be due to the effect of socio-cultural contexts, and that 
multiculturalism may be linked to a lower level of essentialism towards certain 
social groups, in particular concerning the entitative factor. The literature shows 
that a greater contact with different cultures favours openness and positive 
attitudes towards them (Allport 1954), and that this effect increases if the contact 
happens at an interpersonal level (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Section 4.4 describes 
Study 2’s methodology and results. Similarly to Study 1, the first part of the 
study investigated essentialist beliefs about social categories and the second part 
investigated self-categories.  
- 165 - 
My hypothesis for the investigation on self-categories was that a mono-
cultural sample of subjects would essentialise own categories in a more extreme 
fashion than subjects from a multicultural sample. At the end of the chapter a 
joint discussion of the results will summarise similarities and differences 
between Study 1 and 2.  
4.2. Sardinia: a land between myth and modernity  
The aim of this section is to outline some of the most relevant events that 
have occurred throughout history in Sardinia, and their impact on the Sardinian 
population. This should clarify the cultural makeup of Sardinians and their 
attitude towards others, and especially towards non-Sardinians. Sardinia is a land 
that has caught the imagination of its visitors, and about which many legends and 
poems have been written.  
“But neither does time exist without change; for when the state of our 
own minds does not change at all, or I have not noticed its changing, I do not 
realize that time has elapsed, any more than those who are fabled to sleep 
among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened”. 
(Aristotle, Physics, Book IV, chapter 11) 
“The unruly Sherden whom no one had ever known how to combat, they 
came boldly sailing in their warships from the midst of the sea, none being able 
to withstand them”. 
(Kitchen, 1982; pp.40-41) 
Land of rare beauty, untouched by the course of time, populated by 
savages... The two quotes above both summarise outsiders’ beliefs about 
Sardinians. As mentioned by Aristotle, according to an ancient myth Sardinia 
had been colonised by the sons of Heracles and of Tespiades. When the heroes 
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died, their body remained intact to the point that they appeared asleep. The 
legend wanted that the Sardinians who fall asleep next to the heroes' graves 
would fall into such a deep sleep that time for them would stop forever. 
Nevertheless, beside this grandiose and legendary aura, Sardinia has long been 
considered savage and ungovernable (Edwardes, 1889). Sometimes it has been 
referred to as a land inhabited by uncivilized people who aspired to be 
independent from the Italian Government in order to be free from its rules.  
Sardinia is an Italian region, the second largest island in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and has a special statute that recognises its economic and 
socio-cultural differences from the other Italian regions. Its population density is 
the lowest for the national average and its main settlements are currently 
concentrated around its capital city on the South of the island, Cagliari, and 
around its second largest city on the North of the island, Sassari.  
However, this geography of settlements represents a recent trend started 
when tourism became one of the biggest industries in the island. In fact, until the 
end of 19th century, its population was mostly concentrated in the inner part of 
the island. This was due to the dangerousness of the coastal line following 
repeated and devastating invasions carried out over the centuries from the ninth 
century AD, among which the most infamous ones had been perpetrated by the 
“Mori”, the pirates from Andalucía, Morocco, and Tunisia. As a consequence, 
the coastal line became dangerous and the settlements on the south-western 
coastal side started to be designed in a way that they would remain hidden from 
the seaside.  
The geography of the settlements in the island introduces to one of the 
most interesting myths about Sardinia, which says that Sardinians “turn their 
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back to the sea”, lack navigation skills, and have long ignored the potentialities 
of trade and wealth coming from the sea, basing their economy on pastoral and 
agricultural activities instead. Nonetheless, history proves the myth wrong. In 
fact, a few thousand years ago (in the Bronze Age) the ancient Sardinian 
population -- identified with the Shardana, a tribe of the Sea People -- 
maintained close commercial links with the civilisations bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea. Amongst these were the Egyptians -- that mentioned the 
Sardinians in their hieroglyphics-- the Greeks, and the Mycenaeans (Kitchen, 
1982). Also, from the late Seventeenth century, the farmers that inhabited the 
north-eastern region of the island, Gallura, started to trade their goods through 
the sea with the benefit of not having to pay custom duties (Salice, in press).  
From the beginning of the Seventeenth century, and under the Kingdom 
of the Savoia family, Sardinia became a land of immigration for some 
populations. Among these populations were the inhabitants of the Tunisian 
coastal town of Tabarka that settled in the South-West of the island, and a colony 
of Greeks, who were granted the opportunity to move to the North of the island. 
However, these migratory flows often decided from above were rarely approved 
by the local population, as testified by the records. In some cases fights between 
the native populations and the migrants occurred, leading to episodes of tragic 
violence and murder that made of the island one of the most violent places of 
that period in Europe (Salice, in press).  
Later in history, at the end of the World War II, the newly founded 
Italian Republic was among the losers of the war. Thus, in order to pay off its 
debts to America, the government allowed the American army to use part of the 
Sardinian land for military purposes. Again, this produced discontent and even 
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occasional revolts, which most remembered one is the Revolt of Pratobello, 
where the whole population of a village from the inner region resisted to the 
Italian army that aimed to transform a grazing ground into a military base.  
This brief outline of foreign and domestic dominations summarises some 
meaningful events that contributed to shape the attitudes of Sardinians towards 
the outsiders. The lack of trust towards both foreigners and the government that 
had been cultivated over time led to the development of a peculiar way to deal 
with offences in the island, where a self-regulation culture developed under the 
rules of “Codice Barbaricino” (an unwritten law originating from the inner 
region of Sardinia, Barbagia). According to Codice Barbaricino, an offence to 
one’s own honour and/or properties has to be punished through personal 
revenge. This culture dominated for centuries and caused difficulties to rule 
Sardinia under the common law when the country unified. Although this 
phenomenon is now of small scale, in some parts of the island self-regulation 
methods are still employed, causing feuds over land and honour (Salice, in 
press).  
Through history, literates and politicians have tried to define Sardinia as 
a land of immutability and traditions. Nonetheless, despite a bivalent relationship 
with the sea and a shadow of suspiciousness and closeness towards the others, 
the emergence of a new political class in the 18th century made of Sardinia a land 
that aspired to become part of a global vision of Europe. Also, the process of 
centralisation of the political regulation that started in 1847 allowed the 
extension of the legislative code from the mainland to the island. This process 
favoured the emergence of a sense of belonging to the same people and acquired 
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strength when, during the Big War, a battalion fully composed of Sardinians -- 
Brigata Sassari -- was sent to the front.  
For the first time Sardinians recognised each other as the same people, 
with a common ground, similar issues, languages, and aspirations. This event has 
been determinant in creating an idea of in-group (Sardinians) as separated from 
the out-group (Italians). As a consequence a political party -- Partito Sardo 
D’Azione -- was also founded, with the aim to promote the integrity of the 
Sardinian culture against the foreign invaders (Salice, in press). 
Partly myth and partly truth, it has always been said that Sardinia’s 
millenary culture is still alive and observable at present. The family represents 
the core of the Sardinian society, and the roles of women and men had remained 
distinct and separated until a few decades ago. For instance, in a typical middle-
class family the economy of the family would be managed by both partners but 
with different responsibilities. This family-centred set-up constitutes an 
inheritance of the ancient society and also reflects the principles of Christianity, 
to which Sardinians were converted in the 6th century AD. From then on, 
Sardinia’s pagan culture started to integrate Christian rituals, which still coexist 
and are observed in the religious celebrations.  
Despite the Sardinian history is rich of cultural and genetic 
contamination, Sardinians remain one of the most genetically isolated European 
populations and are thought of as an example of pre-Indo-European ethnicity. 
Sardinians are a heterogeneous population which present some distinctive 
genetic characteristics. At present, it is estimated that the 98% of the Sardinian 
population is of Italian nationality, and that only the 2% is composed of 
migrants, with Romanians, Moroccans, Chinese, North Africans, and Ukrainians 
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representing the biggest groups. However, migrants in Sardinia reside mostly in 
the cities and have recently settled, making second generation migrants a recent 
phenomenon.  
One of the oldest proverbs about Sardinians in the local dialect reads “Sa 
domo est minore, su coro est mannu” (The house is small but the heart is big). If 
Sardinians are known for their suspiciousness towards foreigners, at the same 
time welcoming visitors and being good hosts represents one of the most 
important values for them. The two tendencies cohabit and make visitors 
welcomed and treated with respect on one side, but also not truly integrated 
within the Sardinian community on the other side.  
Beside, a certain lack of connection among villages and a great richness 
in local dialects resulted in internal cultural isolation. This has possibly favoured 
the preservation of local traditions as well as fights over cultural supremacy 
between villages, and the tendency to judge people on the basis of their 
provenience. In this cultural context integration may become uneasy, and 
migrants are likely to experience low levels of cultural permeability.  
4.3. The effect of multiculturalism in the perception of other social groups 
This section presents theories about the effect of multiculturalism in 
individuals’ perception of other individuals, and in particular of those who 
belong to different social groups. The literature shows that human cognition is 
shaped through a daily interaction with social partners and cultural exposure to 
conventions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Also, Tajfel and Turner (1986) 
explained that group membership often serves the function to guarantee positive 
status and self-identification, and suggested that a way to decrease distance 
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between groups would be to reduce group identification by providing novel ways 
to establish personal status and goal achievement.  
Empirical work demonstrates that beliefs and attitudes towards either 
individuals or social groups can be modified through an increase of social 
contact (Berry, 1984). This point represents one of the main tenets of the contact 
hypothesis, according to which direct contact between members of two different 
groups may decrease negative beliefs about the other group (Allport, 1954). In 
particular, Brewer and Miller (1984) argued that contacts between groups are 
more successful when interactions between the single group members are close 
and intimate. Accordingly, Messick and Mackie (1989) argued that interactions 
that occur at a personal level are more likely to minimise category labels, to 
increase awareness of individual characteristics, and to reduce intergroup biases. 
There are different ways to reduce the distance between groups.  
For instance, Kramer (1988) suggested that in order to do so, antagonist 
groups can be thought of as belonging to a super-ordinate category that includes 
them both. Similarly, Vanbeselaere (1987) proposed that outgroup members can 
be thought of as ingroup members of another group (e.g., two people from a 
different nationality can be perceived as more similar to each other on the basis 
of the fact that they are both students at the same University).  
Bastian and Haslam (2008) acknowledge the benefits that 
multiculturalism brings to cultures with a high number of immigrants, but also 
accentuate the role played by integration between hosts and immigrants. They 
conducted some work on this aspect and investigated the link between 
essentialist beliefs and social identity, and their influence in group bias. What 
they found was that essentialist beliefs may affect social identity, and especially 
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aspects such as desirability, attitudes of differentiation from the outgroup or 
orientation towards to the outgroup, and perceived similarity between the self 
and individuals from the outgroup. Also, they observed that individuals who 
expressed essentialist beliefs towards the outgroup showed less favourable 
attitudes towards it, and that essentialist beliefs favour stereotypical views and 
promote between-groups differentiation and distance.  
The attitudes of Sardinians towards other groups have also been 
explored. According to Bottazzi (1999), Sardinians are characterised by a certain 
extent of closeness towards other societal system, and this can be possibly 
caused by their insularity. Also, the perceptions of Sardinians about the ingroup 
have been investigated. For example, work by Aiello and Pratto (2006) explored 
essentialist beliefs about being Sardinian in a sample of Sardinian participants (N 
= 460). In particular, the study investigated the role of perceived ingroup 
Entitativity and the motivation to be a social dominator of other groups. 
Although participants showed a high level of ingroup Entitativity, they did not 
perceive themselves as potential social dominator of other groups. It was 
observed that essentialist beliefs about being Sardinian are held by Sardinians, 
and that they seem to be linked to cultural and social aspects (Aiello & Pratto, 
2006).  
4.4. Study 2 
This section discusses the first part of Study 2, which was conducted 
with a sample of participants from Sardinia.  
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4.4.1. Method 
4.4.1.1. Participants 
A total of 87 students from a number of universities in Cagliari (Sardinia) 
were sampled for the study. The study was put online and advertised through 
social networks and leaflets distributed at the University Campuses. No 
participants were excluded from the analysis.  
4.4.1.2. Design & Materials 
The same questionnaire used in Study 1 was utilised for this study, and 
the set of social categories was translated and adapted in order to make it suitable 
for a sample of Italian participants. See Table 4.8 for a comparison between the 
two sets of categories used in Study 1 and 2. 
4.4.1.3. Procedure 
The questionnaire was completed online. Participants did not receive a 
monetary compensation but were offered the opportunity to enter a prize draw 
for cash. At the beginning of the study some demographics (gender, age, ethnic 
group, and nationality) were collected along with consent to take part to the 
study. As for Study 1, an explanation of the nature and procedure of the study 
and a definition of the term “social categories” were provided on the first screen. 
By proceeding further, participants gave their consent and the rights for the 
investigator to use the results for research purposes.  
The layout of the questionnaire was the same as Study 1, with each 
screen showing one of the two sets of 18 categories from the list of 36. The order 
of presentation for both sets of categories remained the same throughout the 
experiment. From the third screen onwards, each screen showed a definition of a 
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measure of essentialism to be rated on the set of the 18 categories. The same 
essentialism measure appeared on two subsequent screens in order to allow the 
full list of 36 categories to be rated for each of the nine scales. There was no time 
limit for completing the task although an average of 30 minutes was given as an 
indication, and a bar on top of the screen showed progress through the study. The 
definitions of the measures of essentialism were entirely translated in Italian. See 
Table 4.9 and 4.10 in the Appendix section, and Table 3.2 and 3.3 for complete 
wording of the nine measures of essentialism according to Haslam et al. (2000).  
The study remained accessible online for a period of two months. As for 
Study 1, version A presented the scales in ascending order from 1 to 9, and 
version B presented them in descending order from 9 to 1. Each version was 
completed by roughly 50% of the participants. Similarly to Study 1 and to 
Haslam et al. (2000), five scales were reverse-keyed: Scale 2 Uniformity, Scale 3 
Informativeness, Scale 4 Naturalness, Scale 5 Immutability, and Scale 6 
Stability. The ratings for the nine measures can be seen in Table 3.4. In order to 
avoid unrated items, participants were allowed to proceed to the next step only 
after rating all the categories on the existing page. As in Study 1, after the final 
screen, participants selected the five categories that they felt best described 
themselves. 
4.4.2. Results 
One of the main questions of the investigation concerned differences in 
essentialist beliefs between monocultural and multicultural contexts, and my 
assumption was that an environment characterised by a strong link with ancient 
traditions and a small level of exposure to foreign cultures may produce a) a 
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different structure of essentialist beliefs, and b) more entitative essentialist 
beliefs towards certain categories (e.g., minority groups).  
As in Study 1, a first step into the analysis was to re-code the five 
reverse-keyed scales in order to have scores 1 indicating high values, and scores 
7 indicating low values of essentialism. Then, reliability was calculated for the 9 
measures. Good reliability (Cronbach’s α) was found for all measures, as shown 
in Table 4.1, with the possible exception of Uniformity (α = .552), probably 
because of low variance across categories (SD = 0.25). 
 
Measure Reliability Mean  Std. Dev. Communalities 
Discreteness .924 3.42  0.61 .786 
Uniformity .552 4.42  0.25 .519 
Informativeness .888 4.37  0.49 .540 
Naturalness .982 3.49  1.27 .799 
Immutability .981 3.78  1.20 .710 
Stability .944 3.51  0.73 .819 
Inherence .782 3.92  0.35 .704 
Necessity .898 3.24  0.52 .778 
Exclusivity .870 4.79  0.44 .535 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for the nine measures of essentialism 
 
The participant data were averaged in order to obtain mean ratings for 
each of the 36 categories on each of the 9 measures. Table 4.2 shows the 
correlations between the measures of essentialism.  
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Scales Dis Uni Inf Nat Imm Stab Inh Nec 
Dis         
Uni .386*        
Inf -.189**  .519**       
Nat .458**  -.017* .440**      
Imm .443** .016 -.274 .754**     
Sta  .650** .218 -.263 .799** .805**    
Inh .110 .393** -586** -.264 -.101 -.161*   
Nec .839** .314 -.142 .31 .411* .421* .319  
Exc .328** .296 .024 -.153 .000 -.059 .527** .600** 
 
Table 4.2. Correlations between the measures of essentialism. ** Correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed) 
 
Subsequently, a Principal Component Analysis was run, which showed 
two orthogonal factors explaining 69% of the total variance. Factor 1 on its own 
explained 40% of the total Variance, and Factor 2 explained 29% of the total 
Variance (see Figure 4.1 for factor extraction of Factor 1 and Factor 2). 
Additional factors each accounted for ≤ 13.2% of the total variance. 
The scree plot in Figure 4.1 showed three components with Eigenvalues 
greater than 1. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the communalities and loadings for 
a three factor solution. Factor 2 from the two factor solution is divided into two 
further components: Exclusivity + Necessity, and Informativeness + Uniformity 
+ Inherence. The need for a third component comes from the scales Necessity 
and Informativeness, which in the two component solution load on both 
components about equally.  
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Communalities 
  
Initial Extraction 
Discreteness 1.000 .797 
Uniformity 1.000 .744 
Informativeness 1.000 .905 
Naturalness 1.000 .833 
Immutability 1.000 .749 
Stability 1.000 .916 
Inherence 1.000 .707 
Necessity 1.000 .898 
Exclusivity 1.000 .834 
 
Table 4.3. Three-Factor Solution communalities 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 3 
Stability .954 .064 .024 
Naturalness .887 -.029 -.215 
Immutability .858 .080 -.080 
Discreteness .642 .613 .093 
Exclusivity -.161 .890 .125 
Necessity .425 .844 .071 
Informativeness -.281 -.149 .896 
Uniformity .211 .225 .806 
Inherence -.227 .477 .654 
 
Table 4.4. Three-Factor Solution Rotated Component Matrix 
 
 
My choice to include only two factors from the PCA was made upon 
evaluation of the Scree plot, where it is observed that the three factor solution is 
less clear. In the Scree plot no obvious elbow is observed in the graph (Figure 
4.1), and being a third component just about Eigenvalue = 1, a three-factor 
solution so can be questioned. Also, given prior results from Haslam et al. (2000) 
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and from Study 1 showing only 2 factors, a three-factor solution should be 
reluctantly accepted without strong evidence.  
 
 
Communalities 
  
Initial Extraction 
Discreteness 1.000 .786 
Uniformity 1.000 .519 
Informativeness 1.000 .540 
Naturalness 1.000 .799 
Immutability 1.000 .710 
Stability 1.000 .819 
Inherence 1.000 .704 
Necessity 1.000 .778 
Exclusivity 1.000 .535 
 
Table 4.5. Two-Factor Solution communalities 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  
Component 
1 2 
Stability .905 .019 
Naturalness .868 -.212 
Immutability .842 -.038 
Discreteness .750 .472 
Inherence -.225 .808 
Exclusivity .069 .728 
Uniformity .081 .716 
Necessity .617 .631 
Informativeness -.503 .536 
 
Table 4.6. Two-Factor Solution Rotated Component Matrix 
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Figure 4.1. Factor Extraction of Factor 1 and Factor 2 
 
According to the results, Factor 1 -- identified with Natural Kind -- 
included Naturalness, Immutability, Stability, Necessity, and Discreteness, and 
Factor 2 -- identified with Entitativity -- included Uniformity, Exclusivity, 
Inherence, and Informativeness (see Table 4.3 for the relative importance of 
Factor 1 and Factor 2, based on the Rotated Component Matrix, and Figure 4.2 
for the factor loadings).  
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Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 
Stability  .887 -.172 
Discreteness  .835 .303 
Immutability  .814 -.215 
Naturalness  .802 -.391 
Necessity .739 .486 
Inherence -.044 .838 
Exclusivity .225 .697 
Uniformity .234 .683 
Informativeness -.375 .630 
Eigen Values 3.583 2.607 
% of Variance 39.8% 28.9% 
Sum of Variance 68.7%  
 
Table 4.7. Relative importance of Factor 1 and Factor 2, based on the Rotated 
Component Matrix 
 
The structure observed is similar to Haslam et al. (2000) but different 
from Study 1, where Informativeness was negatively correlated with Natural-
Kind-ness and was also excluded from Entitativity.  
The presence of Stability, Immutability, Naturalness, Necessity, and 
Discreteness in the Natural Kind factor suggests that categories perceived as 
biologically based are attributed a certain degree of immutability and stability 
over time. Also, it suggests that people think that biological categories have their 
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membership defined through necessary factors and that they have sharp 
boundaries.  
On the other side, the presence of Inherence, Informativeness, 
Exclusivity, and Uniformity in the Entitativity factor suggests that categories that 
are seen as entitative are believed to have underlying characteristics. 
Furthermore, members of these categories may be excluded from other 
categories, perceived as very similar to the other category members, and be 
judged on the basis of the category they belong to since their membership 
provides a great amount of information to the perceiver’s eye. Figure 4.2 shows 
the structure of essentialist beliefs according to the Sardinian sample. 
Respectively, the Natural Kind’s measures cluster on the x axis to form Factor 1, 
whereas the Entitativity measures cluster on the y axis to form Factor 2. For 
comparison, see Figure 3.2 for factor loadings of Study 1, and Figure 3.3 for 
Haslam et al. (2000). 
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Figure 4.2. Factor Loadings for Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 2 
 
In order to explore differences and similarities between Study 1 and 
Study 2 in more depth and to see the locations of the categories along the two 
dimensions, a factor score was calculated for all items. This analysis allowed me 
to verify the hypothesis that some categories, and in particular minority groups, 
may be seen as entitative. Table 4.4 shows the factor scores and mean ratings of 
the social categories, by domain.  
- 183 - 
 
Domain  Category Natural Kind Entitativity 
Age Old -.57 -.04 
 Young -.06 .05 
Diet Vegetarian .00 -.78 
 Meat-eater -.50 -.06 
Ethnic groups Chinese -1.05 .31 
 Italian -.38 -.76 
Gender Female -1.69 -.96 
 Male -1.71 -.42 
Intelligence Talented .93 1.12 
 Intelligent .31 .79 
Disabilities Sighted -1.16 .90 
 Blind -1.58 -1.25 
Occupation Pensioner .20 .20 
 Student 1.09 -.03 
Personality Selfish .70 .29 
 Caring .85 .32 
 Shy .76 .37 
 Friendly .75 .81 
Physical appearance Attractive 1.36 1.23 
 Ugly 1.22 2.57 
Physiques Short -1.14 1.64 
 Tall -1.38 1.59 
Political groups Liberal 1.41 -.90 
 Conservative .88 -1.57 
Races Black -1.59 .48 
 White -1.64 .11 
Religion Believer .31 -1.40 
 Atheist .37 -1.21 
Sexual orientation Homosexual -.35 -.12 
 Heterosexual -.61 .46 
Education Educated .53 -.36 
 Uneducated 1.14 -.59 
Social Status Married .36 -.57 
 Single .80 .47 
Social Class Middle-Class 1.13 -.29 
 Upper-class .33 -2.39 
 
Table 4.8. Factor scores and mean ratings of the social categories, by 
domain 
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Figure 4.3 shows the location of the categories along Entitativity and 
Natural-Kind-ness. The figure shows a pattern similar to the one observed in 
Study 1, since domains like Gender (Female, and Male), Race (Black, and 
White), Ethnicity (Chinese), and Physical Disabilities (Blind) scored high along 
the Natural Kind factor (see Figure 3.4). On the contrary, domains like Class 
(Upper-Class), Political Groups (Conservative), Religious Beliefs (Atheists, and 
Believer), Social Status (Married), and Diet (Vegetarian) scored high on 
Entitativity. Similarly to Study 1, the highest score on Entitativity was shown by 
Upper-Class.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Location of all categories along Factor 1 and Factor 2 
 
Also, some within-domain discrepancies were observed. For instance the 
category Italian was higher in Entitativity than the category Chinese, Upper-class 
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was high in Entitativity but also positive for Natural-Kind-ness, and Middle-
Class was low in Entitativity and negative for Natural-Kind-ness. Similarly to 
Study 1, Vegetarians scored higher in Entitativity than Meat-Eaters, and all the 
Personality Trait categories clustered close to each other and were negative for 
both dimensions. Physical Traits (Tall, and Short) scored high for Natural-Kind-
ness and low for Entitativity, whereas Physical Appearance (Ugly, and 
Attractive) scored low in both dimensions.  
Moreover, the within-domain differences between Blacks and Whites 
observed by Haslam et al. (2000) were not replicated, and both categories scored 
high in naturalness. Likewise, Homosexuals and Heterosexuals received very 
similar ratings and were both higher in Natural-Kind-ness than in Entitativity. 
This result represented a difference from Study 1 since the Sexual Orientation 
domain did not show within-domain differences, and both Homosexuals and 
Heterosexuals loaded positive for Natural-Kind-ness. 
Generally, a pattern similar to Study 1 was observed, with the difference 
that categories perceived as biological kinds were attributed even higher 
naturalness. These categories (e.g., Race, Sexual Orientation, and Ethnicity) -- 
which in Haslam et al. (2000) qualified as entitative -- came out strong on 
Natural-Kind-ness instead.  
In view of these results, my suggestion is that essentialising along the 
Entitativity dimension does not correspond to a devaluation of a social category. 
Rather, this may be linked to the attribution of qualities that are more typical of 
the Entitativity factor, like the presence of underlying realities and a certain 
extent of internal homogeneity that may reflect cultural similarities. For instance, 
Study 2’s participants rated the category Italian (in-group) higher for Entitativity 
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than the category Chinese (out-group). On the other hand, it is possible that 
belonging to a mono-cultural and traditional environment does not necessarily 
lead to the perception of minority groups as more entitative. As suggested by the 
literature, the two dimensions of Natural Kind and Entitativity should be 
regarded as two different ways of essentialising that both converge in the same 
phenomenon, which is the attribution of meaning to social groups (Demoulin et 
al., 2006). 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the second part of the study, I would 
like to discuss the results of the first part of the investigation in more detail. As 
argued in Chapter 3, high consistency in the occurrence of a two-dimension 
structure in the explanation of essentialist beliefs, and similarities in the 
composition of the two dimensions across the three studies reinforce the 
hypothesis that some generalisation across western cultures can be made. Thus, 
further investigation could focus on the design of a more refined scale for the 
measurement of essentialist beliefs about social categories (see Chapter 5). At 
this stage it is difficult to draw conclusions about the reasons why in Study 1 
Informativeness was strongly negative for Natural-Kind-ness and weakly 
positive for Entitativity, but this certainly represents an interesting ground for 
further investigation. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the individual category scores showed 
similarities and differences across the three cultures. In view of Haslam et al.’ s 
(2000) results, Sardinians were expected to produce more extreme scores along 
the Entitativity dimension for Race, Ethnicity, and Homosexuals. However, the 
results showed that these categories scored higher in Natural-Kind-ness than in 
Entitativity, and that categories from the same domain received similar ratings 
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with the exception of ethnicity, where Italian rated higher in Entitativity than 
Chinese.  
A similar pattern was observed in Study 1, and interpreted in 
consideration of the fact that subjects from a multicultural environment benefit 
from having direct contact with minority groups, and that there is a high 
likelihood for some of the participants to eventually belong to those minority 
groups. However, this explanation becomes weaker in consideration of Study 2’s 
results. Hence, I suggest that cultural contexts determine differences in 
essentialist beliefs, but whether this role is played by multiculturalism or by 
different cultural instances has yet to be demonstrated.  
4.5. Investigation 2 
This section describes the second part of the study, which explored the 
impact of category membership in essentialist beliefs about one’s own and 
others’ categories. Table 4.5 shows the frequencies and percentages for the 
chosen categories: 16 categories were chosen by at least 9 participants (9 
participants represent roughly the 10% of the total) and 6 categories had no self-
identifiers.  
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Category Freq. % Category Freq. % 
Old              0 0% Young            47 54% 
Attractive       5 6% Ugly             1 1% 
Upper-class      1 1% Middle-class      0 0% 
Meat-eater       4 5% Vegetarian       4 5% 
Blind            0 0% Sighted          15 17% 
Italian          28 32% Chinese            0 0% 
Female           39 45% Male             25 29% 
Talented         9 10% Intelligent      37 43% 
Student          14 16% Pensioner        2 2% 
Caring           23 26% Selfish          2 2% 
Shy              10 11% Friendly         34 39% 
Short            2 2% Tall             4 5% 
Liberal          6 7% Conservative     1 1% 
White            3 3% Black            0 0% 
Atheist          11 13% Believer         11 13% 
Homosexual      1 1% Heterosexual     29 33% 
Married          10 11% Single           7 8% 
Educated         32 37% Uneducated       0 0% 
 
Table 4.9. Frequencies of self-categories as chosen by participants. The 
characters in bold show the categories that were chosen by at least 9 participants 
(10% of the total) 
 
The same experimental procedure and data analysis employed for Study 
1 were adopted for Study 2, and the data were analysed in two different ways. 
On the one hand, the analysis by items considered the mean ratings for 
categories that were chosen by at least 9 people (16 categories in total). On the 
other hand, the analysis by participants considered all categories. 
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Analysis by Items 
For the 16 categories chosen by at least 9 people the mean ratings for 
each category and each scale were calculated for both the subset of participants 
who expressed membership in the category (Identifiers), and the subset of 
participants who did not (Non-Identifiers). The mean ratings for the two subsets 
(Identifier and Non-identifier) are shown in Table 4.6. The ratings have been 
averaged for the 16 categories that had at least 10% of identifiers across the nine 
scales (paired t-test across the 16 categories). Low values correspond to high 
scores of essentialism.  
The results show that, among the 16 categories chosen at least by 9 
people, only one scale was significantly higher in essentialism for those self-
identifying than for those not. With uncorrected alpha, three measures reached 
significance. They are all measures of Natural Kind: Scale 1 Discreteness; Scale 
4 Naturalness; and Scale 5 Immutability. It is worth mentioning that similarly to 
Study 1, own categories scored consistently higher on essentialism even for the 
non significant scales. On the basis of this result, I proceeded further into the 
analysis by averaging the values of the 9 measures and collapsing them into the 
two respective dimensions of Natural Kind and Entitativity; Natural Kind 
showed a significant difference (p < .001), whereas Entitativity came out not 
significant. These results are shown in Table 4.10.  
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Measure Identifier Non-Id Paired t Significance 
Discreteness 3.10 3.43 3.15 <.001 
 
    
Uniformity 4.25 4.37 1.08 N.S. 
 
    
Informativeness 3.96 4.20 1.76 N.S. 
 
    
Naturalness 3.29 3.60 2.36 <.005 
 
    
Immutability 3.23 4.04 2.31 <.005 
 
    
Stability 3.41 3.47 0.44 N.S. 
 
    
Inherence 3.80 3.93 0.94 N.S. 
 
    
Necessity 3.25 3.39 1.16 N.S. 
 
    
Exclusivity 4.97 5.05 0.63 N.S. 
 
    
Natural Kind 3.37 3.59 4.24 <.001 
     
Entitativity 4.25 4.39 1.80 N.S. 
 
Table 4.10. Item analysis. For each measure, the mean rating for Self-Identifiers 
(ID) and Non-identifiers (Non) for the 16 categories with at least 9 people 
identifying with them. Lower values indicate more essentialist responses 
 
Analysis by participants 
The second way of analysing the data was conducted by considering the 
sum of the ratings of the 5 self-categories on each scale for each participant, and 
by comparing these ratings to the sum of the ratings for the same 5 categories on 
that scale for all the remaining participants. What is termed own-category 
indicates the former value, whereas others-category represents the sum of mean 
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ratings provided by the remainder of the group to those same categories. The 
results are shown in Table 4.5.  
 
Measure Identifier Non-Id Paired t Significance 
Discreteness 3.2 3.4 1.11 N.S. 
 
    
Uniformity 4.2 4.3 0.87 N.S. 
 
    
Informativeness 3.9 4.2 1.36 N.S. 
 
    
Naturalness 3.0 3.3 2.13 <.005 
 
    
Immutability 3.7 3.8 2.08 <.005 
 
    
Stability 3.3 3.4 0.48 N.S. 
 
    
Inherence 3.8 3.9 0.67 N.S. 
 
    
Necessity 3.2 3.3 0.50 N.S. 
 
    
Exclusivity 4.9 5.0 0.46 N.S. 
 
Natural Kind 
 
3.3 
 
3.4 
 
1.96 
 
<.10 
 
Entitativity 
 
4.2 
 
4.4 
 
1.46 
 
N.S.  
 
Table 4.11. Participant analysis. For each measure, the mean rating given by an 
individual to the five categories with which they identified (Own) is compared to 
the mean rating given by the rest of the group to those five categories (Group). 
Lower values indicate more essentialist responses 
 
The only two scales that showed significance are Scale 4 (Naturalness) 
and Scale 5 (Immutability), which belong to the Natural Kind factor. Again, own 
categories were rated consistently higher on essentialism than others-categories. 
This pattern was consistent across all the scales, even for the ones with poor 
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significance. In accordance with the results from the previous analysis, own 
categories are more essentialist and the categories related to Natural-Kind-ness 
are enhanced for own categories whereas those related to Entitativity are not. It 
is possible that the size of the sample determined this weak effect for most of the 
scales and a not very strong value of p in the two significant scales, which was 
close to 0.05. However, the results showed consistency with the prediction and 
with the results of Study 1.  
4.6. Comparison between Study 1 and 2 
Study 1 and 2 were similar in the design but not identical. In fact, the 
social categories used in the two studies presented some small differences in 
order for them to suit those commonly known in the contexts where the studies 
were run. However, they were similar enough to allow comparisons to be made. 
This section presents some statistical analysis comparing the two studies. The 
figures have been already presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
4.6.1.  Similarities between Study 1 and Study 2 
In the investigation of similarities between Study 1 and 2 it was found 
that reliabilities of the scales correlated between the studies at .82. In both 
studies Uniformity, Inherence, and Exclusivity had a lower reliability than the 
other scales. Means and standard deviations also correlated highly between the 
two studies (M = .94; SD = .91).  
4.6.2. Correlation of Scales 
The correlation between the correlation matrices of scales was calculated 
in order to explore the extent to which the two studies are different in 
correlational structure. Correlations were transformed to Fisher Z values in order 
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to clarify to what extent the correlations between scales differ in the two 
samples. Correlations were then compared between the two samples, and 
significant differences in size of correlation were identified, using t-tests, based 
on the standard error of Z, which is the square root of (1/(N1 – 3) + 1/(N2 – 3)). 
Across the 28 correlations, using Bonferroni corrected alpha of .0018, there were 
10 significantly different correlations, which are in bold characters in Table 4.12 
and in Table 4.13. Five of the significant differences involved the Inherence 
scale which had larger positive correlations for Study 1 than for Study 2 with all 
other scales. In contrast, there were no significant differences in the correlations 
involving Exclusivity. Standard error of difference in Z, based on N1 = 123, N2 
= 87, is Square Root (1/120 + 1/84). 
 
 
Difference in Z (Study 1 and Study 2) 
 Dis Uni Inf Nat Imm Sta Inh Nec 
Discreteness                
Uniformity  -0.331        
Informative -0.340 -0.079       
Naturalness 0.052 0.363 -1.322      
Immutable -0.022 -0.095 -0.120 0.051     
Stability 0.059 -0.337 -0.534 -0.073 -0.393    
Inherence 0.482 0.213 0.796 0.598 0.615 0.531   
Necessity -0.114 0.832 -0.390 0.577 0.458 0.306 0.413  
Exclusivity 0.149 0.181 0.051 0.170 0.217 0.172 0.128 -0.162 
 
Table 4.12. Difference in Z in Study 1 and Study 2 (a positive difference 
indicates a stronger positive correlation in Study 1 than in Study 2). Significant 
differences are shown in Bold. 
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Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 show that Inherence was different from the 
other scales, having stronger positive correlation with all other scales in Study 1 
than in Study 2. It is interesting to note that Inherence has been argued to be a 
central feature for essentialism. In fact, the literature argues about how it may 
represent the ground from which essentialism develops. According to Cimpian 
and Solomon (2013), children from a young age present what they call the 
“inherence heuristic”, which is a cognitive ability to link external traits to 
internal features, and this ability will develop later in life into the more complex 
concept of psychological essentialism. Inherence was positively correlated to the 
other scales in Study 1, which means that it is a more central measure of 
essentialism, whereas in Study 2 a much weaker correlation was observed for 
Inherence. Further research would be needed to clarify the differences observed 
in the behaviour of Inherence in Study 1 and Study 2. 
4.6.3. Factor loadings 
This section presents some analysis in which data presented in Chapter 3 
and 4 were compared. The PCA with two components was compared between 
Study 1 and Study 2. Component 1 correlated across the two studies at .932 (see 
Figure 4.4), and Component 2 at .886 (see Figure 4.5) so they were broadly 
similar. The scale that falls below the line for Factor 1 is Inherence, which has 
been discussed as a possible difference between the two studies. 
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Figure 4.4. Comparing Factor 1 Loadings 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Comparing Factor 2 Loadings 
 
Factor scores for individual social categories were compared excluding 
the ethnic group categories which did not correspond. By comparing Component 
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1 and 2 except for the ethnic groups, the two graphs look very similar. By 
looking at the Natural Kind loadings, the two samples were well correlated (.93), 
but slightly less correlated for Entitativity (.85). The high correlations across 
categories confirm a similarity of the factor structure observed in Study 1 and 2 
(see Figure 3.2 and Figure 4.2).  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Factor scores for Component 2 
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Figure 4.7. Factor scores for Component 1 
 
 
Strong similarities were observed between the two samples as both were 
fit well by the two-factor solution, also indicating strong similarity to Haslam et 
al (2000). Inherence was strongly tied into Natural-Kind-ness (Component 1) for 
the London sample but not as strongly for the Sardegna sample. It is unclear why 
this effect was observed but further research could certainly clarify this. 
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4.7. General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore three aspects. First, I wanted to see 
whether the two-factor structure for essentialist beliefs suggested by Haslam et 
al. (2000) and also observed in Study 1 would be replicated in a different socio-
cultural context. My expectation was that the structure observed with a mono-
cultural sample would bear more similarities with the original study due to the 
fact that they were both conducted in traditional settings. Second, I wanted to 
clarify individual category scores and in particular the ratings attributed to the 
minority groups. Third, I wanted to provide further support to the findings of the 
self-categorisation investigation, which showed that own categories are judged 
consistently higher on essentialism and that this especially involves the 
attribution of naturalness to self-categories.  
Results from the present study provided further evidence about the 
occurrence of the two dimensions of essentialism, and strengthened Study 1’s 
findings. Interestingly, the results showed that the structure of the two factors 
was very similar to Haslam et al. (2000) although Study 1 produced different 
results in relation to Informativeness. An explanation for this could be the 
occurrence of an effect linked to multiculturalism, which may be clarified 
through further investigation.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the analysis of the single categories 
showed closer resemblances with the category scores from Study 1. In particular, 
domains such as Race and Sexual Orientation did not show the same within-
domain differences observed in the original study. Whereas in Haslam et al. 
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(2000) such categories were highly entitative, in Study 2 they were high in 
Natural-Kind-ness. The same trend was also observed in Study 1.  
According to these findings, I think that the conclusions drawn for Study 
1 -- which advanced the hypothesis that multiculturalism may favour the 
“naturalisation” of some social categories -- may require some further 
investigation about which environmental factors contribute to this mechanism. If 
some differences occur, and if these differences can be linked to socio-cultural 
factors, this investigation does not provide the ground to clarify which variables 
determine them.  
Whereas Mid-western Americans tend to categorise biological categories 
under the Entitativity domain, the two samples of Londoners and Sardinians did 
not do so. If cross-cultural differences in essentialist beliefs (Newman & Keil, 
2008) and cognitive styles (Nisbett, 2003) have been highlighted in the literature, 
differences between Americans and Europeans in relation to this aspect have not 
been investigated. Further research could explore these differences in more 
depth, and determine which factors of the cultural context are relevant in how 
social categories are essentialised.  
The aim of the second part of the study was to provide strength to the 
findings of Study 1 about the role that category membership plays in essentialist 
beliefs about one’s own and others’ categories. As discussed in Chapter 3, Study 
1 provided evidence for own categories to be essentialised more with high 
consistency across all categories for the Natural Kind measures but not for 
Entitativity. The results from Study 2 confirmed this trend with high consistency 
across all participants. For example, the scores of the individual categories show 
that the 39 participants who rated themselves under the category Female 
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attributed to that category 2.15, whereas the same category was attributed 2.19 
by non-identifiers. Moreover, the category Italian was rated 3.07 by its 28 
identifiers and 3.31 by non-identifiers, and Atheist scored 3.41 for the 11 
identifiers and 3.80 for the non-identifiers. These results provide further strength 
to the conclusion that category members perceive their own categories as more 
natural than non-members do, attributing them naturalness, stability, and sharp 
boundaries.  
The literature suggests that higher levels of naturalness may be linked to 
the attribution of a higher status (Haslam et al., 2000). However, a different 
position argues that essentialism is determined by the interplay between 
Entitativity and Natural-Kind-ness (see Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006). 
For example, if we look at the scores of the single categories across the Natural 
Kind and Entitativity factors (see Figure 4.3), and if we consider for example the 
Italian category, we see that it rated higher on Entitativity than the Chinese 
category. Moreover, minority groups such as Blacks -- that were unlikely to 
represent any of the Sardinian participants -- rated high in naturalness.  
In view of these results and of some previous work (Demoulin, Leyens, 
& Yzerbyt, 2006), we should consider both Natural Kind and Entitativity as 
fundamental components of essentialist beliefs. In fact, if Haslam et al. (2000) 
argued that perceiving a category as more natural correspond to the attribution of 
higher levels of essentialism, the attribution of Entitativity is also a symptom of 
high levels of essentialism (Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006). According to 
Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt (2006), forced social categories (FSC) -- which 
are those not related to personal choice -- are generally attributed high Natural-
Kind-ness and low Entitativity, as opposed to chosen social categories (CSC). 
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This claim has been supported by my results, which showed that Race, Ethnicity, 
and Physical Traits all rated positive for Natural Kind regardless of category 
membership.  
According to Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt (2006), forced and chosen 
categories are both essentialised to the same extent but the attribution of an 
underlying nature is linked to the type of category. Natural-Kind-ness and 
Entitativity are deeply related to the tendency to essentialise categories: either 
separately or jointly they are both accountable for the attribution of essences. 
The category ratings in Study 2 may be interpreted in consideration of this 
argument. For example, the scores received by the category Chinese were 
particularly puzzling since they revealed higher naturalness than the category 
Italians. If we consider Demoulin, Leyens, and Yzerbyt’s (2006) account, the 
two categories can be seen as essentialised to the same extent but in a different 
way.  
Possibly, being an Italian from the perspective of an Italian means having 
inner essences, sharing some distinctive features, and holding meaningful 
information. These features may contribute to provide the category members 
with an important portion of self-esteem and personal meaning. In fact, the 
literature shows that individuals strongly invoke social identity in situations 
where they are in contact with another culture or when they compare their group 
to another one. Social identities become meaningful sources of personal identity 
(Berry, 2001) through a mechanism called civic identity (or ethnic identity) 
(Kalin & Berry, 1995). On the same opinion, Tajfel (1981) claimed that group 
membership involves emotional investment, and Hong et al. (2003) argued that 
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individuals attribute central features to social groups, and then use the same 
features to define their own self-identity.  
On the other hand, being Chinese from the perspective of Italians may 
recall more biological features. The process according to which ethnicities are 
seen as biological kinds has been argued in the literature by Gil-White (2001), 
who claims that genotypic traits account for the fact that appearances are 
processed by the human’s eye as a cue for internal differences and that they 
create beliefs about the existence of different human species.  
Study 2 provided strength to previous evidence about the structure of 
essentialist beliefs and represents a solid ground for further investigation. In the 
next chapter a study whose purpose was to design a more economical 
measurement of essentialist beliefs about social categories and individual traits 
will be discussed.  
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4.8. Appendix: Instructions, categories, and scales in Italian 
Instructions 
“Le Categorie Sociali sono un modo di categorizzare o classificare le 
persone e consistono in raggruppamenti ideali di persone con simili 
caratteristiche. L’obiettivo di questo studio è quello di indagare il modo in cui le 
persone percepiscono le categorie sociali, e per questo motivo ti verrà chiesto di 
valutare una lista di categorie sociali in diverse scale. 
Il completamento di questo questionario è completamente volontario ed 
anonimo. Il tuo nome non apparirà nei dati per nessuna ragione. Non esistono 
risposte giuste o sbagliate, ad ogni modo le tue risposte saranno vitali per il 
buon esito di questo studio, quindi ti suggerisco di pensare attentamente prima 
di rispondere. Di seguito, saranno presentate 9 scale, ognuna delle quali 
occuperà due pagine. Alla fine, nell’ultima pagina, ti verrà chiesto di indicare a 
quali categorie sociali pensi di appartenere”.  
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Domains Study 1 Study 2 
Age groups Old Young Anziano Giovane 
Dietary 
groups 
Meat-
eaters 
Vegetarians Carnivoro Vegetariano 
Ethnic 
groups 
British Asians Italiano Asiatico 
Gender Male Female Uomo Donna 
Intelligence Talented Intelligent Talentuoso  Intelligente  
Disabilities Blind Sighted Non-vedente  Vedente 
Occupations Student Pensioner Studente Pensionato 
Personality Caring Selfish Altruista Egoista 
 
Shy Friendly Timido Amichevole 
Physique Attractive Ugly Attraente  Brutto  
Physiques Short Tall Basso Alto 
Political 
groups 
Liberal Conservative Social-
Democratico 
Conservatore 
Races Black White Nero Bianco 
Religions Atheists Believers Ateo Credente 
Sexual 
orientation 
Hetero-
sexuals 
Homo-
sexuals 
Eterosessuale Omosessual 
Education Educated  Non-
educated 
Istruito Non istruito 
Social 
Status 
Married Single Coniugato Single 
Social 
classes 
Upper-
class 
Middle-class Ceto Sociale 
Alto  
Ceto Sociale 
Medio  
 
Table 4.13. Sets of social categories used in Study 1, and in Study 2 
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 NATURAL KIND DIMENSION 
MEASURE DEFINITION  
Discreteness Alcune categorie hanno dei confini maggiormente definiti 
rispetto altre. Per alcune, l'appartenenza ad un gruppo è 
netta, definita, e le persone possono appartenere ad una 
certa categoria sociale, oppure non appartenervi.Per altre 
categorie sociali, invece, l'appartenenza può essere più 
sfumata, per cui le persone possono avere diversi gradi di 
membership ad una categoria sociale.  
Necessity Alcune categorie richiedono ai loro membri la presenza di 
determinate caratteristiche, senza le quail una persona non 
può essere un membro di quella categoria. Altre categorie 
non richiedono la presenza di tali caratteristiche per 
diventare membro di tali categorie.  
Immutability L’appartenenza ad alcune categorie sociali è facilmente 
modificabile ed i loro membri possono facilmente 
diventare non-membri. La membership in altre categorie è 
invece relativamente immutabile; per cui risulterebbe 
difficile per un membro di una categoria diventare un non-
membro.   
Stability Alcune categorie sociali sono maggiormente stabili nel 
tempo rispetto ad altre, esse sono sempre esistite e le loro 
caratteristiche non hanno subito grosse modificazioni nel 
corso della storia. Altre categorie sono meno stabili, le loro 
caratteristiche hanno subito modifiche sostanziali e 
potrebbero non essere sempre esistite nel corse della storia. 
Naturalness Alcune categorie sociali sono più naturali, mentre altre 
sono più artificiali. 
 
Table 4.14. Natural Kind measures translated in Italian from Haslam et al. 
(2000) 
 
- 206 - 
 
 ENTITATIVITY DIMENSION 
MEASURE DEFINITION  
Uniformity I membri di alcune categorie sociali sono molto simili tra 
loro,hanno molte caratteristiche in comune e sono piuttosto 
uniformi. I membri di altre categorie sono invece molto 
diversi tra loro, e non condividono molte caratteristiche 
Informative-
ness 
Talvolta, è possibile dare numerosi giudizi sui membri di 
alcune categorie sociali: sapere che una persona appartiene 
ad una categoria ci dice molto rispetto ad essa. In altri casi, 
invece, possiamo dare solo pochi giudizi riguardo i 
membri di una categoria, e l'appartenenza è poco 
informativa. 
Inherence Alcune categorie sociali possiedono una realtà sottostante: 
sebbene i loro membri presentino similitudini e differenze 
in superficie, interiormente essi sono sostanzialmente 
uguali. Altre categorie presentano similitudini e differenze 
in superficie, ma non condividono similitudini di fondo. 
Exclusivity Alcune categorie sociali richiedono che i propri membri 
possiedano determinate caratteristiche, e se una persona 
non possiede tali caratteristiche non può essere membro di 
tale categoria. Altre categorie condividono similitudini, ma 
non richiedono ai loro membri di possedere determinate 
caratteristiche. 
 
Table 4.15. Entitativity measures translated in Italian from Haslam et al. (2000) 
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Numeration MEASURE HIGH RATINGS LOW RATINGS 
1 Discreteness 1= confini netti, 
definite 
7= confini sfumati, 
indefiniti 
2 Uniformity 1= diverso, 
dissimile 
7= uniforme, simile 
3 Informative-
ness 
1= pochi giudizi, 
non informative 
7= molti giudizi, 
informativo 
4 Naturalness 1= artificiale 7= naturale 
5 Immutability 1= facilmente 
modificabile, 
mutevole 
7= non facilmente 
modificabile, 
immutevole 
6 Stability 1= instabile nel 
tempo 
7= stabile nel 
tempo 
7 Inherence 1= realtá o identitá 
sottostante 
7= nessuna realtá o 
identitá sottostante 
8 Necessity 1= caratteristiche 
peculiari o 
necessarie 
7= assenza di 
caratteristiche 
peculiari o 
necessarie 
9 Exclusivity 1= esclude altre 
categorie 
7= non esclude 
altre categorie 
 
Table 4.16. Ratings for the nine measures of essentialism according to Haslam et 
al. (2000). The reverse keying is not shown in the Table. In the actual survey, 
scales 2-6 had a 7 for the High rating and a 1 for the Low rating 
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5.1. Introduction 
Study 1 and 2 confirmed previous findings about the occurrence of 
Natural Kind and Entitativity in the explanation of essentialist beliefs about 
social categories (see Haslam et al., 2000). Some similarities were observed 
between Study 1 and 2 in the way single categories were essentialised and in the 
overall composition of the two dimensions. In both studies the Natural Kind 
factor included Discreteness, Naturalness, Stability, Immutability, and Necessity. 
However, Entitativity included Uniformity, Inherence, Exclusivity, and 
Informativeness in Study 2 but not in Study 1, where Informativeness loaded 
negatively on Natural Kind instead.  
On the other hand, similarities in relation to the composition of the two 
factors were observed between Haslam et al. (2000) and Study 2, but not in the 
way individual categories are essentialised. The second aspect that was 
highlighted by both Study 1 and 2 was that self-categories are essentialised more 
than others-categories. Also, a further analysis of the data showed that individual 
differences occur across individuals, and that individual styles are located across 
the continuum line of which Entitativity and Natural Kind represent the two 
extremities. This aspect of the results is discussed in section 5.2. Overall, the 
results of Haslam et al. (2000), Study 1, and Study 2 taken together suggested 
that the observed differences may be determined by cultural factors and by intra-
group processes. The role played by the presence of participants from minority 
groups in the multicultural sample (Study 1) has also been considered.  
In their investigation Haslam et al. (2000) showed that people 
essentialise social categories according to the two dimensions of Natural Kind 
and Entitativity. However, their assumption was that individuals essentialise in 
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the same way and thus they did not consider individual styles. The present study 
aimed to address this point and advances the hypothesis that individuals can 
differ in their essentialist style.  
The former two studies provided evidence about the composition of 
essentialist beliefs. Despite the differences in the composition of Entitativity 
observed in Study 1, the overall structure was confirmed with high consistency 
and represented a solid ground for the present investigation. Study 3 was 
concerned with the design of a more refined and economical measure of 
essentialist beliefs and employed four measures of essentialism: two Natural 
Kind measures (Naturalness, and Discreteness) and two Entitativity measures 
(Uniformity, and Informativeness), which had to be rated on a number of items 
concerning Social Categories (Class, and Religion) and Personality Traits 
(Intelligence, and Personality). 
Study 3 is also referred to as the Four-Essentialism Measure Study. 
Section 5.2 and 5.3 present respectively a reanalysis of the findings of Study 1 
and 2 in relation to individual differences in cognitive styles, and a discussion of 
the results, thus describe the empirical background of Study 3. Section 5.4 gives 
a definition of cognitive style, a summary of theories about cognitive styles, and 
of their measurements. Section 5.5 introduces researchers’ current positions 
about cognitive styles in Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects, and differences 
between Autism Spectrum Disorder s and normally developing individuals. The 
study presented in this chapter aimed at investigating whether individuals with a 
diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder differ in their essentialist style from 
normally developing subjects. There is no previous research directly examining 
this aspect, and this is partly because no scale of essentialist beliefs exists. 
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Designing a scale of essentialist beliefs to be used in investigating this aspect 
represents one of the aims of the work presented in Section 5.6. 
According to the literature, individuals affected by Autism Spectrum 
Disorder show interesting cognitive differences in a number of aspects (e.g., 
cognitive rigidity, black or white thinking, and literalness). In particular, 
cognitive and social difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorders are hypothesised 
to be determined by a lack of central coherence (cognition) and by the absence of 
a theory of mind (social interaction). The two aspects are discussed.  
These aspects lead me to suppose that individuals affected by Autism 
Spectrum Disorder may also show differences in being more likely to see social 
categories as either natural or entitative compared to typically developing 
individuals. If this is found, it could provide another piece of evidence for 
understanding the world of Autism Spectrum Disorder, and it would also provide 
a link between essentialist beliefs and other cognitive styles. 
Section 5.7 describes the design, procedure, and method employed for 
Study 3. At the end of the section the results are discussed. The results of the 
investigation conducted with a sample of normally developing subjects and with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects are discussed in sub-sections 5.7.2 and 5.7.3. 
My hypothesis for this investigation was formulated on the basis of current 
theories that describe Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects’ cognitive style as 
rigid and fixed (Bertoglio & Hendren, 2009; Lewis et al., 2007). Therefore, my 
expectation was that the sample of Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects would be 
more extreme in their essentialist judgments. Section 5.8 summarises the results 
of the two investigations and provides a joint discussion of the findings. 
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5.2. Empirical background of the study 
In Haslam et al. (2000) the assumption was that individuals’ scores and 
their variability across the 9 scales produced a picture of the structure of Natural 
Kind and Entitativity. The same analysis was run in Study 1 and 2 and confirmed 
the occurrence of the factors. However, the data can also be analysed in a way 
that considers the average social category in order to see how essentialist people 
are in their ratings across the 9 scales, and whether people differ in terms of the 
Entitativity and Natural Kind-ness of their judgments. For example, some people 
may judge social categories to be natural kinds whereas other people may not, 
and some people may judge social categories to be entitative whereas others may 
not.  
London sample 
The data collected for Study 1 provided ratings of the 36 social 
categories on the 9 scales for each participant (N = 123). The analysis presented 
previously collapsed this three-way dataset across participants to provide a 
matrix of social categories by scales. In the present analysis I collapsed the 
dataset across social categories in order to obtain a measure of how strongly each 
participant judged each of the essentialism scales as applying to social categories 
in general. In this way, the possibility that participants have different degrees of 
essentialist belief can be determined, together with the possibility that these 
different degrees of belief along the 9 scales show the same correlational 
structure as observed in the analysis presented above. 
The ratings were obtained by creating a single variable for each of the 9 
scales for each participant by averaging the ratings across the 36 categories 
regardless of the domain. By averaging over categories, the data were reduced to 
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a matrix of 123 participants x 9 scales, and participants’ scores for each scale 
indicated how strongly they considered social categories in general to be 
essentialised on that scale. Subsequently, the reliability of individual participant 
differences for each one of the nine scales was calculated (see Table 5.1).  
Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .837 to .970 (M = .918), indicating a 
strong and reliable scaling of individual participant differences for each scale. 
This result allowed proceeding to the next step, where correlation between the 
scales was analysed and a principal components analysis was run. 
 
 
Scales Reliability Extraction Mean St. Deviation 
Discreteness .897 .443 3.23 0.76 
Uniformity .954 .656 4.78 1.16 
Informativeness .924 .529 4.23 0.91 
Naturalness .894 .571 3.40 0.79 
Immutability .837 .459 3.73 0.62 
Stability .899 .516 3.67 0.82 
Inherence .951 .504 4.13 1.13 
Necessity .933 .187 3.17 0.96 
Exclusivity .970 .347 4.62 1.36 
 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for the nine measures of essentialism 
 
 
The scree plot (see Figure 5.1) showed a relatively weak structure but 
with two fairly clear components accounting for the 25% and 22% of the 
variance respectively.  
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Figure 5.1. Factor Extraction of Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 1  
 
 
These two components were extracted and subjected to Varimax rotation. 
(see Table 5.2 for the factor loadings and relative importance of Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 based on the Rotated Component Matrix). 
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Measure Factor 1 Factor 2 
Naturalness .751  
Stability .718  
Discreteness .665  
Immutability .665 .132 
Necessity .421  
Uniformity  .810 
Inherence .166 .690 
Informativeness -.251 .683 
Exclusivity  .585 
Eigen Values 2.259 1.952 
% of Variance 25.104 21.693 
Sum of Variance 46.797  
 
Table 5.2. Relative importance of Factor 1 and Factor 2 based on the Rotated 
Component Matrix 
 
Figure 5.2 shows a factor structure that was remarkably similar to the one 
generated in Haslam et al.’s (2000) study, based on the matrix of categories by 
scales averaged over participants. It can be observed that Informativeness 
showed a smaller negative loading on Naturalness compared to the previous 
analysis of Study 1 by social categories, but otherwise the structure is very 
similar. 
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Figure 5.2. Factor Loadings for Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 1 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of participants across the two factors. 
While the majority are distributed around the centre of the space, there are also 
some clear outliers with strong styles of using the nine scales in different ways. 
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Figure 5.3. Location of all participants along Factor 1 and Factor 2 
 
Sardinian sample 
The same data analysis carried out for Study 1 was run for Study 2. The 
scales’ reliability ranged from .852 to .964 (M= .922). Similarly to Study 1, two 
components were identified, explaining 28% and 21% of the variance 
respectively (see Figure 5.4). Interestingly they did not correspond to the 
structure observed in Figure 5.1. In fact, for Study 2’s sample, the Natural Kind 
scales of Naturalness, Stability, and Immutability combined with the Entitative 
scales of Informativeness and Uniformity on the first component (see Figure 
5.5).  
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Scales Reliability Extraction Mean St. Deviation 
Discreteness .924 .443 3.23 0.76 
Uniformity .949 .656 4.78 1.16 
Informativeness .938 .529 4.23 0.91 
Naturalness .867 .571 3.40 0.79 
Immutability .852 .459 3.73 0.62 
Stability .906 .516 3.67 0.82 
Inherence .947 .504 4.13 1.13 
Necessity .949 .187 3.17 0.96 
Exclusivity .964 .347 4.62 1.36 
 
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics for the nine measures of essentialism 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Factor Extraction of Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 2 
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Figure 5.5. Factor Loadings for Factor 1 and Factor 2, Study 2 
 
5.2.1. Discussion 
The conclusion of the London analysis was that 47% of the variance of 
participant averages across the nine scales was captured by two components, 
which clustered the scales in the same way as shown by the analysis of category 
averages. This remarkable result provides additional validity to the 
meaningfulness of the two dimensions identified as Natural Kind and 
Entitativity. In respect to participant differences, people systematically differ 
along these same two dimensions when judging social categories in general. 
Some see social categories as natural whereas others as non-natural, and 
independently some see social categories as entitative while others as non-
entitative. 
- 222 - 
It is unclear why the Sardinian sample has generated a different structure 
for individual differences, particularly in consideration of the fact that the 
analysis of the social category x scales dataset confirmed the two dimensions of 
essentialism suggested by Haslam et al. (2000). However, the results underline 
the fact that no relation is required between the structure of the category x scale 
and the participant x scale matrices, which makes the finding of the close match 
for the London sample the more interesting. 
In view of these results, it is meaningful to use the two dimensions as the 
basis for the development of a psychometric scale that aims at measuring the 
extent of a person’s essentialist thinking for the London population. Some 
representative scales and categories were therefore selected in order to create a 
short questionnaire that would measure the two dimensions identified here.  
5.3. Definition of cognitive style and theories about cognitive styles  
In Study 3, I hypothesised that individuals may differ in the essentialising 
style they adopt, and that some of them may show beliefs that are explained 
through entitative attributes whereas some can hold beliefs that reflect Natural 
Kind attributes. Although the hypothesis of psychological essentialism as a 
personal style that varies across individuals has not been previously explored, it 
holds interesting implications. In fact, although little evidence is currently 
available, work on cognitive styles represents a rich source of evidence 
concerning individual differences in the way people process information and 
solve problems. Therefore, this section will explain what a cognitive style is and 
will present a summary of some of the most relevant theories on cognitive styles. 
This should provide a link between the literature and Study 3. 
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Cognitive styles can be defined as individuals’ preferred pattern of 
organising and categorising the external world (Kozhevnikov, 2007). One of the 
earliest classifications of cognitive styles and types was attempted by Carl Jung 
in his writing Psychological Types (1921), and later systematised by Myers and 
colleagues into the MBTI Test (Myers et al., 1998). Jungian psychological type -
- later termed cognitive style by the American literature -- provides standardised 
parameters for the understanding of individual characteristics and differences in 
the way information is processed (sensing or intuiting) and decisions are made 
(thinking or feeling) (Myers & McCaulley, 1985).  
The notion of cognitive style was introduced by Klein and Schlesinger 
(1951) by looking at the relationships between personality traits and individual 
differences in perception. Under their view, cognitive styles are a way to adapt to 
the environment and to relate to it. Thus, there is not a single way of solving 
problems, and every method individuals implement is valuable. Under this view 
individual’s choice underlies preferences rather than abilities. However, 
Kozhevnikov (2007) explained that this position may determine some conceptual 
problems since there are more and less efficient ways of solving problems. 
The first experiments about differences in cognitive styles were 
conducted in the 1940s and 1950s by researchers like Hanfmann (1941), Klein 
and Schlesinger (1951), and Witkin and Ash (1948). Hanfmann (1941) observed 
two different styles in the solution of tasks where individuals are required to 
group blocks, and showed that whereas some individuals make use of a 
conceptual approach, others use a more perceptual approach.  
Further research aimed at linking individuals’ personality traits with their 
perceptual abilities and social behaviours was conducted by Witkin et al. (1954), 
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who found that individuals showed a personal pattern of abilities that remained 
stable throughout the duration of the experiment for each of the tasks. 
Accordingly, they distinguished two categories: individuals classified as field-
dependent relied on environmental cues and social referents, and individuals 
classified as field-independent relied less on those sources of information. Field-
independent subjects appeared more impersonal in their social interactions, 
showing a greater physical and psychological distance from other individuals 
and a certain extent of separation from the environment.  
Further work by Witkin and Goodenough (1981) revealed a group of 
individuals that did not fall in either of the two categories. Witkin et al. (1962) 
argued that the two different styles reflect an adaptive way of interacting with the 
reality, but whereas field-dependence reflects primary mechanisms, field-
independence appears later in life with the development of better perceptual 
abilities. This conceptualisation was relevant for representing the first 
investigation on cognitive styles and for stimulating subsequent work. 
At present, there are two main approaches to the study of cognitive 
styles, which are the cognitive-centred approach and the learning-centred 
approach. The former one represents the classic approach and is concerned with 
individual abilities in problem solving, whereas the latter emphasises individual 
differences in learning settings and the importance of assessing personal 
abilities. The cognitive-centred approach includes several theories that describe 
different cognitive styles, like the Assimilator-Explorer, Perceptual-Functioning, 
Tolerance of Ambiguity, Impulsivity-Reflectivity, Locus of Control, 
Constricted-Flexible Control, Field-Articulation, Conceptual Complexity, 
Adaptor-Innovator, and Holist–Serialist.  
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These approaches are briefly outlined in the next part of the section.  
The Assimilator-Explorer concept was elaborated by Kaufmann (1989) 
following work on problem solving where he observed that depending on their 
problem-solving individuals can be distinguished between assimilators and 
explorers. In order to measure the two different styles (e.g., novelty-seeking 
versus familiarity-seeking), a 32-item self-reporting questionnaire was 
developed.  
The Perceptual-Functioning theory was elaborated by Witkin (1962) 
under the theory of field-dependence with a focus on individual styles in 
perceptual abilities. Field-independent subjects rely on environmental social 
cues, whereas field-independent subjects are those who do not do the same. This 
style was the first one to be theorised and measured through a number of tests 
among which the Rod-and-Frame Test, the Body-Adjustment Test, and the 
Embedded Figures Test (EFT).  
The Tolerance of Ambiguity cognitive style was theorised by Klein and 
Schlesinger (1951) and consists in how subjects perceive ambiguous situations, 
which -- according to Budner (1962) -- are those in which cues are reduced so 
that individuals may find difficult to categorise an event. Some individuals 
perceive ambiguous situations as desirable, whereas others see them as threats. 
The concept of intolerance of ambiguity was compared to rigidity by Budner 
(1962) who highlighted their close connection: if intolerance of ambiguity is 
related to the way people evaluate certain situations, rigidity consists in the 
manifestation of individual tendencies regardless of the situation and it is a more 
fixed pattern of response.  
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In classic experiments about tolerance of ambiguity participants receive 
instructions about a target object being still, when in fact the object may give the 
perception of apparent movement. This style is measured through the Budner 
Intolerance for Ambiguity Scale (1962). 
The Impulsivity-Reflectivity cognitive style was introduced by Kagan 
(1965) following studies on conceptual tempo, and is measured through the 
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). Conceptual tempo consists in an 
individual’s speed at making decisions in ambiguous situations. Kagan (1965) 
observed that individuals fall into two different groups, which he classified as 
cognitively impulsive and cognitively reflective. Cognitively impulsive 
individuals are more likely to adopt a problem-solving style that reviews 
different options quickly and makes fast decision. On the other hand, cognitively 
reflective individuals prefer to evaluate the different options carefully in order to 
decrease errors (Kagan, 1965; 1966). 
Locus of Control (internal versus external) consists in the style adopted 
when making attribution of causes of events, and was first theorised by Rotter 
(1966). Individuals with an internal locus of control believe that they can control 
their lives and regard their actions as important. In contrast, individuals with an 
external locus of control believe that their life is controlled by external agents 
hence their actions are not determinant.  
Constricted versus Flexible Control represents the style adopted in 
objects categorisation under contradictory instructions and was theorised by 
Gardner et al. (1959). Subjects who show a constricted style find contradictory 
situations disturbing and tend to rely on the most obvious features of the objects, 
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while subjects who use a flexible control style produce more differential 
responses about the target objects.  
The Field Articulation (element articulation versus form articulation) 
concept was theorised by Bieri (1955) and Messick (1976) following studies 
about perception of complexity. Element articulation consists in relating discrete 
elements together and differentiating them from the background, while form 
articulation considers large forms instead. This style is measured through the 
Design Variations Test.  
The Conceptual Complexity (abstract versus concrete) theory was first 
elaborated by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961), and is measured through the 
Sentence Completion Test. This theory considers people’s tendency to process 
information in a concrete or abstract way: concrete individuals are those who 
show less differentiation and integration, and abstract individuals are those who 
show the opposite tendency.  
The Adaptor-Innovator Style was elaborated by Kirton (1976; 1977) and 
measured through a self-reporting inventory, the Kirton Adaptor-Innovator 
Inventory (KAI). Kirton described cognitive styles as a strategy to respond to 
environmental changes and to employ abilities in problem solving, decision 
making, and creativity. He argued that every individual has a personal way in the 
use of these strategies, and that personality traits play an important role on that. 
According to Kirton (1976; 1977), cognitive styles are developed early in life 
and are stable over time. Individuals are distinguished between innovators 
(individuals who prefer doing things differently), and adaptors (individuals who 
prefer doing things better). 
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The Holist–Serialist concept was proposed by Pask and Scott (1972) in 
relation to problem-solving tasks. The holistic style (or hypothesis-led strategy) 
is employed by people who gather a big amount of information and focus on the 
big patterns, whereas the serialist style (or step-by-step strategy) is adopted by 
people who proceed for subsequent steps and consider small amounts of 
information at each step. It is measured through a number of problem-solving 
tasks.  
The theories above represent an overview of the most influential 
conceptualisations in support of the view that individuals employ different 
approaches in problem solving and in the perception of the environment. They 
are based on studies conducted on samples of normally developing individuals. 
The next section discusses current theories about cognitive styles in individuals 
affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder. 
5.4. Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects and their cognitive style  
Essentialist beliefs in autistic and Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects 
have not been investigated so far. However, the occurrence of a certain rigidity 
in both their cognitive style and behaviour, as argued by authors like Bertoglio 
and Hendren (2009) and Lewis et al. (2007), suggests that if Autism Spectrum 
Disorder subjects hold essentialist beliefs these would be clear-cut, an either 
“white” or “black” vision of things. This aspect is addressed by the second part 
of Study 3, with the assumption that Autism Spectrum Disorder individuals 
would be rather extreme in their beliefs along both the entitative and the Natural 
Kind factor. Research on Autism Spectrum Disorder has been incredibly fertile 
in the last two decades.  
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This section discusses some of the most accredited positions in relation 
to work on the cognitive aspects that are observed in the autism spectrum 
disorder, and work on the emotional and social aspects.  
By Autism we intend a neurodevelopmental disorder that can affect all 
the abilities of a subject at various degrees of severity, ranging from very severe 
to mild (Happé & Frith, 1996; Lord et al., 2000). Autism Spectrum Disorder 
includes a wide range of severity of which Asperger represents a milder variant 
that is usually diagnosed in late childhood (Frith, 2004), and which does not 
usually involve linguistic or cognitive deficits (White et al., 2006). Individuals 
that are affected by Asperger syndrome are referred to as high-functioning in 
relation to the other autistic subjects. Since Autism Spectrum Disorder encloses 
the full range of severity in relation to cognitive and interpersonal styles, the 
term will be consistently used throughout the thesis. 
According to the most common positions of theorists, one of the biggest 
challenges for Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects is to talk about their emotions, 
and this may cause depression and anxiety (Frith, 2004). They usually show 
impairment in both the social and cognitive domain, although some high 
functioning subjects may not experience problems in their cognition. Problems 
in the social domain have been investigated under the concept of the theory of 
mind (or mentalising), which was first proposed by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985).  
The theory of mind consists in the human ability to “read the mind” and 
to take into consideration desires, ambitions, purposes, and beliefs in the 
explanation of one’s own and others’ intentions and behaviours. In particular, it 
has been argued that autistic children fail three basic abilities: a) the ability to 
follow somebody else’s gaze (due to poor eye contact); b) the ability to share 
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attention on objects of interest; and c) the ability to understand false-belief 
situations, or to understand them at the same age normally developing children 
do (Frith, 2001).  
The theory of mind allows normally developing subjects to learn new 
knowledge and to understand the meaning of words. Research with high-
functioning autistic subjects showed that also those with high IQ read minds 
differently and show delays and difficulties in tests of false belief attribution 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Frith (2002) claimed that regardless of their general 
intelligence, all autistic subjects suffer a reduced ability in the attribution of 
mental states.  
The theory of mind theory represents a big step forward into the 
understanding of why autistic individuals lack social skills (Happé, 1997). 
However, a lack of understanding of perceptual and cognitive impairments in 
autistic subjects was addressed by Frith (1989) and Frith and Happé (1994), 
whose work led to the formulation of the central coherence theory (CC) (or weak 
central coherence theory, WCC), which is still one of the main theories in the 
explanation of autism.  
The core idea of the central coherence theory is that individuals who 
suffer from autism fail to “see the big picture”, and to appreciate the interaction 
of different contextual factors (Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). This 
hypothesis has been empirically tested by Shah and Frith (1993) who looked at 
the high level of performance of people with autism in solving the Block Design 
subtest of the Wechsler intelligence scales and the Embedded Figures Test (Shah 
& Frith, 1993). These tests are usually challenging for normally developing 
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individuals who struggle to separate the pattern or background from the rest of 
the figure, whereas autistic subjects find this easier. 
There is some agreement among theorists about the fact that subjects 
with autism show repetitive and rigid behaviours (Bertoglio & Hendren, 2009; 
Lewis et al., 2007). These can be distinguished between lower-order motor 
actions and higher-order behaviours (Lewis et al., 2007; p. 66). The first term 
refers to repetitive forms of behaviours, whereas the last one indicates complex 
behaviours that are connected to cognitive components among which the 
presence of rigid and fix schemes (Bertoglio & Hendren, 2009; Frith, 2004; 
Lewis et al., 2007; Pellicano et al., 2010). Rigidity in cognition involves an 
“obsessive desire for sameness, repetitive use of language, and narrow and 
circumscribed interests and [...] adherence to some rule or mental set” (Lewis et 
al., 2007; p. 66) and relates to failure in tasks that require flexibility (Lewis et al., 
2007).  
These positions constitute the theoretical framework for Study 3, which 
tested the hypotheses about the occurrence of higher levels of extreme 
judgements in Autism Spectrum Disorder subjects’ essentialist beliefs than a 
sample of normally developing individuals.  
5.5. Brief introduction on psychometrics 
The present study aimed at creating an economical measurement of 
essentialist beliefs. Every measurement that is created in the field of the Social 
Sciences has to comply with the psychometrics’ rules. The first laboratory of 
psychometrics was set up in Cambridge in 1887 by McKeen Cattel, and the 
theories he formulated are still in use. Psychometrics is the science that is 
concerned with the quality of assessments in the psychological field and with the 
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measurement of human cognition, contributing to some important discoveries. 
For example, some studies testified higher scores in IQ tests in Japanese people 
than Americans, and higher abilities of girls at comparing objects and at finding 
rhymes, whereas boys are usually better at solving arithmetic problems and 
induction tests (Rust & Golombok, 2009).  
In the presence of differences among individuals there are a few 
explanations that scientists may decide to endorse (Rust & Golombok, 2009). 
For example they can consider differences (e.g., differences between boys and 
girls) in three ways: a) empirical results (in this task boys are better than girls); 
b) validity parameters (these results confirm the hypotheses and support the 
validity of the test); c) proof of the presence of a bias in the way the test was 
constructed. Therefore, it is fundamental to consider the role that social positions 
play in the design of a test (Rust & Golombok, 2009). 
In recent days the interest of psychometrics has broaden to a number of 
different tests due to an increased need for selection and assessment in 
professional and educational settings. Psychometrics ensures accuracy in the 
measurements of individual processes, monitors against the occurrence of biases 
against certain group of subjects, and guarantees equity in the assessments of 
different social groups. The main distinction in the different tests used in 
psychometrics is between person-based tests and item tests: the first ones assess 
somebody’s knowledge in a particular field, whereas the last ones assess 
individual dimensions such as personal attitudes, traits, and beliefs. The items of 
a test can be either open-ended or objective. Study 3 used the item-test typology 
with objective items. 
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Some aspects have been considered in the design of Study 3, among 
which the inclusion of some reverse-keyed items in the questionnaire. Thus, 
prior to the analysis stage all the reverse-keyed items were forwarded and 
pointed to the same direction. Another aspect that was considered in the design 
stage was item bias, which occurs when a certain item behaves differently from 
what expected because -- for example -- it is not suitable for a certain sample of 
participants due to language proficiency. Hence, a bias may occur because a test 
has been developed for a particular sample of people within a certain society and 
who speak the same language (Rust & Golombok, 2009). In this case people 
who are not native in the same language can be biased against by some of the 
items.  
In order to verify the presence of item bias, it would be helpful to carry 
out a specific analysis of the items for the sample of subjects that is observed to 
be problematic with some of the items of the questionnaire, or for the sample 
with different demographics. When the analysis is run, the facility parameters for 
the analysis of this sample should be seen against the facility values of the item 
analysis of the other sample. According to the analysis, the problematic items 
should be then eliminated or reworded. In Study 3 the sample was composed of a 
group of participants from different cultural contexts. Hence, English proficiency 
of the participants was guaranteed by the requirements of City University for 
undergraduate students, which for foreigner students is a minimum IELTS score 
of 6.5. Also, the items were created in a way that they were brief and simple in 
the content, with each item being composed of a single short sentence.  
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5.6. Study 3 
5.6.1. Methods 
5.6.2. Pre-test 
In order to create a number of items suitable for the study, a total of 64 items 
were written and tested during a pre-test stage with N = 19 participants. The 
items were created by taking two representative scales for each essentialism 
dimension (Naturalness and Discreteness for Natural Kind; Informativeness and 
Uniformity for Entitativity), and four different social categories (Intelligence, 
Personality Traits, Social Class, and Religious groups). Each item included one 
of the four social categories to be measured on one of the four essentialism 
scales on a five-point Likert scale (see Table 5.12a, 5.12b, 5.13a, and 5.13b in 
the Appendix section for item wording, and Table 5.14 for item coding).  
Some of the items showed low standard deviation, with the lowest value 
observed for the item coded as PDR1 (Sd = 0.5). All the items that showed low 
standard deviation at this stage were reworded and revised. Overall, the items of 
version 1 (N = 9) of the questionnaire showed good facility with all means lying 
between 2 and 4, while the items of version 2 (N = 10) had a couple of means 
that were too low (e.g., CNF1, M = 0.9) or too high (e.g., PIR1, M = 4.2). A 
reliability analysis of the items showed good reliability for most of the items (see 
Table 5.4).  
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Version Scale Item number Number of participants α 
1 All Scales 32 9 .579 
2 All Scales 32 10 .867 
1 Natural Kind 16 9 .619 
2 Natural Kind 16 10 .602 
1 Entitativity 16 9 .714 
2 Entitativity 16 10 .888 
 
Table 5.4. Reliability analysis for all scales and by domain, pre-test stage 
 
 
On the basis of these results, 64 items were retained and distributed in 
two questionnaires of 32 items each. Each questionnaire counted 16 items 
investigating Natural Kind aspects, and 16 items investigating Entitativity 
aspects. Each set of 16 items counted 4 items about Religion, 4 items about 
Social Class, 4 items about Personality Traits, and 4 items about Intelligence.  
5.6.3. Investigation 1 
5.6.3.1. Participants 
A total of 109 participants completed the questionnaire but two of them 
were excluded due to completing only part of the task, and a total of 107 
participants were retained for the study (version 1 questionnaire N = 49 
participants; version 2 questionnaire N = 58). The study was run during a 
statistics lecture attended by first-year undergraduate students at City University, 
London, and the participants received one credit course in exchange. 
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5.6.3.2. Instructions 
The questionnaire was presented as a four-page booklet with the first 
page providing some general instructions for its completion, as follows: 
“Hello! This is a study on the perception of social and individual 
attributes. I would like to investigate how people perceive individuals who 
belong to some social or psychological categories. For this reason, you will be 
asked to rate a number of statements about religious, social, and individual 
attributes. There are not right or wrong answers to these questions but your 
answers are vital to the success of this study, so please think carefully before 
responding. 
Thank you for your help.” 
5.6.3.3. Results 
Two different analyses were run, one for each version. The descriptive 
statistics showed that the items had sufficient variability and reasonable facility 
(see item statistics in Table 5.5 and 5.6 for the Natural Kind items for versions 1 
and 2; and Table 5.7 and 5.8 for the Entitativity items for versions 1 and 2).  
At this stage, it is meaningful to note that the structure of the 
questionnaire meant that there were two subsets of items relating to each of four 
different scales, which could therefore be analysed separately.  
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Items Mean Std. Deviation N 
PNF1 3.06 .876 49 
CNF2 3.33 1.214 49 
RNF2 3.53 1.023 49 
PDF1 3.67 .922 49 
CDF2 3.27 .953 49 
RDF2 3.41 1.079 49 
IDF2 3.96 .912 49 
INF2 4.14 .866 49 
INR1rev 2.86 1.021 49 
PNR2rev 2.92 .909 49 
CNR1rev 3.14 .791 49 
RNR2rev 2.14 1.021 49 
PDR2rev 3.16 .850 49 
CDR2rev 2.92 .786 49 
RDR1rev 3.00 1.000 49 
IDR1rev 3.33 1.144 49 
 
Table 5.5. Item statistics version 1 for set 1 (N = 16) 
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Items Mean Std. Deviation N 
PNF1 3.14 .782 58 
CNF2 3.31 1.231 58 
RNF2 3.29 1.092 58 
PDF1 3.59 .899 58 
CDF2 3.50 .843 58 
RDF2 3.26 1.305 58 
IDF2 3.83 .976 58 
INF2 4.28 .833 58 
INR1rev 3.41 .956 58 
PNR2rev 3.26 .807 58 
CNR1rev 3.36 .810 58 
RNR2rev 2.00 .838 58 
PDR2rev 3.07 .814 58 
CDR2rev 3.14 .868 58 
RDR1rev 3.09 .923 58 
IDR1rev 3.28 .812 58 
 
Table 5.6. Item statistics version 2 for set 1 (N = 16) 
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Items Mean Std. Deviation N 
IIF2 3.65 .948 49 
PIF2 2.04 .706 49 
CIF2 2.90 1.005 49 
RIF1 3.45 .937 49 
IUF1 3.35 1.011 49 
PUF1 2.65 .855 49 
CUF2 2.78 1.104 49 
RUF2 2.69 .918 49 
IIR2rev 3.51 .845 49 
PIR2rev 3.12 1.033 49 
CIR2rev 3.37 .929 49 
RIR1rev 3.31 1.004 49 
IUR3rev 2.69 .847 49 
PUR1rev 3.41 .934 49 
CUR1rev 2.84 .850 49 
RUR1rev 2.57 .764 49 
 
Table 5.7. Item statistics version 1 for set 2 (N = 16) 
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Items Mean Std. Deviation N 
IIF2 3.69 1.079 58 
PIF2 2.26 .715 58 
CIF2 2.93 1.212 58 
RIF1 3.02 1.192 58 
IUF1 3.36 1.003 58 
PUF1 2.50 .884 58 
CUF2 2.76 .942 58 
RUF2 2.64 1.003 58 
IIR2rev 3.43 1.061 58 
PIR2rev 3.03 .794 58 
CIR2rev 3.38 .970 58 
RIR1rev 3.34 1.052 58 
IUR3rev 2.57 .797 58 
PUR1rev 3.40 .836 58 
CUR1rev 2.91 .732 58 
RUR1rev 2.81 .868 58 
 
Table 5.8. Item statistics version 2 for set 2 (N = 16) 
 
 
Reliability 
The reliability analysis was run in two stages. At the first stage the 
analysis per scales was calculated: all scales showed good reliability with the 
exception of Naturalness (see Table 5.9).  
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Version Scale Item number Number of participants α 
1 Discreteness 8 49 .657 
2 Discreteness 8 58 .660 
1 Naturalness 8 49 -.274 
2 Naturalness 8 58 .131 
1 Informativeness 8 49 .628 
2 Informativeness 8 58 .683 
1 Uniformity 8 49 .730 
2 Uniformity 8 58 .706 
 
Table 5.9. Reliability analysis per scale 
 
 
The second stage considered the reliability analysis by domain 
(Personality, Religion, Social Class, and Intelligence), as shown in Table 5.10. 
 
 
Version Domain Item number Number of participants α 
1 Personality 8 49 .327 
2 Personality 8 58 .170 
1 Social Class 8 49 .590 
2 Social Class 8 58 .519 
1 Religion 8 49 .294 
2 Religion 8 58 .623 
1 Intelligence 8 49 .406 
2 Intelligence 8 58 .307 
 
Table 5.10. Reliability analysis by domain 
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The reliability analysis by domain showed significance only for some of 
the domains, like Social Class (both versions), and Religion (only for version 2 
of the questionnaire). The Personality and Intelligence domains came out with 
low reliability, suggesting that people do not systematically differ in their degree 
of essentialising either of them.  
The results showed that all the items are correlated to a degree, but they 
are not organised into a systematic structure. These findings represent a first step 
into the design of an economic measurement of essentialism beliefs that can be 
used to test beliefs about social categories and personal traits. However, the 
weak values of α suggest that further work is required in relation to the items and 
their wording. In order to investigate the reliability results in more depth, further 
analysis was carried out by picking up 8 random items that had no relation to 
each other. The analysis resulted in a value of α = .380 on average, which is very 
similar to the values of the analysis per scales, suggesting that the values of α 
should be treated carefully. 
5.6.4. Investigation 2 
5.6.4.1. Participants 
A sample of 22 subjects suffering from Autism Spectrum Disorder took 
part to the study as part of a broader investigation on memory carried out by the 
Autism Research Group at City University. No age and gender information was 
collected. All participants with Autism Spectrum Disorder had received their 
diagnosis according to DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
criteria from clinicians through the national health services and assessment with 
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the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (Lord et al., 2000) provided further 
corroboration of their diagnosis. 
5.6.4.2. Instructions 
The subjects were explained the nature of the study by an investigator, 
and were allowed to finish the task in their own time. They completed version 1 
of the same questionnaire as in the first part of the study. 
5.6.4.3. Results 
The results of the investigation showed some small difference between 
the sample of normally developing subjects and the sample of Autism Spectrum 
Disorder subjects, as shown in Table 5.11. However, neither the Natural Kind 
nor the Entitativity scales showed a significant difference in means.  
 
 
 Natural 
Kind 
Entitativity Natural 
Kind 
Entitativity 
 Mean Mean St. 
Deviation 
St. 
Deviation 
Autism Spectrum 
Disorder Sample 
53.3 47.4 3.9 3.5 
Control sample 51.8 48.3 5.4 6.9 
 
Table 5.11. Descriptive statistics for the Autism Spectrum Disorder and the 
control sample on the Natural Kind and Entitativity scales 
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5.7. Analysis of endpoint responses 
An interesting point of investigation was the analysis of endpoint 
responses. It has been argued (e.g., Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Kalish, 1995, 
2002) that a marker of essentialist thinking is the belief that categorization is all-
or-none. Using the endpoints of the scales would therefore be an indicator of 
essentialist thinking. The results suggest that participants made varying use of 
endpoint responses (See Figure 5.6). The group of normally developing subjects 
used endpoint responses 12% of the time (SD = 11.8), and the Autism Spectrum 
Disorder sample used endpoint responses 14.6% of the time (SD = 11.7). 
Difference between the two samples was not significant. 
 
 
 
Figure. 5.6. Use of extreme responses (maximum possible = 32) 
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5.8. Discussion 
This study was aimed at designing an economical measurement of 
essentialist beliefs about social categories based on the two dimensions of 
Entitativity and Natural Kind, as indicated by previous findings (see Haslam et 
al., 2000). The design procedure involved a pre-test stage in which the items 
were tested on a small sample of subjects. The items retained for the study (N = 
64) were subsequently tested on a sample of N = 107 participants. The reliability 
analysis revealed different results for the analysis by scales and by domain. The 
reliability by scales showed good reliability for all scales (with the highest 
valued showed by Uniformity) except for Naturalness. On the other hand, the 
analysis by domain showed poor reliability for most domains with the exception 
of Social Class for both versions of the questionnaire.  
Further reliability analysis that was run by picking up the items at 
random showed similar values with the analysis by scales. These results suggest 
that further work on the design of the items is required in order to improve their 
reliability and to have a sufficient number of items for each domain and each 
scale of the questionnaire. However, the study also showed some underlying 
construct, which was highlighted by the reliability analysis by scales that 
provided good results for most scales.  
Some points can be considered in relation to the results. The data were 
reasonably reliable, with alphas ranging from .6 to .9, but the subscale structure 
did not come out as predicted. A suggestion for that could be that there may be 
just one dimension of individual variability in essentialist beliefs, not two as 
suggested by the analysis of Study 1.  
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The second part of the study explored essentialist beliefs about social 
categories in subjects affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder. Although this 
aspect had not been explored by previous work, my hypothesis was that Autism 
Spectrum Disorder subjects would show more extreme judgements than the 
control population. This expectation was based on researchers’ positions about 
cognitive rigidity and fixity (Bertoglio & Hendren, 2009; Frith, 2004; Lewis et 
al., 2007; Pellicano et al., 2010). Although the present study showed that 
differences between the two samples are very small, this result could be due to 
the sample’s size. Hence, my suggestion is that further investigation is required 
and that a larger sample of subjects could provide evidence for a stronger effect.  
However it should be noted that if a difference in essentialist thinking 
had been a major part of the autism syndrome a large effect would have been 
expected. Given the lack of evidence for an effect in this study, it can be 
concluded that either the effect is not large, or that the measures used here were 
not sufficiently sensitive to the hypothesised difference in thinking. Also, results 
on subjects affected by the Autism Spectrum Disorder could reflect low power 
because sample size was small. If an effect is present it would not be large. 
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5.9.  Appendix 
 
Code Item 
INR1 Intelligence is the result of artificial factors such as education 
and environment 
PNF1 Personality attributes are caused by biological factors such as 
genes and hormones 
CNF2 People naturally belong to a social class 
RNF2 Religious beliefs are the product of a natural individual attitude 
IIF2 It is possible to know a lot about someone from knowing that 
they are intelligent 
PIF2 Personality attributes are very informative of people 
CIF2 Knowing that someone belongs to a social class might reveal a 
great deal of that person 
RIF1 The fact that someone belongs to a certain religion is very 
informative about that person 
IUF1 People who are intelligent form a uniform group and share many 
characteristics 
PUF1 Personality attributes make people very similar to each other so 
that they share many characteristics 
CUF2 People who belong to the same social class compose a relatively 
uniform group and share many characteristics 
RUF2 People who belong to the same religious group can be very 
similar to each other and have many things in common 
PDF1 Personality attributes are generally clear-cut and observable 
from the outside 
CDF2 It is usually clear what social class someone belongs to 
RDF2 Religions are categories with clear and sharp boundaries: people 
can either belong to one religion or to another 
IDF2 Intelligence is generally clear-cut and observable from the 
outside 
 
Table 5.12a. Set of items utilised in version 1, part 1 
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Code Item 
INF2 Intelligence is fixed at birth rather than acquired over life 
PNR2 Personality attributes are caused by artificial factors such as 
education and environment 
CNR1 Social classes are an unnatural way of organizing societies 
RNR2 It is not natural for the human species to develop religious 
beliefs 
IIR2 The fact that someone is intelligent does not tell you very much 
about that person 
PIR2 The fact that someone has a certain personality says little about 
their other characteristics 
CIR2 The fact that someone is a member of a certain social class says 
little about their other characteristics 
RIR1 The fact that someone is a member of a certain religion says 
little about their other characteristics 
IUR3 People who are intelligent are very dissimilar; they do not have 
many things in common 
PUR1 The fact that some people share similar personality attributes 
does not make them similar in other ways 
CUR1 People who belong to the same social class do not form a 
uniform group; their members do not share many characteristics 
RUR1 People who belong to the same religion do not form a uniform 
group; they do not share many characteristics 
PDR2 Personality attributes are fuzzy qualities 
CDR2 It is difficult to tell what social class someone belongs to 
RDR1 It is usually difficult to tell what religion someone belongs to 
IDR1 Intelligence is an indefinite quality rarely observable from the 
outside 
 
Table 5.12b. Set of items utilised in version 1, part 2 
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Code Item 
INF2 Intelligence is a quality completely unrelated to biological 
inheritance 
INR2 Intelligence is fixed at birth rather than acquired over life 
PNF1 Personality attributes are caused by biological factors such as 
genes and hormones 
PNF2 Personality attributes are fixed at birth rather than acquired over 
life 
CNF1 Societies naturally organize themselves in social classes 
CNF2 People naturally belong to a social class 
RNR1 Religious beliefs are the result of artificial factors such as 
education and environment 
RNR2 It is not natural for the human species to develop religious 
beliefs 
IIF2 It is possible to know a lot about someone from knowing that 
they are intelligent 
IIR2 The fact that someone is intelligent is very informative about 
that person 
PIR1 Personality attributes are uninformative of people 
PIR2 The fact that someone has a certain personality says little about 
their other characteristics 
CIR2 The fact that someone is a member of a certain social class says 
little about their other characteristics 
CIR1  The fact that someone belongs to a certain social class is 
uninformative about that person 
RIR1 The fact that someone is a member of a certain religion says 
little about their other characteristics 
RIR2 The fact that someone belongs to a certain religion is 
uninformative about that person 
 
Table 5.13a. Set of items utilised in version 2, part 1 
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Code Items 
IUR3 People who are intelligent are very dissimilar; they do not have 
many things in common 
IUR2 A group of intelligent people can include dissimilar individuals 
PUR1 The fact that some people share similar personality attributes 
does not make them similar in other ways 
PUR2 A group of people with similar personality attributes can include 
individuals who are dissimilar in other ways 
CUR1 People who belong to the same social class do not form a 
uniform group; their members do not share many characteristics 
CUR2 People who belong to the same social class can be very 
dissimilar; they might not have much in common 
RUF1 People who belong to the same religious group compose a 
uniform group and share many characteristics 
RUF2 People who belong to the same religious group can be very 
similar to each other and have many things in common 
IDR1 Intelligence is an indefinite quality rarely observable from the 
outside 
IDR2 Intelligence is a variable quality with no sharp dividing line; 
varying degrees of intelligence can occur in people 
PDF1 Personality attributes are generally clear-cut and observable 
from the outside 
PDF2 Personality attributes are definite qualities in people 
CDF1 Social class membership is a relatively definite quality in people 
CDF2 It is usually clear what social class someone belongs to 
RDR1 It is usually difficult to tell what religion someone belongs to 
RDR2 Religions are fuzzy categories: people can belong to a religion in 
varying degrees 
IUR3 People who are intelligent are very dissimilar; they do not have 
many things in common 
 
Table 5.13b. Set of items utilised in version 2, part 2 
 
Code Domain Code Scale 
C Class D Discreteness 
R Religion N Naturalness 
I Intelligence I Informativeness 
P Personality U Uniformity 
 
Table 5.14. Scales and domains coding 
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Chapter 6: 
 
Categorisation of personality traits: an 
investigation into the role of verbal and 
visual information 
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6.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes a study that investigated the mechanisms involved 
in social categorisation and that considered three variables: facial stimuli, neutral 
information about a target person’s personality, and information about a target 
person’s behavioural response during a social interaction. The study was 
conducted within the theoretical framework of work on essentialist beliefs and 
person construal, and theories about personality traits.  
Theorists describe essentialism as a mechanism that allows people to 
make sense of the physical and social world, that is automatic and pervasive 
(Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989), and that is thought of as an essential 
component of categorisation (Gelman, 2003) and thinking (Medin, 1989). 
Moreover, essentialism favours understanding of the reasons why people are 
they way they are (Yzerbyt et al., 2004): individuals believe that personality 
traits are shaped by social factors like exposure to peers, culture, and education, 
and that they are deep aspects of somebody’s personality (Rangel & Keller, 
2011).  
The analysis of the data from Study 1 and 2 conducted as a background 
analysis for Study 3 (see discussion in Chapter 5) showed that people have their 
own personal style in essentialising, and that their style varies along the 
Entitativity or Natural Kind dimension. In light of these results, Entitativity and 
Natural Kind are to be seen not only as the two main components of essentialist 
beliefs, but also as a continuum line along which different styles of 
categorisation are found. This finding was the basis for the design of an 
economical scale for the measurement of essentialist beliefs about social 
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Also, Study 3 explored whether differences in the way categories are 
essentialised occur between subjects affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder and 
normally developing subjects.  
As discussed at the beginning of Chapter 5, individual differences in the 
way individuals essentialise are observed among a sample of normally 
developing subjects, raising a number of questions about social categorisation. 
One of these questions was about the mechanisms that influence essentialist 
beliefs and in particular the extent to which verbal and visual information about 
a target individual is determinant in the categorisation of that individual. In every 
day social interactions our perceptual skills are greatly stimulated by visual, 
olfactory, and auditory factors, and by the complexity of the cues that those 
interactions generate.  
However, categorisation applies to all situations where meaning is sought 
and may result from factors other than social interactions. For example, 
sometimes individuals make judgment of others by hearing a story where 
another person was involved, or by seeing somebody’s face in a photograph. In 
particular, work by Townsend et al. (2000) showed that facial stimuli guide 
categorisation and decision making in individuals, and that visual information is 
used to both understand the kind of individual they are interacting with and to 
decide how they should respond to him/her.  
Understanding social partners through facial cues reflects the 
employment of perceptual mechanisms that consider variant cues -- like 
emotional states -- and invariant cues -- like gender (Tarr & Gauthier, 2000). 
Categorisation is a fundamental mechanism in an individual’s life that deals with 
events, environment, and other individuals, and that aids decision making: “the 
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mind tends to categorize environmental events in the grossest manner compatible 
with the need for action” (Allport, 1954; p. 21). 
The study herein wants to tackle psychological essentialism from a 
different angle than the previous three studies of this thesis by looking at the 
mechanisms that underlie social categorisation. Study 4 looked at the interaction 
between facial stimuli and behavioural information at favouring extremeness of 
judgments towards a target individual’s personality traits, and at the increase in 
the confidence ratings of perceivers. I consider behaviours and visual stimuli to 
play a central role in the construction of beliefs about individuals although little 
attention has been paid to it. Solomon Asch regarded external traits basic 
elements of inner features: “Things are what they appear to be; they have just the 
qualities that they reveal to sight and touch. The surroundings open themselves 
to us directly and almost without deviation, as if we were face to face with 
objective reality” (Asch 1952; pp. 46-47). This claim recalls positions about the 
link between outer appearances as a result of essences, and suggests that what is 
observed outside reveals some distinctive inner qualities.  
In thinking of a human being, for instance, essences may range from the 
attribution of biological features (e.g., the genes, the DNA), hidden realities 
(e.g., the essence of being human), and individual’s traits (e.g., the essence of 
someone’s personality) (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). This study represents a first 
step into the understanding of the perceptual cues that favour person construal 
and that generate essentialist beliefs. The expectation for the results was that 
when administered a facial stimulus of either a man or a woman, the ratings for 
the personality traits of that person would become more extreme. This 
expectation in relation to higher values of extremeness matches previous 
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findings (e.g., Estes, 2004) in which natural categories are rated as more extreme 
than artefacts. According to the literature (Estes, 2004), also some effect would 
be observed in the confidence ratings, which should decrease. That is to say that 
if humans are perceived as Natural Kinds with essential personality traits, 
judgment of the presence or absence of those traits should be all-or-none, while 
uncertainty about the judgments would be expressed through reduced 
confidence, rather than by providing graded judgments. 
The term person construal refers to the mechanism that guides 
individuals in their judgements and in the action they decide to take when 
interacting with a social partner, and which refers to the perception, 
interpretation, and understanding of other individuals. According to the 
literature, person construal is determined by the interplay between visual stimuli 
and the information stored in the semantic memory (Macrae et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Psychological Essentialism is a way to understand the world and 
especially social partners, which is characterised by the belief that deep features 
determine superficial ones (Medin & Ortony, 1989). This suggests that these two 
mechanisms may bear some similarities. For instance, the underlying 
mechanisms of both social construal and psychological essentialism may involve 
an interaction between perceptual and verbal stimuli and may be influenced by 
previous knowledge stored in memory.  
In the study, the effect of behavioural information and facial stimuli are 
observed through changes in the extremeness of the responses and in the 
confidence at rating the items. Estes (2004) and Kalish (1995) showed that 
people use more extreme responses when categorizing natural kinds. Therefore 
extreme responses are a plausible measure of people judging that kinds are based 
- 257 - 
on essences. The effect might be different for confidence. In fact, Estes (2004) 
argued that when categorising natural kinds, extremeness of ratings and 
confidence may go in a different way. In his study, natural kinds were judged 
with more extreme ratings than artefacts, but with reduced confidence for 
borderline cases. Thus, one possible expected outcome for this investigation was 
that people would make more extreme judgments but feel less confident. On the 
other hand, confidence might also be increased as additional information is 
provided through the visual stimulus. 
The present chapter has been organised into four sections. Although 
providing a complete review of the literature goes beyond the aims of the 
chapter, a brief overview of the relevant work that has been carried out in 
relation to the role of visual and verbal information in social categorisation is 
given in section 6.2. Section 6.3 begins with a definition of personality, and will 
then go on to discuss theories and models of personality and in particular the 
Five-Factor Model by McCrae and Costa (1985a; 1985c). The analysis of 
previous empirical accounts in this field of research will help to introduce the 
investigation presented in this chapter (Study 4) and discussed in section 6.4. 
The overall discussion of the findings is to be found in section 6.5. 
6.2. The influence of facial stimuli and verbal information in social 
categorisation 
Allport (1954) argued that sometimes people base their judgments of 
other individuals on demographic characteristics such as physical traits, and in 
particular race and gender-typical features. This tendency results from the belief 
that people who look similar had similar life experiences: they come from 
similar cultural and historical backgrounds that exposed them to the same 
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advantages and disadvantages. Also, they may have experienced similar 
treatments by other groups and may show similar interactional patterns with 
social partners (Pfeffer, 1983). This belief determines individuals from the same 
groups be attributed similar inner characteristics such as values, beliefs, and 
attitudes, and be classified into the same categories (Chatman et al., 1998).  
It is the opinion of some authors that one of the most refined human 
skills in perception and a basic aid for social interactions is the ability to read 
faces (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). A Latin proverb of over 2000 years 
ago attributed to Cicero supported positions about the importance of faces: 
“vultus est index animi” (the face is the mirror of the soul). Some recent work 
has shown that by looking at somebody’s face, perceivers collect a great amount 
of information, like age, gender, ethnicity, emotional, and mental state (Bruce & 
Young, 1998). This information is usually gleaned automatically and with great 
ease (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Bruce & Young, 1986; Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000, 2002; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), 
and is linked to semantic memory (Macrae et al., 2005).  
Work by Macrae et al. (2005) investigated the mechanism that underlies 
personal construal. Their experiment was based on the Stroop Colour-Naming 
Paradigm and aimed to see how much information about gender and identity 
participants are able to collect in situations where the facial stimuli are not 
relevant to the task they are carrying out. In particular, they looked at the 
automaticity of information extraction. The study was run on a sample of fifteen 
undergraduate college students, and the results showed that the participants 
responded to gender and identity information automatically even if it was not 
related to the task.  
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Macrae et al. (2005) argued that even in situations where individuals 
extract face information unintentionally, the primary purpose of this mechanism 
is semantic. In fact, information gathered from the face of social partners allows 
the understanding of both other individuals and the environment. A further 
experiment by Cloutier, Mason, and Macrae (2005) showed that individuals are 
better at extracting categorical information (e.g., gender) than information 
related to the identity of a social target.  
Bruce and Young (1986) suggested that the process of face perception 
may be characterised by two mechanisms that act separately: one part of the 
process deals with the identity of the owner of the face, while the rest of the 
process deals with other information, like age, gender, and emotional state. This 
claim has received broad support by further empirical investigation (e.g., Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; 2002). 
Work on social categorisation has been carried out also with the use of 
verbal material, for example by associating labels to the target stimuli. This work 
showed that categories are automatically activated by verbal inputs (Devine, 
1989; Dovidio et al., 1986; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990), and that sometimes verbal 
inputs can overtake other relevant information and mask the complexity of social 
perception (Macrae et al., 2005). A study by Sinclair and Kunda (1999) 
suggested how verbal information can affect the perception of a social target. 
Further work by Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000) confirmed this thesis: in their 
study they manipulated information about the performance of a black doctor, 
providing their participants with some positive feedback first and with negative 
feedback afterwards.  
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They observed that in the first condition the positive information 
overcame negative attitudes towards the category “black” and enhanced the 
positive attitude towards the category “doctor”. In the second condition they 
observed the opposite mechanism, with the negative attitude towards the 
category “black” overcoming the category “doctor” and determining negative 
judgements of the target individual. In view of these results, Macrae and 
Bodenhausen (2000) suggested that the categorisation of an individual is affected 
by the occurrence of perceptual, motivational, and cognitive factors.  
6.3. Definition of personality and of personality traits  
Psychology has long dealt with the study of personality traits and 
Personality Psychology represents a fertile branch investigating psychological 
processes, and individual differences and similarities. One of the big focuses of 
Personality Psychology is the study of personality traits, which are measured 
through an individual’s patterns of behaviour (Costa & McCrae, 1997). Also, the 
definition of personality may vary in relation to which aspects of personality are 
taken into account.  
According to Carver and Scheier (2000), personality is a “dynamic 
organisation, inside the person, of psychophysical systems that create a person’s 
characteristic patterns of behaviour, thoughts, and feelings” (p. 5). Temperament, 
motivation, values, attitudes, and beliefs constitute the main components of 
personality. Temperament is a disposition that is also observed in new-born 
babies and therefore believed to be genetically determined: it consists in a 
pattern of behaviours that remains consistent over time and in different 
situations; motivation is an individual’s drive towards a specific direction; values 
are beliefs about what is important and positive; attitudes are personal 
- 261 - 
dispositions towards other individuals, objects, and events; and beliefs represent 
the cognitive counterpart of attitudes. 
One strand of literature that can be traced back to Cattel (1946) examined 
personality traits on the basis of several factors such as the nature of the traits, 
their measurement, and other sources among which are self-inventories, clinical 
settings, and psychological tests. This line of research considered 16 primary 
personality factors that are all represented in an individual personality sphere to a 
certain degree, and which are assessed through the 16 PF Personality 
Questionnaire (Cattel, 1946).  
A different line of research was followed by Eysenck and Eysenck 
(1975), whose model of personality counted three dimensions only and included 
Introversion/Extraversion, Neuroticism/Emotional Stability, and Psychoticism. 
Later reviews of the theories above suggested that both models are limited for 
either considering too many or too few personality dimensions, and that the main 
dimensions of personality can be reduced to five (Goldberg, 1990). This belief is 
held by two different approaches that are often referred to as the same one 
(Saucier & Goldberg, 1996): the Big-Five and the Five-Factor Model. The first 
one tracks back to work by Galton (1884) and Goldberg (1990) and to the lexical 
approach adopted by Allport and Odbert (1936), Fiske (1949), and Goldberg 
(1976; 1981) among others, whereas the second one is owed to the questionnaire 
approach of McCrae and Costa (1985a; 1985b; 1985c).  
According to the Five Factor Model (FFM), the five dimensions through 
which an individual’s personality is explained are: Neuroticism versus 
Emotional Stability; Extraversion or Surgency; Openness to Experience or 
Intellect, Imagination, or Culture; Agreeableness versus Antagonism; and 
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Conscientiousness or Will to achieve (McCrae & Costa, 1997, p. 509). Work 
carried out among different cultures showed that the personality dimensions 
presented in the model are universally found (McCrae & Costa, 1997; Salgado, 
1997), and that they show stability over time (Costa & McCrae, 1992). On the 
basis of these elements, the most common position of theorists is that the best 
representation of personality traits is the one provided by the Five-Factor Model 
(FFM) (Digman, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1997).  
However, the universality of the five dimensions suggested by the Five-
Factor Model has been challenged by studies conducted in other cultures, like 
the Hungarian, Chinese, and German culture. These studies highlighted the 
presence of all the personality trait adjectives propounded by the model in the 
German culture, but not in the Hungarian and Chinese cultures (De Raad & 
Szirmák, 1994; Yang & Bond, 1990).  
However, this problem has been overcome in English cultures thanks to a 
substantial number of experiments run over the years, which ensure that the 
model represents a reliable instrument for the study of personality traits (McCrae 
& Costa, 1997). Under Costa and McCrae’s (1992) view the four different 
elements in support of the model are a) the fact that the five dimensions are 
expressed through human behavioural patterns; b) that they are found in the 
language; c) that they are observed through the lifespan and in different cultures; 
c) and that transmission of the traits suggests that they may have a biological 
basis.  
As argued by some authors, a fundamental factor to be considered is that 
personality traits are expressed through language and thus there should be a 
specific term for all of them (Goldberg, 1981). This principle is satisfied in the 
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English language where all traits from the five dimensions of the model are 
defined through the appropriate terms, thus ensuring suitability of the model for 
English speakers (McCrae & Costa, 1997).  
In view of the empirical evidence in favour of the Five-Factor Model, the 
five personality dimensions described in the model have been utilised for Study 
4, which was carried out on a sample composed of English and international 
undergraduate students from City University, London. In the study, a set of four 
personality traits representing each of the five dimensions from the Five-Factor 
Model had to be rated in the presence or absence of facial stimuli, and for both 
the behavioural and neutral story about a target person.  
Study 4 investigated two aspects: a) the role of both visual and verbal 
(written) information in social categorisation and the effect of such information 
at increasing the extremeness of the ratings about a target individual’s 
personality traits, and b) the effect of visual and verbal information on 
participants’ confidence at rating the personality traits. Therefore, I manipulated 
two variables (presence or absence of facial stimuli, and behavioural story), and 
used the neutral story as a control variable. In condition 1 both the neutral and 
behavioural story were presented with the photographs (showing respectively the 
face of a young woman for story 1, and the face of a young man for story 2 -- the 
two photos are included in the Appendix section of the chapter), whereas in 
condition 2 the stories were presented without photographs.  
The neutral story was about a young woman, and controlled for 
presenting a photo in a neutral story context, where it should have no effect. The 
second scenario was a behavioural story about a young man, and some negative 
ratings were predicted to appear on the traits. Here the photo absence/presence 
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was assumed to have a bigger impact and to lead to more extreme and more 
confident ratings. If people consider categories as an essence, they then consider 
category membership all-or-none since you either possess a quality or you do 
not. Kalish argued that people tend to see biological kinds as all-or-none 
categories (Kalish, 1995). According to the literature, graded responses testify a 
lack of certainty in the perceiver (Estes, 2004). Thus, the criterion behind the 
adoption of confidence and extremeness measures in Study 4 lays in the fact that 
endpoint responses indicate categorical views (Estes, 2003). The confidence 
measure was adopted by Estes in two studies from 2004, in which confidence 
judgments were used to measure certainty in the categorisation of artefacts and 
natural categories. The results showed that although confidence ratings did not 
anticipate within-domain gradedness, they did predict between-domain 
gradedness.  
Previous studies show that beliefs and social perceptions of facial stimuli 
are tightly linked, and in particular category labels and lay beliefs about human 
traits favour recall and recognition of faces (Eberhardt et al., 2003). Some 
authors argue that facial stimuli play a central role in social perception and 
person construal (Cloutier et al., 2006; Quinn & Macrae, 2005), and that 
perceivers gather information from facial stimuli even if that information is not 
directly relevant for the task, and that the purpose of this is purely semantic 
(Macrae et al., 2005). Zebrowitz insists (1997) that faces are the predominant 
stimulus in social perception. Similarly, behaviours play an important role in 
social categorisation. Psychology research has shown that in the perceiver’s 
eyes, someone’s behaviour is seen as the results of her/his own unique 
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personality make-up rather than the result of contingency factors. This tendency 
has been named as the correspondence bias by Gilbert and Malone (1995).  
Findings in the literature support the key role that facial stimuli and 
behaviours play in social construal. This chapter introduces a study that aimed to 
link psychological essentialism to social construal by exploring the effect of 
faces and behavioural information. The expectation was that some differences 
would be observed between the ratings of the neutral and behavioural story, and 
that more extreme ratings would be shown in the behavioural story. Likewise, 
the effect of the facial stimulus for the behavioural story was expected to further 
increase extremeness as would favour the perception of a more “real” person in 
the perceiver’s eye. As previously discussed, the effect was expected to produce 
lower confidence ratings.  
A two-way interaction was predicted, as no effect of the 
presence/absence of the facial stimulus was expected for the neutral story. The 
study is presented in the next section. 
6.4. Study 4 
6.4.1. Methods 
6.4.2. Participants 
The initial sample consisted of 109 participants of whom one did not 
complete the entire questionnaire, thus a total of 108 participants were retained 
for the study (condition 1 C1, with photos N = 57; condition 2 C2, without 
photos N = 51). The study was run during a research methods lecture for 
undergraduate students at City University, London, as part of a broader 
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investigation on essentialist beliefs that included Study 3 also. The students 
received one course credit. 
6.4.3. Materials 
The study was presented on the first four pages of a booklet including 
also Study 3. The questionnaire included two short stories: story 1 (neutral story) 
(see Table 6.3 in the Appendix section) gave some description of the hobbies, 
work, and likes of a young woman, and story 2 (behavioural story) (see Table 
6.4 in the Appendix section) described an event that involved a young man, 
providing some information about his behavioural response to a work issue 
caused by a colleague. The stories were presented with or without a photograph 
showing the neutral face of the two target individuals associated with the stories 
of either male or female gender.  
Each story was followed by a scale composed of twenty personality traits 
tapping the five dimensions of personality as indicated by the Five-Factor Model 
(see Table 6.7 in the Appendix section), and the traits were rated on a seven-
point Likert Scale (see Table 6.5 and 6.6 in the Appendix section). In addition to 
rating the personality traits of the target person, the participants had to indicate 
their confidence at scoring the traits for each of the twenty items (1 = very 
confident; 7 = not very confident) (see Table 6.5 and 6.6 in the Appendix 
section). The instructions for completing the questionnaire were provided on top 
of the sheet, and were as below: 
“Please read carefully the two stories presented below. Underneath the 
stories you will see a table with two columns. In the left column of the table you 
will be asked to rate some psychological traits of the person in the story on a 
seven-point scale. In the right column of the table you will be asked to indicate 
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how confident you are at rating each of the personality traits for the person in 
the story”. 
6.4.4. Results 
The analysis measured extremeness in judgements ratings and confidence 
in judgements ratings. Extreme responses and high confidence were considered 
as indicators of a strong opinion at making judgement. In this section the results 
about Extremeness are discussed first and the results about Confidence are 
discussed afterwards. The scales all had 1 as a high value, and 7 as a low value. 
A general trend for the behavioural scenario to produce more extreme scores 
than the neutral scenario is observed with both lower and higher values on 
different traits.  
 
6.5. PCA analysis of the ratings of the characters in the stories in Study 4 
Study 4 wanted to explore perceptions of personality and how knowledge 
on some personality traits is likely to extend to other personality traits that are 
not known to a perceiver. Thus, the study looked at ratings of perceptions of 
personality, rather than personality per se. As previously mentioned, the twenty 
personality traits utilised in the study were borrowed from the Big Five Theory, 
and I thought that it would be interesting to explore whether the factor structure 
of the scales matched that of the Big 5 theory from which they were taken. The 
ratings of each story on the 20 scales were analysed separately with Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) using the data from all 108 participants. 
Story 1 showed a structure with a strong first factor, and 5 other factors 
with Eigenvalue greater than 1 (see Scree Plot in Figure 6.1). Rotated factor 
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loadings suggested that the first factor was a combination of Extraversion and 
Openness (7 of the 8 scales from these two dimensions loaded on the first 
factor), but the other factors did not correspond to particular dimensions. 
Confirmatory PCA was run on the 5 dimensions, each including 4 scales. The 
analysis found that Extraversion and Openness had good structure (all four 
scales positively loading on the first factor which captured 48% and 45% of the 
variance respectively), but the other three dimensions did not. 
 
 
Figure. 6.1. Scree Plot for Story 1 showing five factors with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 
 
 
Similar analyses were conducted on Story 2 (see Scree Plot in Figure 
6.2). Story 2 described a behavioural scenario therefore contained some evidence 
of the protagonist’s personality in a real-life situation rather than a neutral 
description of the protagonist’s personality traits (the story included a negative 
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social behaviour). The resulting picture had more structure than the one in Story 
1, with the Scree Plot showing three components above the “elbow”. 
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Figure 6.2. Scree Plot for Story 2, showing three factors with Eigenvalue 
bigger than 1 
 
 
For the three factor rotated solution suggested by the Scree Plot, once 
again the first component was primarily a combination of Extraversion and 
Openness, with positive loadings for 3 out of 4 scales on each dimension. The 
second component had 3 out of 4 of the Conscientiousness scales, and the third 
component had 3 out of the 4 Agreeableness scales. However, a solution with 5 
components (to match the theoretical structure) did not reveal the expected five 
factor structure. Finally, confirmatory PCA on each subscale showed a similar 
pattern to that for Story 1. Extraversion and Openness had strong first factors 
with 47% and 46% of the variance, while the other 3 dimensions showed weak 
structure. 
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In conclusion, there was some evidence that the meaning of the scales for 
the participants as they judged the characters in the stories corresponded to the 
theoretical five factors, but only in respect of the Extraversion and Openness 
scales, which themselves were inter-correlated within the data. My expectation 
was for a clear structure to emerge if there was consistent variance between 
participants in how they viewed the personality of the protagonist in each story. 
Failure to confirm the five personality factors is likely to be due to low variance 
between participants in what was a relatively simple task. 
6.6. ANOVA of five dimensions mean ratings in Study 4 
In order to examine the structure underlying the 20 scales, the scales 
were used to generate mean ratings for each of the Big Five personality 
dimensions that they represented. A first step into the analysis was to align the 
reverse coded scales in order to have them all in a positive direction. Then, a 
three-way ANOVA was run on the mean scale ratings for the five personality 
dimensions across stories and conditions. For the ANOVA factors of dimension 
(5 dimensions) and story (2 stories) were within-subjects, whereas condition 
(photo versus no-photo) was between-subjects. 
No main effect of condition (F<1) was observed, but there was a 
significant three-way interaction of Story, Scale and Condition (F(4, 424) = 
4.157, p < .005 when a Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor epsilon of .826 was 
applied to the degrees of freedom). The main effect of Scale (F(4, 424) = 82.4, p 
< .001) and the interaction of Scale and Story (F(4,424) = 48.0, p < .001) were 
also significant.  
The interaction of Scale and Story is seen in Figure 6.3. The effect of the 
event described in Story 2 was to reduce Conscientiousness and Neuroticism, 
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and (perhaps surprisingly) to increase Agreeableness (all significant at .001 on a 
related t-test, Bonferroni corrected alpha = .01).  
 
 
Figure 6.3. Mean ratings on the Five Factors 
 
 
In order to explore the significant three-way interaction, individual 2-way 
ANOVAs were run on the five dimensions separately, with Story and Condition 
as factors. The only dimension showing a significant two-way interaction was 
Extroversion (F(1,106) = 9.3, p < .005). Without a photo, mean extraversion was 
14.7 for the first story and significantly increased to 17.3 for the second (t(50) = 
3.95, p < .001). Given the photo, these means were reversed with 16.5 for the 
first story dropping to 15.8 for the second, a drop that was not significant (t(57) 
< 1). 
As discussed above, only one out of five dimensions was significant. 
This result is incidental to the main aim of the study which was to see whether 
providing a photo led to more extreme and more confident ratings of personality. 
* 
* 
* 
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However, it partly supports the hypothesis that facial stimuli may increase 
confidence and extremeness, and it is interesting to see that although partial, the 
photo did have some significant effect. Presumably the faces of the two 
individuals pictured provided additional cues to this particular personality 
dimension which were sufficient to over-ride the impression of increased 
extroversion provided by the behavioural story condition when there was no 
photo shown.  
6.7. ANOVA of extremeness of responses 
The extremeness of responses was defined in terms of absolute distance 
from the midpoint of the rating scale (in a seven-point Likert Scale the midpoint 
is 4). As an additional dependent measure, the analysis was repeated on the 
number of extreme rating responses given (1 or 7). Factors were Photo Condition 
and Story. The results of extremeness of responses and use of endpoint ratings 
were the same, with the same pattern of means showing an increase in use of 
endpoint responses from 2.33 (0.25) for Story 1 to 3.75 (0.34) for Story 2. There 
was a significant main effect of Story (F(1,106) = 27.6, p < .001) and no other 
significant effects.  
In both analyses the same result was observed, highlighting an increase 
in extreme responding with Story 2, but no effect of photographs. 
Also, the correlations between extremeness and confidence ratings were 
investigated. As shown in Figure 6.4, the constructs correlated at -.5, and are 
therefore not independent. The first and second story showed very similar 
correlation of extremeness and confidence. Note that a negative relation between 
extremeness and confidence is consistent with Estes (2004) data, where all-or-
none categorization was accompanied by reduced confidence. 
- 274 - 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Confidence as function of Extremeness across Forty scales 
judgments 
 
 
Since Study 3 and 4 were run on the same participants, an interesting 
point of investigation would be to see whether individual essentialism scores in 
Study 3 predict judgments in Study 4.  
I calculated an overall essentialism score for each participant. I treated 
these scores as different scores for the two groups who had different versions of 
the questionnaire, and I then correlated that with the overall average extremeness 
scores for each story. None of the four correlations were significant. The 
correlations were in the range of -.09 and -.16. The conclusion is that no 
evidence of systematic individual differences linking the two studies was 
observed.  
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6.8. Discussion 
Study 4 aimed at investigating some of the factors that are considered 
influential in social categorisation. In particular, the two aspects that have been 
explored in the study were the role of facial stimuli through the presentation of 
photographs of neutral faces, and of verbal information through the presentation 
of behavioural and neutral stories. Recent research revealed the importance of 
facial stimuli in the categorisation of social partners (e.g., Bruce & Young, 
1998), and suggests that individuals collect all the relevant details concerning 
age, gender, social status, and emotional state for semantic purposes (Townsend 
et al., 2000). Moreover, the judgements we make on the basis of an individual’s 
appearance guide us in decision making, for instance decision about the type of 
behaviour we are going to adopt with that person (Townsend et al., 2000).  
In line with this strand of research, the expectation for the present study 
was that the presence of a facial stimulus would generate more extreme ratings 
in the categorisation of personality traits for the behavioural story, but would not 
enhance the confidence of the participants. Likewise, similar expectations about 
an increase in the extremeness of the ratings were held for the behavioural story.  
In accordance with the expectations, the results showed that the 
behavioural stories produced more extreme ratings than the neutral story. 
However, contrary to Estes (2004) participants’ confidence was also enhanced in 
this condition. On the other hand, the presence of facial stimuli had very little 
effect on either the extremeness of the participants’ ratings or their confidence. 
Overall, the data analysis showed that the behavioural responses of individuals 
favour impression making more than neutral information about personality traits, 
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and that neutral facial stimuli do not significantly enhance participants’ 
confidence or the extremeness of the judgements.  
This result provides little support to previous empirical evidence about 
the influence of facial stimuli in the process of impression making and 
categorisation. Nevertheless, it brings some contributions in relation to the 
finding that impression making is greatly influenced by behavioural information 
and that the sight of a neutral facial stimulus does not add much to it. Likewise, 
behavioural information becomes more relevant than neutral information about 
the attitudes, likes, and personality traits of a target individual. This study leaves 
some open questions and loose ends in the understanding of categorisation 
processes. For instance, the gender factor was not taken into account, and the 
fact that a female target person was associated to the neutral scenario while a 
male target person was associated to the behavioural scenario may have favoured 
some gender bias.  
Also, a possible limitation in the results would be the decision not to 
counterbalance the order of the stories. However, I did not expect order of 
presentation to have an effect. This represents a first investigation into the effect 
of faces and behavioural information on personality perception. In the case that 
an effect had been observed, order of presentation and gender would have 
required to be disentangled. Further research could be carried out in order to 
overcome limitations of the results. For example, a range of photos matching the 
different scenarios could be introduced. Another aspect to be considered would 
be the order of presentation of the stories and different versions of the 
questionnaire could be produced in order to reverse the order of presentation of 
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the stories. By introducing these changes, the likelihood for the results to 
generalise would increase. 
Future work could try to overcome this limit by creating two conditions 
in which the presentation of the two variables is inverted. Also, the neutral faces 
used in the study did not provide much information about the emotional state of 
the target person. The presentation of a face showing an emotional state could 
possibly produce more extreme response although this aspect would go beyond 
the purpose of this study, whose intention was in fact to draw a more real picture 
of a target person through the presentation of his/her face. 
Also, no direct evaluation of the hypothesised similarities between 
person construal and essentialist beliefs has been carried out. My opinion is that 
more research needs to be undertaken before the link between social construal 
and psychological essentialism is more clearly understood, and their mutual 
influence is evaluated.  
- 278 - 
6.9. Appendix 
 
Story 1 
Mary shares her house with 
two cats and a dog and during her free 
time she does some gardening. Mary 
is 30 and she works as a cook in a 
restaurant. At work, she supervises 
some trainees in her specialties, which 
are the starters and Italian food in 
general. Mary has a big passion for 
motorbikes and she has owned one 
since she was twenty. 
 
 
Table 6.1. Story 1, neutral scenario with photograph, condition 1 
 
 
 
Story 2 
Michael is on a coffee break 
when he meets a colleague of his and 
they start having a chat. After a little 
while his colleague admits that he has 
not submitted his paperwork from the 
previous week yet. Michael is very 
annoyed to learn that since this delay 
could affect the evaluation of his work 
and he shouts at him. When they leave 
the café they walk apart from each 
other and go back to their duties. In 
the afternoon Michael works till late 
in order to finish his colleague’s 
paperwork. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2. Story 2, behavioural scenario with photograph, condition  
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Scale of personality traits and participant’s confidence -- Part 1 
Please rate Michael’s personality by 
placing a check mark on the 
appropriate number from 1 to 7 for 
each of the personality scales listed 
below 
Please indicate how confident you are 
in judging Michael’s personality traits 
as listed on the left by placing a check 
mark on the appropriate number from 1 
to 7 
Michael is 
Shy                                 Friendly 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Trustworthy                  Unreliable 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Despotic                            Compliant 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Entertaining                          Boring 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Altruistic                      Selfish 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Open-minded              Close-minded 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Persistent                      Flagging 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Optimistic                  Pessimistic 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Realistic                           Naïve 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Self-confident                  Unsecure 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
 
Table 6.3. Scale of personality traits and participant’s confidence, story 2. The 
scale for story 1 had the same wording with the exception of the name, which 
was Mary instead of Michael 
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Scale of personality traits and participant’s confidence -- Part 2 
Please rate Michael’s personality by 
placing a check mark on the 
appropriate number from 1 to 7 for 
each of the personality scales listed 
below 
Please indicate how confident you are 
in judging Michael’s personality traits 
as listed on the left by placing a check 
mark on the appropriate number from 1 
to 7 
  
Michael is 
Sympathetic                Unsympathetic 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Adventurous             Conventional 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Creative                    Uncreative 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael has 
High goals                    Low goals 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Innovative                 Conservative 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Patient                     Impatient 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Punctual                           Late 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Tough                           Soft 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Imaginative             Unimaginative 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
Michael is 
Ambitious                   Fulfilled 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
I am 
Very confident       Not very confident 
1---2---3---4---5---6---7 
 
Table 6.4. Scale of personality traits and participant’s confidence, story 2. The 
scale for story 1 had the same wording with the exception of the name, which 
was Mary instead of Michael 
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List of personality traits as in the questionnaire 
NEUROTICISM 
Despotic/Compliant 
Patient/Impatient 
Self-confident/Unsecure 
Optimistic/Pessimistic 
AGREEABLENESS 
Trustworthy/Unreliable 
Altruistic/Selfish 
Tough/Soft 
Sympathetic/Unsympathetic 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 
Persistent/Flagging 
Punctual/Late 
Ambitious/Fulfilled 
High goals/Low goals 
OPENNESS 
Creative/Uncreative 
Open-minded/Close-minded 
Imaginative/Unimaginative 
Realistic/Naïve 
EXTRAVERSION 
Shy/Friendly 
Entertaining/Boring 
Innovative/Conservative 
Adventurous/Conventional 
 
Table 6.5. List of personality traits according to the Five-Factor Model (John & 
Srivastava, 1999) 
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The psychological debate about essentialism has deepened in the past 
fifteen years favouring a wealth of investigations and new knowledge in the 
field. Among other features, the debate has ranged from the contexts in which 
essentialism is observed (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Medin, 1989), to the reasons why 
it occurs (e.g., Gelman, 2003), and to the elements of which it is composed 
(Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006; Haslam et al., 2000; 2002). My doctoral 
thesis has focused on a number of aspects related to essentialism and essentialist 
beliefs, and aims to answer some questions for which little explanation was 
provided by previous work.  
First, my doctoral research investigated a number of factors that may 
influence essentialist beliefs, like cultural contexts and personal category 
membership. According to the literature there are some elements -- like people’s 
perception of the world and their behaviour -- that are shaped by the social 
groups individuals belong to (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). This concept is 
double-faceted and is shared between lay-people -- who think that social groups 
own deep properties that define their true nature (Demoulin et al. 2006) -- and 
researchers -- who highlight the fundamental role of group membership for 
survival (Castano & Dechesne, 2005), cognitive (Caporael, 2005; Dunbar & 
Shultz, 2007), emotional (Correll & Park, 2005), and identification needs 
(Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). 
Second, a further purpose of this work was to build an economical 
measurement of essentialist beliefs that could be employed in the study of social 
categories and personality traits. Among the several measurements of 
essentialism, the questionnaire by Haslam et al. (2000) measuring essentialist 
beliefs about social categories obtained important results at revealing the 
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mechanisms implied in psychological essentialism. These results provided the 
theoretical and empirical background upon which the first two investigations of 
this thesis built, and a solid ground for Study 3. In particular, evidence was 
produced about the two dimensions of Natural Kind and Entitativity, later 
supported by Study 1 and 2 of this thesis. This finding led to the design of an 
essentialist beliefs scale that utilised four measures of essentialism only, with 
two sets of measures representing either Natural Kind or Entitativity. 
Third, my doctoral work explored whether individual differences occur 
in the way social categories are essentialised, and whether it would be 
meaningful to talk about personal styles of essentialism. The theoretical 
framework within which this hypothesis was elaborated was the empirical 
evidence provided by former work about individual differences in the way 
people solve problems and interact with social partners (see Klein & Schlesinger, 
1951). Some complementary work carried out in the field of autism revealed that 
normally developing subjects differ from individuals suffering from the autism 
spectrum disorder in both their cognitive and social style (Happé, 1999; Happé 
& Frith, 2006). Hence, the second investigation of Study 3 tested a sample of 
subjects affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder with the expectation that they 
would show more extreme essentialist beliefs either on one or the other side.  
Finally, this doctoral work explored some variables that could influence 
the process of social categorisation, such as a facial stimulus and verbal 
information about a target person. The hypothesis was that visual and 
behavioural information would increase extremeness of the judgements and 
confidence ratings. Also, a link between the mechanisms involved in person 
construal and psychological essentialism was hypothesised. In reviewing the 
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literature, little data was found on the association between social categorisation 
and essentialist beliefs, and Study 4 aimed to fill this gap. 
The next part of this chapter will discuss the findings of each study in the 
same order followed in the thesis, from Study 1 to Study 4, and will link the 
findings of the studies for a broader discussion where relevant.  
7.1 Essentialist beliefs about social categories: an investigation into the 
effect of social context and category membership  
Study 1 set out to investigate essentialist beliefs about social categories 
in a multicultural sample of subjects. The study was a replication of a former 
study run by Haslam et al. (2000) that provided evidence for the occurrence of 
the two dimensions of Entitativity and Natural Kind as fundamental components 
of essentialist beliefs, and which individuated nine measures of psychological 
essentialism. Evidence for the interplay of Entitativity and Natural Kind in the 
structure of essentialist beliefs was provided, and the way individual categories 
are essentialised was revealed.  
According to Haslam et al. (2000), Natural Kind was composed of the 
five measures of Discreteness, Necessity, Immutability, Stability, and 
Naturalness, and Entitativity was composed of the four measures of Uniformity, 
Informativeness, Inherence, and Exclusivity. The analysis of the single items 
showed that among the categories associated to Entitativity are political groups 
(Liberal, and Republican), Diseases (Aids patients), Sexual Orientation 
(Homosexuals), and Religious Beliefs (Catholic), whereas the groups especially 
associated to Natural Kind are Gender (Female, and Male), Ethnicity (Asian), 
Physical Appearance (Tall, and Short), and Race (Black, and White).  
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Also, some within-domain discrepancies were observed for a few 
domains such as -- for instance -- Sexual Orientation, which had the category 
Heterosexual loading under Natural Kind and the category Homosexual loading 
under Entitativity. The same result was observed for Race, with Black people 
scoring higher on Entitativity than White people. Beside the two aspects above, 
Haslam et al. (2000) explored the perceived status of the forty social categories 
and observed that the attribution of high levels of Entitativity was correlated to a 
low category status, whereas the attribution of high levels of Natural-Kind-ness 
correlated to high category status. Thus, this aspect was interpreted as an 
indication that these categories are particularly prone to mechanisms such as 
stereotypes and prejudice.  
Haslam et al.’s (2000) study represented a breakthrough investigation in 
the field of essentialism, and favoured the beginning of a rich area of research. 
However, the study’s empirical design bore some weak points that may have 
affected the strength of the findings: the two main problems were the small 
sample size (N = 40) and the cultural set-up in which the study was run, 
described by the authors as traditional and conservative. These two aspects 
determined a reduced opportunity to generalise the findings to the whole 
population and to other cultures. Thus, Study 1 aimed to replicate the former 
study in a multicultural environment, and to test a broader number of subjects in 
order to provide further strength to previous results. Also, it aimed to see 
whether cultural contexts affect essentialist beliefs.  
During a pre-test stage a number of social categories representative of the 
cultural background in which the study was run were generated. The categories 
retained for the study showed great similarity with the ones tested in the former 
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study, with the exception that four domains of the former study were not 
represented in Study 1. The study was run on a wide sample (N = 123) of 
participants from either an English or an international background who 
completed the whole set of 36 categories.  
Interestingly, the results of Study 1 showed both similarities and 
differences with the former study. The first aspect that was observed in relation 
to the structure of essentialist beliefs was that the two-dimension structure was 
confirmed with strong empirical evidence. Also, the structure of the two 
dimensions appeared very similar to the one observed in the former study 
although not identical, with the main difference represented by the fact that 
Informativeness loaded negatively for Natural Kind rather than positively for 
Entitativity. Thus, the two dimensions were now respectively composed of 
Necessity, Discreteness, Immutability, Stability, and Naturalness for the Natural 
Kind dimension and of Inherence, Exclusivity, and Uniformity for Entitativity, 
whereas Informativeness loaded apart.  
Further analysis exploring the meaning of this result, and which 
categories scored high or low in Informativeness, was run on the Informativeness 
factor. In the analysis the Natural Kind scores were plotted against the 
Informativeness scores, showing that among the less informative categories 
appeared biological domains such as Race, Height, and Gender, whereas non-
biological categories such as Upper-Class, Liberal, and Believer rated 
particularly high on the measure. This result was interpreted in consideration of a 
cultural effect that would affect the perception of some social categories in 
relation to the social context perceivers belong to. Also, the analysis of the 
category scores for the remaining categories showed some important differences 
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from the former study, which were observed in particular for Race and Sexual 
Orientation: while Haslam et al. (2000) observed that Homosexual and Black 
people were rated under Entitativity and that Heterosexual and White were rated 
as natural, Study 1 did not find within-domain differences for those categories, 
which scored high in Natural-Kind-ness instead.  
An evaluation of the status of the categories above carried out by Haslam 
et al. (2000) showed that the entitative categories suffered from the attribution of 
a lower status. However, since Study 1 did not investigate this aspect, it was not 
possible to establish whether the status of these categories had improved. 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the shift that occurred from one dimension to 
the other testifies that a different perspective has been adopted by Study 1’s 
participants who associated a number of categories to biological (or natural) 
traits rather than to entitative ones. In my opinion, these results reflect the 
cultural background of the participants: the literature supports the hypothesis that 
traditional and mono-cultural backgrounds may produce less favourable attitudes 
towards minority groups due to a reduced opportunity to interact with other 
groups (e.g., Berry, 1984), which was also observed in the former study.  
On the other hand, a daily cross-cultural interaction and exposure to 
different cultures has been indicated as a favourable aspect in the acceptance of 
other social groups, and in a more positive disposition towards them (Fowers & 
Davidov, 2006). Additionally, elements such as social inclusion, equal 
opportunities policies, and anti-discrimination legislation could plausibly 
influence the way we see certain social groups (Rudiger & Spencer, 2003). This 
was the direction undertaken by the European Commission (2007) in the annual 
report on migration and integration, which recognises the importance of 
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immigration for European countries, and of the reciprocal relationship between 
the hosts and the migrants at adapting and opening to each other.  
Likewise, the importance for the majority group to play an active role 
that would go beyond tolerance has been supported by recent research (see 
Phelps et al., 2011). Such national management of minority ethnic groups -- that 
is being promoted in countries like Britain -- favours members of those groups to 
feel comfortable and integrated in the community, and minimises conflict 
between hosts and migrants (Berthoud et al., 1997; Heckmann & Schnapper, 
2003). I would like to suggest that the effect of an increased “naturalisation” of 
some minority groups in the eyes of the participants of Study 1 could reflect the 
employment of the inclusion policies adopted and promoted in London.  
This study has the merit to have highlighted differences in beliefs 
towards others-categories between two social contexts where minority groups 
are either devalued as in the case of Homosexuals and Blacks -- see Haslam et al. 
(2000) -- or “naturalised” in the same way own-categories are -- see Study 1. 
This perspective is encouraging and supports positions in favour of social 
inclusion policies as discussed above.  
7.2 Essentialist Beliefs about Social Categories: a comparison study in 
Sardinia  
Study 1 provided some insightful material concerning cultural 
differences in the way individuals essentialise social categories, which 
represented one of the most striking observations to emerge from the comparison 
with the former study. In light of this result, the investigation of cultural 
differences appeared a rich seam to mine. In particular, the large sample of Study 
1 provided a wealth of data in support of the findings. As previously argued, the 
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former study did not benefit from such strong empirical evidence and this made 
the extent of the differences between the two studies unclear. Certainly, further 
investigation in traditional settings would have clarified these doubts in more 
depth. 
The chosen set up for Study 2 was the cultural context of Sardinia that 
offered an ideal setting thanks to its monocultural society and to a strong 
connection of its population with the ancient traditions and values of the land, 
and also to a strong identification of its population with the ingroup (Sardinians) 
rather than with the outgroup (Italians). In particular, the Sardinian context 
appeared suitable at providing information about how the population see 
minority groups, which in the study were represented by categories such as 
Chinese, Homosexuals, and Blacks, and at showing whether the structure of 
essentialist beliefs would have been more similar to the former study or to Study 
1. Although Sardinians tend to identify themselves as Sardinians rather than 
Italians, the chosen category for the Nationality domain was Italian. This 
decision was made in order to keep Study 2 similar to Study 1, and also since the 
category Sardinian was not included, the category Italian would have 
automatically activated the own-categories domain.  
The data analysis strongly confirmed the occurrence of a two-factor 
explanation, and a composition of the two factors that was identical to Haslam et 
al. (2000): Natural Kind included Naturalness, Immutability, Stability, 
Necessity, and Discreteness, whereas Entitativity included Uniformity, 
Exclusivity, Inherence, and Informativeness. Nonetheless, while the structure of 
the two dimensions was similar to the former study, the way single categories 
were rated resembled more to Study 1. For instance, domains such as Race and 
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Sexual Orientation did not show within-domain differences and obtained high 
scores for the Natural Kind factor, and also minority groups such as Chinese 
were rated high in naturalness.  
This result was very meaningful at revealing cultural influences in 
essentialist beliefs, although difficult to interpret. In fact, unexpectedly the single 
category scores were more similar between the traditional and multicultural 
samples of Study 1 and 2, than between the two traditional samples of Haslam et 
al. (2000) and Study 2. This result could involve a number of different aspects: 
on the one hand I believe that the fact that the former study was run a decade 
before its replication has to be taken into consideration: the present era 
propounds matters such as racial integration, acceptance of sexual diversity, and 
a vision of life-threatening diseases in a different fashion than ten years ago, and 
fast changes have happened even in traditional societies. Furthermore, as 
previously discussed, the small sample size of Haslam et al.’ s (2000) study may 
have influenced the results and a broader sample would have certainly provided 
a more reliable yardstick.  
Also, both Study 1 and 2 were run in a European context: despite 
previous work highlighting similarities in the cognitive style adopted by 
individuals from Anglophone cultures and differences between Anglophone and 
Mediterranean cultures (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 1993), there may be a 
common ground and values that guide the perception of social groups and that is 
shared among the European cultures. As argued by Risse (2003), although 
Europe still lacks Entitativity due to its fuzzy boundaries, from the advent of the 
Euro the status of the European continent clearly emerged as a collectivity of 
political, social, and cultural identities that unify European citizens. Thus, this 
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common ground may result in similarities in certain beliefs and attitudes shared 
among Europeans.  
Beside the investigation of the structure of essentialist beliefs about 
social categories, Study 1 and 2 explored the influence of personal category 
membership in essentialist beliefs about own-categories (categories an individual 
belongs to) and others-categories (categories an individual does not belong to). 
The literature shows that higher responsiveness towards own categories is 
automatic (Bastian, Loughnan, & Koval, 2011) and that individuals tend to 
attribute to themselves the essences of the categories they belong to (Leyens et 
al., 2000), which suggests that own categories benefit from the activation of 
prompter and more positive attitudes towards them.  
In consideration of these positions, my hypothesis was that own-
categories would have been rated higher in essentialism than others-categories. 
The data analysis showed that, although the effects were small for most of the 
scales, the findings provided support for the hypothesis and own categories were 
more essentialised than other categories with high consistency across all 
categories. In particular, this aspect was observed for the Natural Kind factor in 
both Study 1 and 2 (with the exception of Stability and Necessity for Study 2), 
but not for the Entitativity factor, where no scales were significant in either of 
the studies indicating that own-categories are not attributed an increased 
Entitativity.  
This result indicates that the categories people identify with are seen as 
more natural, immutable over time, and discrete, whereas the same categories are 
not attributed those characteristics by people who do not identify with those 
categories. The process of naturalisation of own-categories has been discussed in 
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Chapter 3 in relation to the positions of some researchers (see Haslam et al., 
2000) that linked naturalisation to the attribution of a higher status. This point 
suggests that membership to some social groups may lead to a vision of them as 
natural and thus be defined by Discreteness, Immutability, and Naturalness 
rather than by entitative features. On the other hand, categories that are not seen 
as biological (e.g., Upper-Class) are described through entitative elements such 
as Inherence, Exclusivity, Uniformity, and Informativeness. It is interesting to 
note the emergence of a link between Study 1 and 2 in the treatment of own 
categories and minority groups, which were both naturalised. The reasons behind 
this mechanism are not clear and I would indicate this aspect as an interesting 
question for future research. 
Analysis of this aspect recalls the concept of Entitativity as formulated 
by Campbell (1958): “Entitativity is the degree of having the nature of a real 
entity, of having real existence” (p. 17). Moreover, Entitativity reflects the 
perception of an entity whose homogeneity and cohesiveness trigger a process 
similar to the one that develops when a person faces another individual 
(Hamilton, Sherman, & Castelli, 2002). A likely reflection upon these positions 
is that groups that own these characteristics are seen as more distant from the 
ingroup. This perception of distance may explain why social groups that are seen 
as biological categories are likened to own categories. In fact, for biological 
categories the perception is not of cohesiveness and exclusivity but of closer 
resemblance to the categories an individual knows well, like own-categories. On 
the contrary, groups that are neither associated to biological kinds (Social Class, 
Political and Religious Groupss) nor express membership are seen as more 
distant and inherent.  
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On the other hand, it is meaningful to recall the position of Yzerbyt et al. 
(1997) about the attribution of essences to social categories as a fundamental 
error for which they are likened to natural kinds. This mechanism is not observed 
in groups whose principle features are instead similarity (e.g., homogeneity) and 
organisation (e.g., common goals), and which are linked to Entitativity. The 
positions above are consistent with Haslam et al. (2000) and with the account 
advanced by Rothbart and Taylor (1992) of high levels of inductive potential and 
inalterability as the core features of Natural Kind entities (among which they 
mentioned Race and Physical Appearance) and low levels of these features as an 
indicator of Entitativity (among which are Political Groups).  
The approach for the investigation of essentialist beliefs adopted in the 
first two studies deepened understanding of aspects that had already been 
evaluated by former research, but that required further investigation. In 
particular, group membership was previously explored by Demoulin, Leyens, 
and Yzerbyt (2006) as part of their work on forced social categories (FSC) and 
chosen social categories (CSC), although without significant results. One of the 
most noteworthy contributions to consider in the results of Study 1 and 2 is the 
provision of evidence about a tendency to naturalise one’s own categories with 
high consistency for all categories. Likewise, it was observed that minority 
groups received a similar treatment. Clearly this finding indicates that the 
naturalisation of certain categories represents an influential factor in the 
understanding of essentialism towards some kinds of categories.  
It is interesting to note that in Study 2 emerged a tendency to treat the 
ethnicity outgroup (Chinese) as more “natural” than the ingroup (Italian), which 
was interpreted in the light of some previous theoretical positions (e.g., 
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Demoulin, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 2006) suggesting that both Entitativity and 
Natural-Kind-ness contribute to high levels of essentialism. A similar 
mechanism in relation to the naturalisation of own-categories was observed in 
investigation 2 of Study 1 and 2.  
However, the analysis of the demographics revealed some important 
details that require attention: in Study 2 the number of Italian participants was 84 
out of 87 (the remaining three people indicated themselves as Sardinians) of 
which 28 people identified as such, and in Study 1 the number of participants 
from either a British or an English background was 81 people of which 22 
people identify themselves as such. However, while in Study 2 the percentage of 
Chinese participants was equal to zero, in Study 1 among the 34 Asian 
participants 27 self-identified as such. Thus, the percentage of Asian identifiers 
considerably overcame the percentage of British identifiers. This aspect offers 
some ground for discussion, and may suggest that being Asian for Asian 
identifiers represents an important factor in the perception of the self and may 
reveal the necessity to maintain this identity along with the newly adopted 
identity of English citizen and English native speaker.  
Nevertheless, the investigation about own-categories revealed an 
opposite tendency from the attribution of higher naturalness to the ethnicity 
outgroup, which determined own categories to be “naturalised” more. Thus, if on 
the one side the ethnicity outgroup rated higher in Natural-Kind-ness and the 
ingroup rated higher in Entitativity, the opposite tendency was shown in the 
investigation about own-categories. However, the fact that Sardinian people 
identify themselves as Sardinians (ingroup) rather than Italians (outgroup) may 
influence the way the category Italian was essentialised: the attribution of higher 
- 298 - 
levels of Entitativity to this group could reflect the fact that membership in this 
category is not entirely perceived as own-category. In fact, although Sardinians 
are and feel Italian, membership to the “Sardinian” group is strongly felt and 
overcomes the category “Italian”. This point is to be considered as a weakness in 
the overall findings, which future research should seek to explore in more depth. 
A further contribution brought by the present research is the result about 
the influence of cultural factors. Although this aspect had attracted previous 
attention (e.g., Lockhart et al., 2009, in the field of Psychological Essentialism; 
and Miller, 1984, in the field of Social Psychology), I think that further 
exploration of this issue would uncover interesting material. Miller regarded 
cultural influences as an independent variable to be considered independently 
from subjective and objective factors (Miller, 1984; p. 961). My suggestion is 
that these components (subjective factors, objective experiences, and cultural 
elements) all converge in the essentialism process and guide dispositions and 
beliefs towards the target categories.  
7.3 Individual styles of essentialism  
The analysis of the data of Study 1 revealed the occurrence of individual 
styles at essentialising social categories, and suggested the opportunity to 
measure individual essentialism through a specific scale. The support of Haslam 
et al.’ s (2000) findings brought by Study 1 suggested that some random 
measures of Natural Kind and Entitativity could be reliably used in the design of 
the new scale, for which two pairs of measures taken from the former 
questionnaire were used. Despite the reassuring results about personal styles in 
essentialist beliefs, the questionnaire failed to validate an underlying construct 
for half of the domains tested (personality traits and intelligence), only providing 
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evidence for the presence of an underlying construct for the analysis by scales. In 
fact, good reliability was shown by most scales in the analysis by scale and by 
the social class scale in the analysis by domain. Thus, although some 
significance was provided, the results should be interpreted carefully.  
A number of limitations to Study 3 should be mentioned. One of these 
limitations concerns the design of the study, and the questionnaire items in 
particular. Given the poor significance shown by some of them, it would be good 
to make the items go through further testing in order to increase their reliability 
for a better measurement of essentialist beliefs. The weakness of the items -- 
although not observed during the pre-test stage -- was highlighted by a deep 
analysis of reliability in the analysis by scale. There, similar values of Cronbach 
α were observed with items selected at random. Likewise, the investigation with 
the Autism Spectrum Disorder sample revealed a weak effect in relation to an 
increased extremeness of essentialism, showing little difference with the sample 
of normally developing subjects. Unexpectedly, the results of Study 3 failed to 
support the hypotheses for both investigations. I suggest that an improved design 
of the questionnaire and of its items could improve its overall reliability and be 
the focus for future work. 
7.4 Categorisation of personality traits: an investigation into the role of verbal 
and visual information 
The purpose of Study 4 was to explore the role of some of the 
mechanisms that come into play in social categorisation and that lead to 
essentialist beliefs about an individual’s personality traits. The mechanisms 
considered by the investigation were neutral facial stimuli and information about 
a target individual, either behavioural or neutral. The weight of both verbal and 
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visual information has been widely discussed and recognised by researchers (see 
Macrae & Bodenhausen; 2000; Macrae et al., 2005; Tarr & Gauthier, 2000; 
Townsend et al., 2000), and Study 4 looked at which of these variables play a 
stronger effect. The analysis considered both the extremeness of the scores and 
the ratings of self-confidence since they would be indicators of strong 
judgments, and revealed that the factor that has a stronger effect in social 
categorisation is behavioural information. As predicted, behavioural information 
produced stronger ratings than visual information of neutral stimuli, which 
showed little effect.  
7.1. Gender differences in essentialist beliefs 
An interesting question relates to the possibility of age and gender 
differences in essentialism. I looked at gender differences in the degree of 
essentialising based on average ratings across categories in Study 1, and there 
were neither significant differences on any of the nine scales, nor on factor 
scores derived from the PCA. In all cases t (121) < 1. Overall, this thesis was not 
designed to look for such differences. Study 1 and 2 had a gender imbalance, 
with roughly 2/3 of participants who were females in both studies. Also, the 
sample size was not large enough to allow separate analysis of correlations for 
males and females within the sample. Gender and age were not recorded for 
Study 3 and Study 4. Similarly, given the distribution of ages in the samples, it 
was not possible to break data down by age but the practise in the literature on 
essentialising appears to be ignore age and gender effects.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The empirical work conducted for this thesis was organised as a series of 
consecutive investigations that built upon the findings of each other, and a 
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common thread linked the experiments. The first stage of the research was 
represented by Study 1 and 2, which furnished some important material about a) 
the structure of essentialist beliefs, b) cultural differences in the way categories 
are essentialised, c) the role of personal category membership in essentialist 
beliefs, and d) the occurrence of individual styles in psychological essentialism. 
The finding about individual styles provided a solid ground for Study 3, which 
tested a scale of essentialist beliefs on two samples of subjects. Finally, Study 4 
considered the impact of visual and verbal stimuli in the categorisation of 
individuals, distinguishing between behavioural and neutral information, and 
explored the perceived confidence of participants at categorising a target 
individual’s personality traits under these three different conditions.  
Overall, the present research programme provides an important 
understanding of essentialism from a broad perspective which considers the role 
of several aspects, from cultural factors, to category membership, and individual 
aspects in the way categories are seen. Also, factors that are external to an 
individual’s will, like the presentation of some behavioural information about 
other individuals, strongly influence the perception of social categories or, more 
precisely, of individuals. Additionally, the present research raises important 
implications for the approach of essentialism, whose understanding should 
consider the interplay of subjective, objective, and contextual variables.  
Future directions of research on psychological essentialism  
The present thesis aimed to embrace psychological essentialism from a 
broader perspective than previous approaches. Essentialism still represents a 
recent trend of research in psychology that covers the last fifteen years in terms 
of systematic investigations. Thus, despite the effort made by its many 
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researchers, some of its domains still benefit from little investigation. My thesis 
wanted to address a number of questions to which little attention had been paid, 
and also wanted to give a glance into the width of the essentialism phenomenon. 
Several are the possible paths that future investigation can pursue.  
One of the most interesting aspects that this doctoral work has found is 
the effect of social contexts at determining the attribution of essences to others. 
A number of factors have been observed to be affected by cultural contexts, and 
Study 1 and 2 especially stressed on those related to the perception of single 
categories and to the structure of essentialist beliefs in terms of how the Natural 
Kind and Entitativity dimensions are composed. While this aspect has now 
received strong support by the empirical investigation carried out for this thesis, 
a comprehensive explanation of why these differences occur is still somehow 
missing. Future research could address this aspect and provide further insight 
into the understanding of the mechanisms that made subjects from traditional 
settings judge single categories similarly to subjects from multicultural settings, 
but produce a structure of essentialist beliefs that was different from them.  
The fact that some results were similar across similar cultural contexts 
while others changed, suggests that cultural contexts produce a multifaceted 
range of factors other than just saying that there are some fixed shifts of beliefs 
in individuals from traditional or modern cultures. Future research could analyse 
these mechanisms in more depth and bring new knowledge for the prevention of 
devaluing mechanisms towards minority groups, and for the making of a fairer 
society.  
Another direction of research could be the analysis of different styles of 
essentialism across different group of subjects. Although not significant, the 
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trend shown by the investigation run with a sample of subjects affected by 
Autism Spectrum Disorder suggested that by improving the measurement scale 
and by sampling a broader number of subjects, different styles may be observed 
across different subjects. Thus, I would advice future researchers to improve the 
Four-Essentialism-Measure Scale, and in particular to run further testing on the 
items of the questionnaire in order to make them a strong measure of essentialist 
beliefs. This should support future work on the nature of the differences 
mentioned above. 
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